Limitation periods and restitution after loan invalidity - three new CJEU Swiss-Franc mortgage judgments

To continue our reporting on CJEU judgments concerning unfair contract terms in mortgage credit contracts denominated in Swiss francs, let us look at three recent judgments in Polish cases, all delivered on 16 April. Each of these cases addresses the compatibility of national procedural rules governing limitation periods for banks' restitution claims following the invalidation of a credit agreement under the UCTD.

C-901/24 Falucka (see here)

In this case, the CJEU held that a consumer's declaration, made during preliminary proceedings for the invalidation of a loan agreement containing unfair terms, that they are aware of an obligation to repay the sums received from the bank, constitutes an acknowledgment of debt (para 44). National law may treat such an acknowledgment as interrupting the limitation period applicable to the bank's restitution claim (para 25). Consequently, the Court found that bank's legitimate interests (limited to reimbursement of the capital paid out - para 35) are protected where a loan agreement is invalidated after the limitation period for the bank's restitution actions has otherwise expired. This approach prevents consumer's unjust enrichment (para 36), without undermining the objectives of the UCTD.

C-752/24 Jangielak (see here)

Here, the CJEU confirmed the compatibility with EU law of a common procedural practice in Poland whereby banks bring counterclaims for restitution of capital paid under a loan agreement before the consumer's claim for invalidation on the grounds of unfair contract terms has been finally resolved (para 44). Bringing such counterclaims at an early stage may interrupt the running of the limitation period for the banks' restitution actions, thereby giving effect to the principle of equality of arms (para 36). However, the Court emphasised that this procedural possibility must not significantly hinder consumers in the effective enforcement of their rights. Accordingly, national courts should consider staying bank's restitution actions until the consumer's claims have been resolved (para 42). Moreover, procedural costs must not operate as a deterrent preventing consumers from further pursuing their rights under EU consumer protection law (para 42).

C-753/24 Rzepacz (see here)

Finally, Rzepacz addressed the question of whether a bank may reclaim the capital paid under an invalidated loan agreement where the limitation period for its restitution claim has already expired under national law. The CJEU acknowledged that exceptional circumstances may arise in which considerations of equity justify such recovery (para 37). Where national procedural rules exceptionally permit courts to disregard the expiry of a limitation period, such rules are not, as such, incompatible with the EU consumer protection framework (para 30). In applying those rules, however, national courts must rely solely on objective criteria. These may include the excessive length of proceedings concerning the invalidation of the loan agreement (para 29), the length of the limitation period, the time elapsed between its expiry and the submission of the claim, and the conduct of both parties during the proceedings (para 32). Further, national courts aiming for an equitable resolution must give due effect to the principle of effectiveness. This requires careful consideration of the impact of their decision on consumers' ability to enforce their rights without facing significant obstacles, e.g., being required to bear disproportionate court costs if proceedings are continued after the limitation period has expired (paras 33-35).

Legislation based contract amendments and the review of unfairness C-176/23

On 30 May 2024, the CJEU delivered C-176/23 UG v Raiffeisen Bank SA an important judgment that is highly relevant today and covers an important and not frequently adjudicated question - the issue of the mandatory terms exception in Article 1(2) and the way it applies in the highly regulated environment of a consumer loan contract. Based on the 'contractual terms which reflect mandatory statutory or regulatory provisions ... shall not be subject to the provisions of this Directive.’

In this case, the consumer entered into a variable-rate credit agreement with Raiffeisen Bank, indexed to the Swiss franc. Based on the Romanian mandatory legislation OUG No. 50/2010, the term relating to the determination of the variable rate had to be amended so that it was linked to an objective index increased by a margin fixed for the entire duration of the agreement. Unsatisfied with the new interest rate, the consumer sued the bank, alleging that the term was unfair.

The first legal question before the CJEU was whether the term could be assessed for fairness, given that it was inserted into the contract as required by mandatory legislation. Given that the term was not a copy-paste of a legislative provision, but rather an action based on the legislation, the CJEU addressed whether the term reflected mandatory rules.  In answering the question, the CJEU ruled that, in this situation, the term can be assessed for fairness because the legislation was not overly prescriptive and left the bank a degree of discretion to determine the variable interest rate. In the words of the CJEU, the ‘legislation merely establishes a general framework for fixing the interest rate for that agreement, while leaving a margin of discretion to that seller or supplier as regards both the choice of reference index for that rate and the size of the fixed margin that can be added to the latter.’ This approach was confirmed by the CJEU in its latest case on the matter C-471/24 PKO BP (see our report here).

