The Teaching Consumer Law conference returns to Santa Fe this year on 17-18 May. You may reply to the call for papers for another week, with the deadline set on February 15.
Further details of the call for papers may be found here and of the conference - here.
In two judgments issued on 25 January, the CJEU addressed questions related to the passengers’ right to claim compensation for a long flight delay. The unusual aspect of both cases is that in neither of them passengers actually experienced the delay, having decided to forego the delayed flight. Unsurprisingly, the CJEU decided in both cases that they could not then claim compensation from Regulation 261/2004.
C-474/22 - Laudamotion
In this case, a passenger in expectation of the delay, which would have led him to not make the business meeting he was to travel for, decided to stay home rather than go to the airport. His flight arrived at the final destination with a delay of 3 hours 22 minutes.
The CJEU emphasised that the loss of time that the compensation aims to alleviate is „not damage arising out of delay” but an inconvenience (para 27). All passengers experience it the same way, which allowed to standardise the compensatory measure. Contrary, however, to cancelled flights in case of a flight delay to be eligible for claiming compensation passengers need to present to check-in at the airport (para 30). In this case, the passenger was then not eligible for compensation as he did not present himself for check-in. However, the Court reminded that the passenger could claim further compensation pursuant to Art. 12 Regulation 261/2004 for individual damage, e.g., arising due to having missed the business meeting (paras 32-33).
C-54/23 - Laudamotion and Ryanair
Here, the passenger avoided the flight delay of 6 hours by booking themselves on an alternative flight, which arrived at the final destination with a delay of fewer than 3 hours.
The CJEU focuses on the fact that the passenger did not experience the inconvenience of a long delay, the loss of time, and therefore is also not eligible for the compensation (para 22). The Court notes that the passenger could have experienced an inconvenience as they had to find an alternative means of transport themselves, but that is not a serious inconvenience pursuant to the Court (para 23). It should be mentioned that also in this case the passenger received some form of redress as they could claim reimbursement for the flight ticket pursuant to national law.
Both cases then limit the application of the Regulation 261/2004 but in a way consistent with the objective of high level of passenger protection. Passengers are not left without a recourse for claiming compensation for individual damages.
At the end of 2023, the European Law Insitute published its Interim Report on EU Consumer Law and Automated Decision Making, answering whether EU Consumer Law is ready for automated decision-making, and observing this question through the lens of a relationship between the consumer, the digital assistant and the trader. The Report sets out eight Principles that should be followed to make EU consumer law ready for automated decision-making.
On the 31st of January 2024, ELI will host a webinar that is open to everyone.
For more information, follow this link.
Happy 2024 Dear Readers!
We are starting a new year of reporting with the reference to the last week's judgment in the Polish case referred to the CJEU as Getin Noble Bank and Others (C-531/22 - not yet available in English, but accessible in other languages). This judgments continues to provide guidance on the application of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive to terms in mortgage contracts indexed in Swiss Francs. The CJEU considered two questions/issues:
1. Ex officio judicial authority to test unfairness while overseeing enforcement of a final payment order with res judicata status
To not keep you in suspense: The CJEU decided that national courts may ex officio assess unfairness in such circumstances, provided that: 1) national law did not allow for unfairness test at the moment of issuing of a payment order, or 2) if such unfairness test is only allowed if a consumer would have objected to the issued payment order, provided that there is a significant risk that a given consumer is not going to issue an objection. This risk could result from: the short time allowed for filing the objection, objection's costs compared to the debt amount, or the lack of obligation to provide consumer with all the information necessary to determine their rights in this respect (para 61). This is, in large extent, confirming Court's previous judgment in Leasing România judgment (C-725/19) (paras 50-51).
This is an important judgment to address some inefficiencies of the Polish civil law procedure that may limit the scope of the unfairness testing. Specifically, payment orders may be issued by Polish courts upon an electronic request by creditors, without the courts having either legal or technical access to contractual documents, on the basis of which this payment order is issued. If the debtor does not file an objection to the issued payment order within 2 weeks from its delivery, they become final with the res judicata status. This means that they may not be further questioned in enforcement proceedings (para 49). As the CJEU previously considered a 2 week timeframe too short to reasonably give a chance to consumers to file an objection (paras 54-55), this judgment clearly indicates the lack of compliance of the Polish civil procedural rules with the effective consumer protection framework against unfair contract terms. This finding is not weakened by the inertia of the consumer during previous judicial proceedings with them as a party, as the option to file an objection to the payment order is the only opportunity for the consumer to procedurally stop the enforcement proceedings, and as such the consumer needs to be given a real chance to do so (considering the timeframe, costs etc.) (para 60).
