Banks prevented from manipulating reimbursements following early credit repayment - CJEU in Lexitor (C-383/18)

Today the CJEU issued a judgment in the case Lexitor (C-383/18). As we have presented the facts of this case before, we refer the readers to our description of the AG Hogan's opinion first - Early birds and credit costs' repayment... here. 

Article 16 Directive 2008/48 (Consumer Credit Directive, CCD) states that 'The consumer shall be entitled at any time to discharge fully or partially his obligations under a credit agreement. In such cases, he shall be entitled to a reduction in the total cost of the credit, such reduction consisting of the interest and the costs for the remaining duration of the contract'.

The dispute pertained to the interpretation of the last part of this provision ('reduction consisting of the interest and the costs for the remaining duration of the contract'), namely, whether it allowed for the compensation in case of an early repayment of the credit of fees and charges placed on the consumer by the credit institution but unrelated to the duration of the credit agreement (para. 21). The CJEU believes that is indeed the case based on the purposive approach to CCD provisions. Art. 16 CCD replaced previously binding Art. 8 of Directive 87/102 (old Consumer Credit Directive), which referred to the consumer's right to 'an equitable reduction in the total cost of the credit'. Art. 16 CCD intended to make the general right of 'an equitable reduction' more precise by adding that this reduction would pertain to both interest and costs (paras. 27-28). The total cost of the credit as defined in Art. 3(g) CCD encompasses all fees and charges, with the only exception of public notary costs. The total cost of the credit includes, therefore, also fees and charges that are unrelated to the duration of the credit agreement (para. 23). The general objective of the CCD is to ensure a high level of consumer protection (para. 29), which aim would be endangered if during an early repayment the consumer could only be entitled to the reduction of costs presented by the credit provider as dependant on the duration of the credit agreement. It is, after all, the credit provider that unilaterally determines the fees and charges, and their amount, which could facilitate the credit provider choosing to limit fees and charges related to the duration of the agreement (paras. 31-32). The credit provider's interests are protected during the early repayment of the credit by Art. 16(2) and (4) CCD, which allow the credit provider to deduct costs related to the early repayment and for the Member States to set rules on ensuring the fit of the early repayment with the particular credit terms (para. 34).

All in all, this is the positive judgment for consumers, as they can be assured that the early repayment would entail a fair reduction in the total cost of the credit, which could not be manipulated by the banks by arbitrary setting of special, one-off fees and charges.

Unfairness assessment of variable interest rates - AG Szpunar in Gómez del Moral Guasch (C-125/18)

Facts of the case

In 2001 M. Gómez del Moral Guasch concluded a mortgage loan contract, with a variable interest rate, with a Spanish bank in order to purchase a residential apartment. In 2017 the consumer contested the fairness of a term in that contract that determines the mechanism of calculating the variable interest rate - based on the Spanish IRPH index. The consumer claimed that it is unfair that the interest rate is not indexed pursuant to EURIBOR index, which would have been more beneficial to him and is more commonly applied to Spanish mortgage contracts (in ca 90% of all contracts - para. 30). 

The IRPH index used in this loan contract was one of six IRPH indexes that have been adopted by the Spanish government. In 2011 it has been replaced - automatically - by a new IRPH index, also determined by the Spanish government. In a judgment of 14 December 2017 the Spanish Supreme Court declared, in a similar to this case, that if the IRH index is adopted as such in loan contracts it should not be subject to the unfairness or the transparency test from the UCTD, as it reflects a mandatory statutory provision (para. 53). The Supreme Court further decided that a contractual term based on IRPH index, which was drafted similarly to the one used in the case referred to the CJEU, was transparent, both formally and materially. Formally it was transparent as it was placed in the contract in a grammatically clear way, it was comprehensible and allowed consumers to understand and accept the fact that the variable interest rate will be calculated on the basis of an index controlled by the Spanish central bank. Materially it was transparent as it allowed average consumers to calculate the costs of concluding the agreement and it could not be required from banks to propose differently indexed loan agreements and explain how various indexes have been set up (para. 54).

