Deferred payment option as a ‘promotional offer’: CJEU in bonprix (C-100/24)

In bonprix (Case C-100/24), the CJEU was asked to clarify the meaning of ‘promotional offers’ under Art. 6(c) of the E-commerce Directive. According to this provision, any such offers must clearly outline the conditions for eligibility. The disputed practice was an advertising message that bonprix, an online trading company, put on its website: ‘Convenient purchase on invoice’. It was contested that this message is misleading as it leaves out the fact that such a payment arrangement is subject to a prior assessment of the consumer’s creditworthiness. It is thus necessary to establish whether the message on bonprix’ website is a ‘promotional offer’ in the first place – a concept that is not directly defined under the Directive.

First, according to a literal interpretation, ‘promotional offers’ can include ‘any form of communication by which a provider seeks to promote goods or services to the recipient by giving him or her an advantage’ (para 24), which is still rather broad.

Second, according to a contextual interpretation, since Art. 6(c) of the E-commerce Directive included some illustrative examples such as ‘discounts, premiums and gifts’, for ‘reasons of consistency’, ‘promotional offers’ must have ‘the characteristics common to’ these examples (para 25). The CJEU outlined three such characteristics: the conferral of an advantage that is

1. objective, i.e. not left to ‘the subjective assessment of that recipient’ (para 26),
2.  certain, i.e. ‘does not depend on chance or selection’ (para 27, per the distinction between ‘promotional offers’ under Art. 6(c) and ‘promotional competitions and games’ under Art. 6(d)), and that is
3. ‘capable of influencing that recipient’s consumption behaviour’ (para 28).

In response to bonprix’ arguments, the CJEU added that ‘promotional offers’ are neither defined by ‘the existence of a substantial monetary advantage for its recipient’ nor by ‘its exceptional nature’ (paras 29-31). The form and extent of the advantage is ‘immaterial’ and may be ‘monetary, legal or mere convenience, such as to enable the recipient to gain time’ (para 32). In the context of the disputed practice, the CJEU highlighted some potential benefits of bonprix’ offer: the deferral of payment provides the consumer with ‘a cash advance’ and represents ‘a monetary advantage, albeit minimal’ (para 43); in the event of extinguishment of the contract due to withdrawal or termination, ‘the purchaser does not need to claim reimbursement of the price’ (para 44).

Third, according to a teleological interpretation, the CJEU confirmed that subjecting the disputed practice to Art. 6(c) of the E-commerce Directive can ‘contribute to a high level of consumer protection, without, however, entailing unreasonable economic burdens for service providers’ (para 34). By informing the consumer that the deferred payment option is subject to a creditworthiness test and thereby making the consumer realise that they may be refused the option, it ensures consumer protection ‘at all stages of contact between the provider and the recipient of a service’ (para 35). Finally, the CJEU also added that its interpretation of Art. 6(c) of the E-commerce Directive is fully compatible with the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (particularly its Art. 3(4) and its general prohibition of misleading practices) and the Consumer Rights Directive (particularly its Art. 6(8)).

The Court’s broad interpretation of ‘promotional offers’ should be welcomed as a positive move to strengthen consumer protection through information. It represents a more inclusive understanding of the factors that drive consumers’ purchase decisions, in particular convenience. Of course, it should also be borne in mind that the disputed practice in this case is in any event a ‘commercial practice’ within the scope of EU law.

On stowaway protection - AG Pitruzzella in Kanyeba (C-349/18 to C-351/18)

AG Pitruzzella published his opinion today in an usual referral asking for the interpretation of the provisions of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive as applicable to stowaways (travellers without a valid ticket). The odd-egg character of the Belgian case Kanyeba (joint cases C-349/18 to 351/18) concerns a possibility of there not being a consumer contract and the question of whether the UCTD could apply in administrative, non-contractual disputes.

There is a debate in Belgian law as to the character of the legal relationship between passengers who have not purchased a ticket for their journey and public transport providers. Some scholars argue that even if a traveller does not purchase a ticket, they enter into a contractual relationship with transport providers by walking into the 'travelers-only' zones (adhesion contracts). If this interpretation is followed, then when a stowaway is found and charged the price of the ticket plus any accompanying surcharges (increasing drastically if the ticket is not purchased at the moment of the ticket control), it would be possible to consider, e.g. whether the surcharges are based on fair terms and conditions, pursuant to the UCTD. Other scholars claim that it is a contractual relationship only when the traveller purchased a valid ticket for their journey. They recognise that in other cases a stowaway would not have had an opportunity to accept terms and conditions of the transport, and that the relationship would need to have been regulated by law rather than by contract. Interestingly, in the opinion the attention is drawn to the fact that in Belgian law the unfairness test may also be applied to either type of the legal relationship (para. 28). Regardless the answer as to the nature of the relationship between a stowaway and a transport provider, the UCTD might still apply in Belgium then.