2. Recognition of an unfair character of a contract term, upon it having been entered into a register of unfair contract terms, also in subsequent judicial proceedings against a given consumer, even with a different trader involved and when the term has been differently drafted, but when it retained the same substance and led to the same consequences.
The CJEU first (paras 69-73) recalls the conditions for the validity of a register of unfair contract terms in national legal systems, which were first discussed in the Biuro case (see our comment here). Pursuant to the Court, the opportunity for national courts to compare a given contract term to a term already entered into a register after previous judicial proceedings, may lead to a more efficient and faster enforcement of the unfairness control, freeing consumers from harmful consequences of unfair terms in many contracts simultaneously (para 75). The finding of unfairness of a given term could then indeed be recognised and applied also in subsequent judicial proceedings - even with a different trader involved, and when the term has been differently drafted, but when it retained the same substance and led to the same consequences (para 78).
Last Thursday the CJEU issued a new judgment in the saga of Swiss francs mortgage loan contracts (C-140/22 - there is no English language text available yet). It was a Polish court who asked for a clarification of a few issues related to voiding such contracts as a result of them containing an unfair contract term, the removal of which would not enable the contract to remain in force.
Declaring unfairness
The CJEU recalls its past judgment emphasising the obligation of national courts to assess (un)fairness of contract terms and ensure that any finding of unfairness results is fully remedied (Karel de Grote-Hogeschool Katholieke Hogeschool Antwerpen C-147/16 - with our comment - and Abanca C-70/17 - with our comment) (paras 53-55). Previous case law mentioned that consumers could, however, object to national courts attaching all the consequences resulting from finding of an unfair contract term, pursuant to the UCTD. Namely, when consumers are informed by courts about the presence of an unfair contract term in their contract, they could then decide, while fully informed, to still be bound by that term, which would give effect to the freedom of contract and the UCTD's protection (para 57). The CJEU rightly emphasises now that this right for consumers to object to courts applying the UCTD provisions should not be interpreted as placing an obligation on consumers to declare that they do not object to the UCTD's application (para 56). This could deter consumers from benefiting from the scope of the UCTD's protection and further discourage traders from agreeing to consumers' out-of-court settlement claims (para 61). The CJEU reminds also that even if consumers are not present at court, the CJEU has an obligation to ex officio assess the unfairness of a contract term and apply the consequences following from the UCTD (para 60).
In short, the CJEU decided that the Unfair Contract Terms Directive should not be interpreted by national courts as requiring consumers to declare: 1) their consent to voiding an unfair contract term; 2) their awareness of the consequences that this voidness would have (voiding the whole contract); and 3) their consent to voiding the whole contract.
Financial consequences of unfairness
The CJEU recalls that when a mortgage loan contract is declared void, due to the finding of an unfair core term, consumers should only reimburse the bank by the amount of a borrowed loan, and possibly also statutory interest if they delay this reimbursement (para 62; also Bank M, C-520/21 - see our comment). Any further claims for reimbursement by banks would limit the deterrent effect of the UCTD (para 63).
Consequently, if as the result of finding an unfair core contract term the entire mortgage loan contract is voided, the UCTD prohibits national courts from calculating the impact of that voidness in a way that deducts from the consumer compensation of loan amounts paid to the bank, amounts of interest that the bank would have received if the contract remained in force.
While all eyes are on the trialogue negotiations for the AI act, another very important negotiation round has just closed in Brussels - namely the one concerning the proposed Ecodesign regulation. We have become more and more aware that most of the environmental impact of products is generated at production stage - making it necessary that we buy less products and use them for longer. Improving product durability is one of the core objectives of the proposal, which may now get turned into legislation by the end of the current parliamentary term.