Opinion

Scope of application of UCTD to terms that reflect national mandatory statutory provisions

First, AG Szpunar reasonably differentiates between evaluating the unfairness of an index rate that has been set out in national statutory provisions and a contractual term that foresees the use of such an index rate in calculating the variable interest rate of a loan contract (para. 59). Then he proceeds to consider whether the exception of Art. 1(2) UCTD should be applicable in this case, i.e. whether the contractual term reflects both a mandatory and a statutory provision of national law. His analysis leads to the conclusion that the mandatory character of the provision regulating the IRPH index is missing, which leaves it possible to subject a term reflecting it to the unfairness test of the UCTD. This conclusion is based on the fact that at the moment of the conclusion of the contract Spanish banks could choose whether to apply the IRPH index or another index that would fulfill the same conditions (e.g. EURIBOR index) (para. 78, 83). Therefore, as the exception from the scope of application of the UCTD should be strictly interpreted and applied only to situations where parties' freedom of choice is taken away, it cannot be said that the use of this index had a mandatory character (para. 82). 

Side note: It is irrelevant that subsequently, in 2011 the IRPH index used in the contract has been automatically substituted by a different IRPH index (here the freedom of choice of parties was eliminated, therefore, we could determine its mandatory character), as the unfairness should be assessed considering the facts of the case at the moment of the conclusion of the contract (para. 64).

Transparency

- of core terms

Whilst implementing the UCTD the Spanish legislator chose not to apply the exception for the application of the Directive to core terms of a contract (Art. 4 UCTD). This leads to an interesting conundrum in this case. Namely, whether Spanish courts could still refuse to assess the unfairness of a transparent core contract term, which is what Art. 4(2) UCTD stipulates, despite this provision not having been implemented in the Spanish legal order.

AG Szpunar rightly observes along the lines that: you cannot have the cake and eat it too. Principles of legal certainty and transparency require full transposition of provisions of directives that will then be applied in national legal systems (para. 93). In the previous CJEU judgment (Caja de Ahorres), it was decided that the Spanish legislator could have made a legislative choice, by not implementing Art. 4 UCTD, to submit also transparent core terms to the unfairness control, as this provides more consumer protection and the UCTD is a minimum harmonisation directive (para. 89). If, however, the Spanish legislator made a transposition mistake and actually intended to subject transparent core terms to the unfairness control, then, following the CJEU's judgment, we would have expected a change of the Spanish legislation. This has not occurred. Instead, the Spanish Supreme Court took upon themselves to clarify Spanish law as indeed not submitting transparent terms to the unfairness control. Such a judicial and not legislative clarification could be, however, perceived as in breach of the above-mentioned principles of legal certainty and transparency of EU law (para. 96). Therefore, Spanish courts may subject transparent core terms to the unfairness control (para. 100).

- what does it entail?

AG Szpunar reminds the previous CJEU case law referring to the principle of transparency as being fulfilled when an average consumer not only receives information that is grammatically correct but also that allows them to determine economic consequences of concluding a particular contract (paras. 106-108). In light of a given contractual term, he considers the term to definitely be grammatically clear and comprehensible in a way that it informs consumers as to what index will be applied to their variable interest rate and how the rounding-up of the interest will occur (para. 112). Does the term, however, sufficiently inform consumers about the economic consequences of the concluded loan agreement? AG Szpunar is inclined to believe that it may have done so, provided that the method of calculating the interest rate and its elements was clearly related to the applicable index rate, which has not only been fully defined, with a reference to appropriate legal rules establishing it, but also mentioned changes in the past values of that index (para. 125).

Side note 1: Here, AG Szpunar differentiates between the previous case law on transparency, which addressed transparency of loan contracts concluded in foreign currencies, and the given case on a loan with a variable interest rate. When a loan is concluded in a foreign currency, the mechanism of calculating the exchange rate may be very complex and there are potentially serious economic consequences following from non-understanding that mechanism and the fact that there is a future, uncertain risk related to its application. These potentially serious economic consequences shape the transparency requirements (paras. 115-118). In the given case, however, such a future, uncertain risk is not present, as the economic consequences of concluding a loan contract with a variable interest rate are more foreseeable (para. 119). This leads AG Szpunar to not see as necessary that bank warns consumers about the possibility of future changes to an index rate. However, by obliging banks to provide consumers with an indication of past changes to the index values, a possibility of future fluctuation should become clear, as well. Consequently, the difference in transparency requirements seems subtle.