AG Pitruzzella leaves it to national laws, and national courts, to determine the character of the legal relationship between stowaways and transport providers (paras. 40, 43). If the national law does not determine the matter, it is for the national court to establish. In the referred cases, it was clear that passengers had no intention of being bound by the transport contract, as they did not consent to its core conditions: the price (paras. 52-53). This should preclude the relationship as being determined as contractual, although AG Pitruzzella leaves the space for national courts to still do so (paras. 54-58). If the relationship is non-contractual, the UCTD normally would not apply (para. 60). This does not preclude Belgian law from extending the application of the UCTD to all relationships between consumers and traders, also non-contractual ones (para. 62).

We may find specific tips in the opinion of AG Pitruzzella on how to assess the unfairness of surcharges in such circumstances. Namely, as the unfairness test should consider all circumstances surrounding the conclusion of an agreement (or alternatively of the legal relationship between the parties), it seems crucial for national courts to balance private and public interests in stowaway cases. After all, surcharges are supposed to discourage illegal behaviour of a travel without a valid ticket and to protect traders' interests in easier enforcement of travel prices (paras. 63-64). If passengers consider such surcharges as being of a significant detriment to them and distorting the contractual balance, they could have protected themselves against them by a timely ticket purchase.

In the news

Some of the interesting reads we found in the news from last week:

Five misleading pricing tactics to avoid in sales (V. Crowe in Which?) - warns which pricing offers may be misleading considering the rulings of the UK's Advertising Standards Agency from last year

How Airbnb's Tech Is Impacting People's Fundamental Human Rights (L. Coulman in Forbes) - more specifically the right to housing

Blue Planet has "huge impact" on shopper behaviour, finds report (L. Wells in Talking Retail) - Waitrose study shows more sustainable behaviour patterns of consumers and what impacts them

The price of a cancelled flight - CJEU in Harms (C-601/17)

Today the CJEU published its judgment in the Harms case (C-601/17), in which it elaborated on the concept of the reimbursement of the ticket price for the cancelled flight, as mentioned in Article 7(3) and 8(1)(a) of the Regulation 261/2004.

In a given case the family Harms (parents with their four children) purchased flight tickets with an airline Vueling Airlines from an intermediary website of opodo.de. Mr Harms paid EUR 1108.88 to Opodo for the flights, whilst Opodo transferred EUR 1031.88 to Vueling Airlines. As the flight has been cancelled, the question arose as to the amount of money that the airlines had to compensate the family with: EUR 1108.88 (returning the full contractual performance of the passengers) or EUR 1031.88 (returning the airlines' unjust enrichment). It is the amount of EUR 77 that was paid for intermediary services that remains contested here.

Regulation 261/2004 uses the wording of the airlines having an obligation to reimburse passengers for the 'ticket' at the 'price at which it was bought', without determining its application only to direct ticket sales by the airlines (para 13). On the one hand, the objective of providing high levels of protection to air passengers requires that they are reimbursed fully, incl. the commission they paid to the intermediary for purchasing their flights. On the other hand, there is a need to balance passengers interests with these of the airlines, which leads the CJEU to set a limitation on the inclusion of the commission in the ticket's price: the air carrier had to have been aware of the commission that was set by the intermediary. 

The CJEU justifies the introduction of this limitation by referring to previous case law as well as other provisions of Regulation 261/2004, such as the definition of a 'ticket' in Article 2(f), which states that it is a document that has either been issued or authorised by an air carrier. This, pursuant to the CJEU, implies the need for knowledge of the air carrier of the elements of the ticket, incl. its price, and the components of this price. The national court will need to, therefore, inquire whether the air carrier had any knowledge of the commission that Opodo was charging for its services to air passengers. 

It seems safer to advise passengers to purchase their tickets directly from the airlines unless they have a travel insurance that could reimburse them for the amount charged by the intermediary or the intermediary offers such a reimbursement option in their T&Cs.

EU Commission cracks down on Airbnb to comply with EU consumer protection

On 16th July, the EU Commission published a press release calling on Airbnb to comply with EU consumer law, especially with regard to price transparency.

Airbnb's innovative sharing economy model has been very successful and has won a large part of the short term rental market; yet, that has not been without its share of controversy.