The new draft Regulation builds on the Ecodesign directive, which prescribed energy efficiency requirements for a variety of electricity-connected devices, by expanding both the range of potentially covered products and the sustainability requirements. According to the Commission,
"The new Ecodesign requirements will go beyond energy efficiency and aim to boost circularity, covering, among others:
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| By Alex Azabache on Unsplash |
1. Revision of Regulation 261/2004 on Passenger Rights through a newly proposed Regulation as regards enforcement of passenger rights in the Union
2. Revision of Regulation 1107/2006 on Rights of Disabled Persons and Persons with Reduced Mobility when Travelling by Air through a newly proposed Regulation as regards enforcement of passenger rights in the Union
3. New proposal for a Regulation on passenger rights in the context of multimodal journey
3. Revision of Package Travel Directive (2015/2302)
Additional proposals have been adopted that aim to facilitate better provision of information to travellers on available travel modes, incl. combining different types of travel (revision of Delegated Regulation 2017/1926 on the provision of EU-wide multimodial travel information services). This new service intends to provide real-time information and updates, also on delays and cancellations, as well as specific information, e.g. on possibilities of taking bikes on a train (see more here).
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| Freepik |
The very announcements of paid subscriptions have already triggered a wave of criticism. So it didn't take long for the first steps to challenge the legitimacy of the Meta's actions. A few days ago NOYB, which is a non-profit organization led by privacy activist Max Schrems, announced that it filed a GDPR complaint against Meta over "Pay or Okey". According to NOYB, such a "privacy fee" is not only illegal, since you cannot be forced to pay for exercising your fundamental right to privacy, but moreover, it risks having a domino effect and being taken over by other leading players in the digital services market as well.
But this is not the only step against Meta's new practice. Today BEUC, which is a European Consumer Organization, also has voiced its opposition to this practice, stating that it is "an unfair choice for users, which runs afoul of EU consumer law on several counts and must be stopped". Thus, BEUC together with its 19 members filed a complaint on grounds of Meta engaging in unfair commercial practices in multiple ways. As BEUC stated, partially blocking the use of Facebook and Instagram until users have selected one option or the other constitutes an aggressive practice under European consumer law. What is more, opting for the paid subscription doesn't guarantee that a user gets a privacy-friendly option involving less tracking and profiling - user's personal data still may be collected and used but for purposes other than ads. More detailed assessment of Meta's subscription model you can find here.
It remains to be seen how these actions will affect the Meta approach in the future. One thing is certain - the story will have its continuation, perhaps before the Court of Justice.
*The Court, inter alia, questioned Meta's legal grounds for processing personal data for personalization purposes, i.e. Article 6(1b) of the GDPR (the necessity of processing data for the performance of a contract), and Article 6(1f) of the GDPR (the processing of data on the basis of legitimate interests of the controller or a third party) - see paragraphs 97-126 of the ruling.
Fairness test
Contrary to first intuitions, the focus of the case was not transparency (although it does come up later in the judgment). Rather, what the referring court wanted to know was whether a term which provides for payment of amounts which are manifestly disproportionate to the service provided may be unfair. And, in short, the answer of the Court was yes (kind of).
Now, there are several issues to unpack.
Significant imbalance
First, can a "significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations arising under the contract" (Article 3(1) UCTD) at all be established on the basis of an quantitative economic evaluation, involving a comparison between the total value of the transaction and the costs charged to the consumer? According to the Court, it can.
Such a perspective differs from the focus that the Court normally takes in its UCTD case law. As a typical passage goes: "a significant imbalance can result solely from a sufficiently serious impairment of the legal situation in which the consumer (...) is placed" (para. 45). To establish such an imbalance a comparison needs to be made between the rights and obligations of the consumer under the contract and the relevant rights and obligations under otherwise applicable national rules. However, as the judgment in Provident Polska prominently shows, the reference to "resulting solely" does not mean that there can be no other source of a significant imbalance, but rather that a "legal imbalance" is sufficient. Thus, an imbalance of rights and obligations can also be established on the basis of a quantitative economic evaluation (para. 47).
Article 4(2) UCTD
Of course, this does not mean that all contract performances can now be analysed for fairness by comparing the value of the transaction to the costs charged to the consumer. Nevertheless, this follows not from the concept of a "significant imbalance", but rather from the exclusion in Article 4(2) UCTD. Pursuant to this provision
assessment of the unfair nature of the terms shall relate neither to the definition of the main subject matter of the contract nor to the adequacy of the price and remuneration, on the one hand, as against the services or goods supplied in exchange, on the other, in so far as these terms are in plain intelligible language.
The exception from Article 4(2) consists of two parts. The first one relates to the terms defining the "main subject matter of the contract". Not all fees charged by the trader are captured by that notion. For example, commission fees covering remuneration for services connected with the examination, grant or treatment of the loan do not (para. 51). The second part, however, is more relevant for our context and provides little space for assessing performances in economic terms. As noted by the Court:
terms relating to the consideration due by the consumer to the lender or having an impact on the actual price to be paid to the latter by the consumer thus, in principle, fall within the second category of terms covered by Article 4(2) of Directive 93/13 as regards the question whether the amount of consideration or the price as stipulated in the contract are adequate as compared with the service provided in exchange by the lender (para. 52).