Side note 2: AG Szpunar did not consider it necessary that the banks provide consumers with a separate information on the mathematical formula that allows to clearly follow the method of calculation of the index rate, as this information was publicly available (paras. 122-123). If, however, the information would have been difficult to access, we could possibly expect the information obligations of the banks being extended.

Full harmonisation of consumer credit rules re-explained - judgment in C-331/18 Pohotovosť

Last Thursday the Court of Justice delivered its judgment in C-331/18 Pohotovost’. The case forms part of the series of Slovak references concerning the interpretation of EU consumer law in the context of credit agreements. It is not to be mistaken with previous disputes involving the same creditor and focusing on Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms (especially C-470/12 Pohotovost' and C-168/15 Tomášová - see the relevant posts here and here). Rather, it revolves around disclosure duties laid down in Directive 2008/48/EC on consumer credit, and as such, presents a direct follow-up to the ruling in C-42/15 Home Credit Slovakia.

Facts of the case

The case involved a consumer who questioned his obligations under a credit contract, arguing that the creditor failed to comply with several disclosure duties set out in national rules implementing Directive 2008/48/EC. As we have learnt from Home Credit Slovakia, non-compliance with key disclosure duties may result in the credit being deemed as free of interests and charges - a sanction established among others by Slovak law, which the Court of Justice found to be compatible with EU law. 

Home Credit Slovakia, however, also addressed another important matter - the scope of disclosure duties which Member States can impose on the creditors in the first place. This part of Court's reasoning was not really surprising: the CJEU held that, due to the principle of full harmonisation, to which Directive 2008/48/EC is subject, Member States may not adopt information obligations which are not established in that act. In response to this ruling, the Slovak legislator decided to adjust the national act on consumer credit, among others by removing the duty to break down the payment of the credit in terms of the capital, interest and other charges. The consumer in the present case nevertheless sought to rely on precisely on that duty, arguing that, firstly, the legislative changes undertaken in response to Home Credit Slovakia were too far-reaching and, secondly, they could not be applied to him as the disputed agreement predated the legislative amendment. This faced the referring court with questions about the scope of disclosure duties in Consumer Credit Directive and the limits of its obligation to interpret national rules in conformity with EU law.

Judgment of the Court

The Court of Justice did not consider the dispute to be all that complicated and, in any case, did not find arguments to support the pro-consumer approach considered by the referring court. Firstly, no obligation to break down credit payment was found in Directive 2008/48/EC. As noted by the Court, Article 10(2)(h) refers merely to frequency of payments, Article 10(2)(i) to the right to receive an amortisation table, and Article 10(2)(j) to a statement showing the periods and conditions for the payment of the interest and associated charges, if charges and interest are to be paid without capital amortisation. As a result, the duty relied upon by the consumer in the main proceedings was precluded by the principle of full harmonisation. 

Secondly, the Court recalled that interpretation of EU rules provided in its judgments clarifies and defines the meaning and scope of these rules as they ought to be understood and applied from the time of their entry into force. It follows that a rule must be interpreted according to the CJEU judgment also when the legal relationship, to which it is applied, was established before that judgment. The referring court should, therefore, apply the law applicable at the time when disputed agreement was concluded in conformity with EU law, as interpreted in Home Credit Slovakia. While it is true that the requirement to interpret national rules in conformity with EU law cannot serve as the basis for an interpretation of national law contra legem, a national court cannot consider this to be the case merely because it would have to change the established, national case-law.

Concluding thought

The analysed case is not groundbreaking but it helps to systematise several important pieces of CJEU case law, notably on the principle of full harmonisation and interpretation of national rules in conformity with EU law. As regards the more specific context of consumer credit, the ruling should be read together with the previous judgments in C-76/10 Pohotovosť and C-42/15 Home Credit Slovakia. Some of the parties intervening in the proceedings observed that the consumer could also have relied on inaccurate definition of annual percentage rate - a matter which the previous case law clarified to his advantage. This shows that - regardless of the analysed judgment - Consumer Credit Directive leaves room for important safeguards of consumer interests.

Towards clearer Terms and Conditions... again

Be it pre-contractual information in terms and conditions or information on the processing of personal data in privacy policies, the truth is that the way businesses provide information to consumers generally leaves a great deal to be desired. In order to prevent this, and to better inform the informers, the Behavioural Insights Team (BIT) published a ‘Best Practices Guide’ on improving consumer understanding of contractual terms and privacy policies. These evidence-based guidelines are aimed at businesses and focus on ‘how’ to present information, rather than on the ‘what’. 