The press release focuses on the following issues:

1) Price transparency

The EU Commission points out that current Airbnb practices contravene the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive. More specifically, Airbnb should clarify on its platform whether the renter is a private person or a professional. As more and more traditional businesses, such as hotels, apartments and bed and breakfasts, are listed on Airbnb, consumers must be aware in a clear manner as to whether they are renting from a professional. If they do rent from a professional, the increased protection of EU consumer law applies.

Furthermore, Airbnb should present the total price for a rental on the initial search of the consumer, as at the moment, obligatory charges such as cleaning and service are added on in later steps, thus making it more difficult for consumers to compare offers.

2) Clarification or removal of unfair contract terms 

The terms and conditions of Airbnb should be amended in order not to create a significant imbalance between the parties. Also, the terms should be more transparent, presented in a clear and intelligible language in order to allow consumers to be better informed. However, even if the terms are presented in a more transparent manner, as they should, it does not ensure that consumers will be more likely to actually read them.

Some of the problematic terms highlighted in the press release include:

• that the company should not mislead consumers by going to a court in a country different from the one in their Member State of residence;
• Airbnb cannot decide unilaterally and without justification which terms may remain in effect in case of termination of a contract;
• Airbnb cannot deprive consumers from their basic legal rights to sue a host in case of personal harm or other damages;
• Airbnb cannot unilaterally change the terms and conditions without clearly informing consumers in advance and without giving them the possibility to cancel the contract.

Finally, in terms of redress, Airbnb should comply with art. 14(1) of  Regulation 524/2013 (the ODR Regulation) to display the link to the ODR platform. However, traders are not obliged to participate in the ODR platform scheme.

Now the ball is in the court of Airbnb, who has a deadline until the end of August to submit solutions to the Commission on how they intend to comply with EU consumer law. These suggestions will be discussed in a meeting between the Commission and the national authorities in September, and should they be found to be unsatisfactory, national authorities will use their enforcement powers.

It will be interesting to see how this story develops and whether this is the start of a new more consumer-friendly sharing economy.

Pricing of flights - CJEU in Air Berlin (C-290/16)

CJEU issued a judgment today in the area of air travel, following on its previous decisions in cases ebookers.com (see our post here) and Vueling Airlines (see our post here). The judgment Air Berlin (C-290/16) first clarifies that airlines are obliged to indicate to air passengers prices of taxes, airport charges and other fees and surcharges separately from the price of the air fare. Air Berlin was shown to have had indicated as the price component of the final price a tax amount that had been much lower than the taxes the airline had to pay in reality. This could be misleading for consumers, as the remaining amount of the tax would be added to the final price, and could be seen as part of the air fare. The CJEU perceives Article 23(1) and (3) of the Regulation 1008/2008 on common rules for the operation of air services in the Community as requiring such a separate indication of air fares from taxes etc., in order to guarantee price transparency.

Furthermore, the CJEU in this judgment confirms that the Unfair Contract Terms Directive is also applicable to the area of air travel. The German consumer organisation argued that the flat-rate handling fee of 25 Euro that was charged by the airline also in cases when the passenger did not take the flight or cancelled their booking was clearly detrimental and could be considered unfair. The airline objected to this assessment by invoking the pricing freedom of air services in the EU. While the principle of pricing freedom indeed applies in this area, that does not mean, pursuant to the CJEU, that terms of contracts of carriage by air could be excluded from the unfairness control.

The EU is a step closer to regulating financial benchmarks

Yesterday (28 April 2016) the EU Parliament approved by large majority the adoption of the proposed Regulation on financial benchmarks. The decision follows the political agreement reached by the Parliament and the Council in November 2015.

A benchmark is an index or indicator, calculated from a representative set of underlying data that is used as a reference price for financial instruments, financial contracts or to measure the performance of an investment fund. Well known examples of benchmarks are the LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate) and the EURIBOR (Euro Interbank Offered Rate). The EU Commission proposed the regulation of financial benchmarks in 2013, in the wake of the LIBOR-fixing scandal that shred light on shortcoming in the benchmark setting process and in the use of benchmarks.

The proposal has a significant consumer protection dimension, given that for example LIBOR is used for determining the price of mortgages and other consumer loans. The proposal aims to close the door for manipulation by subjecting benchmark administrators to prior authorization and on-going supervision; improving the governance of benchmark administrators (e.g. conflict of interest); requiring transparency in the benchmark setting process; and by ensuring supervision of critical benchmarks such as the EURIBOR and LIBOR.

The proposal now needs to be approved by the EU Council.