Does it mean that excessive fees can never be assessed for fairness? Not quite. The Court is offering three ways out. The first two are well-known: minimum harmonisation (Article 8 UCTD) and transparency (Article 4(2) UCTD in fine). The third suggests that one cannot speak of assessing the adequacy of the price/remuneration as against the services or goods supplied, if no goods or services are supplied at all. In the words of the Court:
[I]f the unfairness of such a term is alleged before the national court on the basis of the lack of any actual service provided by the lender that could constitute consideration for a commission fee that it provides for, the issue thus raised does not concern the adequacy of the amount of that commission fee as compared with a service provided by the lender, and does not therefore fall within the scope of Article 4(2) of Directive 93/13 (...) (para. 54).
Overall, there are quite some hurdles to finding excessive fees unfair, but it is not impossible. The formulation of the Court's response is rather telling:
[P]rovided that the examination of the possible unfairness of a term relating to the non-interest costs of a loan agreement concluded between a seller or supplier and a consumer is not precluded by Article 4(2) of [the UCTD], read in conjunction with Article 8 thereof, such a term may be held to be unfair as a result of the fact that that term provides for the payment by the consumer of charges or a commission fee in an amount that is manifestly disproportionate to the service provided in exchange.
Partial removal of the clause
Another question concerned payment arrangements. The national court was quite convinced that the term requiring the consumer to pay in cash during the agent's visits at his or her home was unfair. Such a term - the court observed - could only be explained by the possibility it offered the lender to exert emotional pressure on the borrower. However, the court was not quite sure about the consequences it should draw from finding the unfairness.
Part of the problem was that the term formed part of a longer clause, which also defined other payment arrangements, e.g. amounts and dates. The referring court was thus unsure if it can remove part of the clause containing the unfair term (about paying in cash to the agent), or if it should rather invalidate the whole term. Since the latter would result in the inability to enforce the contract, the question was raised if the whole contract had to be annulled.
The Court of Justice considered it possible to remove part of the clause containing the unfair term and keep the remaining part in force. At first glance, this may seem incompatible with its previous case law. Indeed, the Court repeatedly found that the UCTD precludes a term that has been found to be unfair from being maintained in part, with the elements which make it unfair removed, where that removal would be tantamount to revising the content of that term by altering its substance (para. 89). However, this has to be distinguished from a situation "where the unfair element of a term consists of a contractual obligation distinct from the other requirements and capable of being the subject of an individual examination of its unfairness (...) since the stipulation laying down such an obligation may be regarded as severable from the other requirements under the term concerned" (para. 90).
This seems quite understandable. A clause can consist of several terms and it should not be generally impossible to remove only some of them. In the remainder of the judgment, the Court attempts to help with this assessment by drawing a distinction between "ancillary terms" and the "substance of the terms". In the words of the Court:
[I]t appears that a stipulation determining such specific arrangements for the performance of the consumer’s payment obligation constitutes a contractual obligation distinct from the other stipulations of a single term, as described in the preceding paragraph of the present judgment, and is ancillary to the elements of the contract which define the substance of that term, such as those relating to the determination of the amounts to be paid and the dates on which those payments must be made. Furthermore, the deletion of that stipulation does not appear to be such as to affect the very substance of the term concerned, since the consumer continues to be obliged to perform his or her repayment obligation in accordance with the other conditions laid down in that term by choosing any method of payment from among those which are permissible under national law (para. 93).
The added value of this distinction is yet to be seen. Was it not enough to say, as the Court did previously, that a clause can contain several distinct requirements which can be separately assessed for unfairness and which, therefore, can be invalidated independently of each other? The distinction between the substance of the terms and ancillary terms suggests a hierarchy, but a single clause can also refer to apples and oranges. Overall, the outcome is certainly well-founded, but the case law on the consequences of finding unfairness is not the easiest one to navigate.
On November 9th, the CJEU delivered an important ruling on the application of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive (UCTD) to consumer credit agreements. In particular, the request of the Slovakian referring court concerned suspension of the extrajudicial enforcement of the charge of the consumers’ family home which secured their credit agreement with the bank.