This study had a dual-focus: consumer comprehension of online contractual terms/ privacy policies and consumer engagement (i.e. the opening of full contractual terms or privacy policies). The study produced interesting, although not surprising, findings. In fact, the shortcomings of the information paradigm have been repeatedly studied and analysed, both at a practical and at a normative level. See, for example, what we previously reported here, here and here.

From the 18 measures tested, 6 proved to be effective, meaning that they showed evidence of increased consumer understanding or increased consumer engagement. The most effective measures are the display of important or unusual terms as Frequently Asked Questions (which increased comprehension in 36%), the use of icons combined with summaries to explain key terms (which increased comprehension in 34%) and telling customers how long it will take to read the policy (which increased opening rates of full terms and policies in 105%). Other effective measures include the use of illustrations and comics to explain step-by-step actions and processes, telling customers when it is their last chance to read information before they make a decision and showing customers the terms in a scrollable text box instead of requiring a click to view them. Also noteworthy is the fact that while BIT’s research showed that reducing a policy’s reading age level did not change comprehension levels for general customers, it showed evidence that such a measure helped people with lower levels of qualifications (increased comprehension by 16.9%).

Funnily enough, considering social media trends, adding emojis to contractual terms is amongst the measures that have no supportive evidence of increased understanding or engagement. Besides, well-known techniques like shortening the terms and conditions, using simpler language or resorting to summaries showed mixed evidence, which means that although they worked in some cases, they did not work in others. For example, presenting key points in a summary table increased comprehension of terms included in the summary, but it also decreased comprehension of terms not included in the summary. These findings show that a mere language simplification-based solution is not enough to fix consumer disinformation: measures such as simple language and summaries must be combined with visualization.

The study – which was commissioned by the UK Government – also demonstrates how regulators are well-aware of the consumer disinformation problem. However, it is rare to see a legislative instrument (both at national and EU level) incorporating explicit measures dealing with these (or with similar) findings. The only recent exception at EU level is the General Data Protection Regulation, which explicitly calls for ‘standardized icons’ and visualization as a means to increase transparency in the pre-contractual stage. This study is another reminder of the need for lawyers to work with information designers in order to increase and improve visualization of their terms and conditions.

Finally, it is important to stress that even though the effective measures led to an increase in consumer understanding and consumer engagement, the final numbers did not go above 58% and 34%, respectively. In other words, according to this study, around 40% of consumers still do not understand terms and conditions, while 66% of consumers do not open the full policies, even after the tested measures are implemented. This means that in order to reach an almost complete comprehension of pre-contractual information – or to guarantee that everyone understands what they are binding themselves to - we need additional solutions and new approaches.

Are contract summary templates transparent? - feedback opportunity

The European Commission asks for feedback on the draft contract summary template, which all consumers must receive from e-communication service providers. Commission aims to make this template 'clear and understandable' and to facilitate comparison of services of different providers, thus transparency is definitely one of the key points that should be considered during the evaluation. Feedback may be submitted until 9 September on this website.

Public call for information on online choice architecture for consumers

The Dutch Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM) has published a call for information on online choice architectures for consumers. The questionnaire may be found on this website, with the deadline for submitting information being set at August 16. The gathered information is to be used in preparation of the 'Guidelines regarding online choice architectures'. Through these guidelines ACM intends to advice traders, which online behavioural persuasive practices could e.g. be assessed as unfair (deceptive or coercive) commercial practices, and which examples of online persuasion could be seen as exemplary.

When the going gets tough - the need for insolvency protection of travel organisers

As today's UK news bring about information about two major holiday providers (Super Break and Late Rooms) going into administration (Super Break and Late Rooms holiday firms go into administration), the scope of consumer protection measures is again at the forefront of many travellers' minds. Already the previous Package Travel Directive (Directive 90/314/EEC) required the Member States to ensure that package travel providers had sufficient insolvency protection, but these rules have been further specified and strengthened in the new Directive 2015/2302 on package travel and linked travel arrangements. The UK has implemented the new Directive in the Package Travel and Linked Travel Arrangements Regulations 2018.

At the moment, the European Commission is reviewing whether the Member States have completely and properly implemented provisions of Directive 2015/2302 into their national laws. What happens to travellers who have booked their holidays with Super Break and Late Rooms will be a good example, on which to check how effective the UK protection against the insolvency of the package travel organiser is. However, even if the insolvency protection has been properly arranged many customers of Super Break and Late Rooms are likely to end up dissatisfied. Why? 

Well, first: they may not have concluded a package travel or a linked travel arrangement contract, which means that they would not benefit from insolvency protection.

Travellers who have been inconvenienced and do not have a separate travel insurance (as then it is best to contact the insurance company), should then first check whether their holidays are a package holiday or a linked travel arrangement, as in both cases insolvency protection had to be assured. Generally, this means that the traveller booked at least two different types of travel services (accommodation, travel, vehicle rental, etc.) for the purpose of the same holiday with either the same trader or through a linked booking process. If only accommodation was booked, without travel or vehicle rental, then the question whether a booking of another travel service makes it a package holiday depends on the value and importance of the provision of this additional travel service in the overall context of the package travel contract. 

Second, even if they fall within the scope of protection, their holiday has likely been ruined.

In case of package travel holidays or linked travel arrangements, travellers may at least expect the full refund of the payments they have made for the purchase of the package (but not additional payments that e.g. have been made after the package has already been concluded - e.g. to purchase additional attractions at their destination) and repatriation, in case they were already on holidays. Unfortunately, it is unlikely that they will be able though to enjoy their holidays as the insolvency insurance does not have to ensure the possibility of travellers continuing with their travel plans.

CJEU in Fashion ID (C-40/17): some consequences of embedding social plugins

Yesterday, the CJEU published its judgment in Fashion ID, a case concerning mainly the notion of "controller" under EU data protection law.

The facts of the case are relatively simple: Fashion ID had placed a "like" button on its website which was connected to Facebook. What Fashion ID's customers may not realise is that - even if they did not use it - the button's presence meant that information concerning them was being transmitted to Facebook. In the proceedings it was uncontested that this information qualified as personal data.

Verbraucherzentrale NRW, a consumer association, brought an injunction against Fashion ID demanding that it abandon such practice. The question whether Fashion ID has any obligations in connection with the data processing - including the duty to inform consumers that their data are being collected and/or require their consent - depends on whether the website is to be considered a data controller.

The referring court doubted whether this is the case since the website operator has no control over the processing of the data transmitted to the plugin provider (para 37).

The Court, in essence, answered that the operator of the website acts as a controller, and is thus responsible for informing the consumer or collecting their consent, insofar as the collection of information and transmission to Facebook is concerned. In particular concerning the collection of the user's consent, the court highlighted that it would not be in line with efficient and timely protection of the subject's rights if the consent would be given only to the second controller, which is involved at a later stage (para 102). Even more strongly, when a customer is not a Facebook user, their data will be processed by the social media operator without them having any direct connection to the latter- which makes the responsibility of the other provider all the greater (para 83).

However, the website operator is not responsible vis à vis the data subjects for any other uses that Facebook itself will make of the data, nor for collecting their consent in that respect (para 102).

While the website has no control on the use of the transmitted data, the purpose of such collection is in part related to the website's benefit as it allows better promotion of its products (para 77-81).

As concerns the collection of data without the subject's consent - ie data that is necessary for the pursuit of a legitimate interest - the court importantly clarified that where both the website and the provider of the social plugin are controllers, they must both be pursuing a legitimate interest for the ground of processing to apply (para 96).

The decision interprets relevant provisions in the "old" Data pProtection directive, which has meanwhile been replaced by the GDPR - but the concepts that it deals with have been kept in the Regulation, so the decision can be transposed to the new rules.

Quite unsurprisingly, the Court rejected Fashion ID's claim that consumer associations would not be entitled to bring any claims under data protection rules - while article 80(2) of the GDPR quite

famously invites MS to set collective enforcement mechanisms, nothing in the previous directive, which only contained general indications on enforcement, can be seen to stand in the way of Member States allowing consumer associations to bring such claims (see in particular paras 57-62).

The Court seems to be aware of the potentially high-profile nature of this case and has accompanied the publication of its decision with a press release. 

Consequences of sub-optimal re-routing - CJEU in Rusu (C-354/18)

The Court of Justice came out of its summer break yesterday and published a judgment in the case Rusu (C-354/18), further clarifying the application of Regulation No 261/2004 on air passenger rights.

Mr and Mrs Rusu were supposed to fly with Blue Air airlines from Romania to the UK, but they were denied boarding due to a last minute change of an operating aircraft, which resulted in fewer seats and overbooking. They have then been re-routed on another flight, which only took place 5 days later. Blue Air first offered the passengers a free flight ticket as compensation, which offer has been rejected as not fully compensating their loss. Subsequently, they have been offered compensation from Regulation No 261/2004 - 400 Euro each. As the passengers experienced loss that was not covered by this amount of compensation, they filed a claim for further compensation to be paid out to them. This was to cover both material damages - having lost part of their earnings as they were not able to report to work on agreed time - and non-material damages - loss from having experienced a threat of being fired from their job. Blue Air claimed that further compensation should not be awarded to the passengers, as they have agreed to the proposed offer of re-routing, without explicitly emphasising the need to be re-routed on an earlier date, perhaps by another air carrier.

As a reminder, Art. 7(1) Regulation No 261/2004 awards passengers a right to compensation, which has been determined in CJEU's case law and scholarship to compensate passengers for the standardised loss of time (amount of compensation is dependant on the distance of the flight) (para. 30). Additional individual losses may be compensated further based on the provisions of national law, on the basis of Art. 12(1) of this Regulation, which provision also allows national courts to deduct the amount of compensation paid out pursuant to Art. 7(1) from the compensation awarded pursuant to Art. 12(1).

The CJEU indicates explicitly that the loss of earnings by the passengers is a clear example of an individualised loss, which is not covered by the standardised amount of compensation pursuant to Art. 7 Regulation (para. 32-34) and thus can be recovered on the basis of Art 12. It is then up to national courts to determine the individual damage, as well as whether the national requirements for recovering it have been fulfilled (para. 40). Whether the national court decides to deduct from it the amount of compensation paid out pursuant to Art. 7 of the Regulation is left to them to decide on the basis of applicable national or other international law, as well, as Art. 12(1) 2nd sentence provides for such a possibility but not an obligation of deduction (para. 44).

As the operating air carrier raised an issue of the passengers not explicitly emphasising the need to reach their destination as soon as possible, by the best/fastest re-routing possible, the CJEU also considered the scope of air carriers' obligations related to arranging the re-routing on the basis of Art. 8(1) Regulation No 261/2004. The CJEU highlights that this provision places the obligation on the operating air carrier not only to provide the passenger with the choice of reimbursement of their flight tickets or re-routing, but also with all appropriate information to make the choice between these options (para. 53-55). It is, therefore, not expected that the air passengers would actively seek any of the information that the operating air carrier is supposed to provide - e.g. on best re-routing options. As Art. 8(1)(b) of the Regulation requires that the re-routing takes place at the earliest possibility, it is up to the operating air carrier to prove that the proposal made by them to passengers complied with this requirement (para. 61). When putting together a re-routing proposal the air carrier should clearly  consider whether the re-routing proposal would transport passengers under similar conditions and at the earliest possibility based on its own resources, or whether it would require a help of another air carrier, in appropriate circumstances, depending on their available seats (para. 60).

Whilst the Regulation No 261/2004 does not place an obligation on operating air carriers to use services of other air carriers to find best re-routing options for their passengers, the CJEU clarifies that if they choose not to do so, they have to be prepared to pay damages under national law. The scope of these damages and under what conditions they will be awarded will differ amongst the Member States then.

Commission guidance note on Unfair Terms Directive

The European Commission adopted today a guidance note on unfair contract terms. It is intended to ensure that consumer associations and legal practitioners, including judges, will be better equipped to protect EU consumers from unfair contract terms. The guidance note is based on the case law of the EU Court of Justice on Directive 93/13. As a complement to the guidance note, European businesses organisations have drawn up recommendations on how mandatory consumer information as well as terms and conditions can be presented to consumers in a more user-friendly and transparent way.
Both initiatives follow up on the REFIT Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law, as announced in the Commission’s Communication on a New Deal for Consumers.

Source: https://www.pubaffairsbruxelles.eu/fighting-unfair-contract-terms-commission-issues-guidance-to-better-protect-consumers-eu-commission-press/