The second question raised a question of whether such an amended term is not assessable for fairness under the general test of fairness in Article 3(1) even if it has been inserted into the contract without a negotiation with the consumer? The CJEU provided an expected answer to this question, confirming that this is the case, given that the entire UCTD, including the test of fairness, is designed to protect against unfair individually non-negotiated terms, and some terms are exempted from the security of fairness, against that default provision. Although the second question is somewhat unusual and, at first glance, seems redundant, it raises an interesting question about the hierarchy among the provisions of the UCTD. Indirectly, the CJEU here seems to confirm the natural reading of the UCTD that Article 1(2) prevails over Article 3(1), in the sense that the term must first be within the scope of the UCTD to be assessable for fairness. Conversely, if a term is exempted from the scrutiny of the test of fairness by virtue of Article 1(2), this cannot be remedied by Article 3(1). 

Overall, the judgment provides an important contribution to EU consumer law and to the interpretation of the relationship of legislative interventions imposing mandatory rules on the contracting parties and the UCTD. These are relevant in the post-2008 environment, which incentivises legislative intervention in matters that would previously have been left to the parties (see more on this relationship here).

On the assignability of consumer claims under credit contracts: CJEU in Zwrotybankowe.pl (C‑80/24)

As consumer law remains under-enforced, it becomes all too common for consumers to assign their claims to third-party claim management companies, which typically operate on a contingency basis and take a percentage of the amounts successfully recovered. In Case C‑80/24, the consumer assigned their claim against a bank to Zwrotybankowe.pl, one such claim management company, which would retain 50% of the recovered amounts as remuneration. The assigned claim arose under Art. 30(1) of the Polish Law on Consumer Credit, which implements Art. 23 of the Consumer Credit Directive 2008 and imposes a penalty for the bank’s failure to comply with information obligations. In a proceeding brought by Zwrotybankowe.pl against the creditor bank, questions arose as to the assignability of the consumer claim in question and the court’s duty to assess the assignment agreement ex officio under the Unfair Terms Directive.

The first question concerns whether the Consumer Credit Directive precludes the assignment of consumer claims thereunder. This is because Art. 22(2) of said Directive prohibits the consumer from waiving their rights under it. A broad interpretation of this provision could suggest that consumers cannot assign claims arising under the Directive to third-party companies that make a profit from these legitimate claims (paras 13-14). However, the CJEU rejected such an interpretation. In particular, it drew an analogy with its reasoning in Case C‑11/23 concerning Art. 15 of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004, which similarly provides an ‘exclusion of waiver’. In that case, the airline’s general conditions included a prohibition of the transfer of passenger rights, in particular the right to compensation. The Court disallowed such a prohibition, in order ‘to ensure a high level of protection for air passengers and to enable [consumers] effectively to exercise their rights’, including ‘the freedom to choose the most effective way in which to defend his or her right’, such as ‘to transfer his or her claim to a third party in order to spare him- or herself difficulties and costs that might deter him or her from taking steps personally in relation to that carrier with the prospect of a limited financial return’ (para 27). Based on an analogous reasoning rooted in the rationale of weaker party protection, the Court held that Art. 22(2) of the Consumer Credit Directive likewise does not preclude the assignment of consumer claims arising under the Directive.

The second question goes on to ask: if the claim is assignable, should courts assess the unfairness of the assignment agreement ex officio – when the dispute before them arises from a different contract, namely the credit agreement? Recalling its case law on ex officio review under the Unfair Terms Directive, the Court confirmed that such a duty is limited to ‘the subject matter of the dispute’ (para 38). In this case, the assignment agreement ‘does not come within the limits of the subject matter of the dispute before it’ and therefore falls outside the ex officio review obligation under EU law (para 40). Moreover, since the consumer was not a party to the proceedings, the imbalance between a consumer and a trader, which justifies ex officio intervention, was also absent (paras 41-43). Accordingly, the Court concluded that the Unfair Terms Directive does not require national courts to assess the assignment agreement ex officio in such circumstances. Finally, the Court added that, where national law does allow such an ex officio review, the principle of effectiveness should serve to safeguard consumers’ procedural rights (para 46).

The reasoning in Zwrotybankowe.pl seems to give away a rather permissive stance towards third-party enforcement of consumer claims. Given that many instruments within the EU consumer acquis contain comparable prohibitions on waiver, one may ask whether the Court’s analogy extends to those regimes as well. Sure, consumers should have the freedom to spare themselves from the ‘difficulties and costs’ of private enforcement, but how much should they pay for such convenience? And if these ‘difficulties and costs’ stem from a systematic failure in consumer enforcement, is the privatisation of enforcement – and the shifting of its costs to consumers whose rights have been infringed in the first place – really the right call?

Polish bankruptcy law fails consumers with unfair loan terms - CJEU in Wiszkier (C-582/23)

Photo by Towfiqu barbhuiya on Unsplash

In July 2025, the CJEU issued a judgment in Wiszkier (C-582/23), concerning a Polish case involving a consumer mortgage loan indexed to Swiss francs. In this instance, the consumer had to declare bankruptcy after being unable to meet, among other obligations, their mortgage payments. Although the bankruptcy court found that the contract potentially contained unfair terms, raising the possibility of the contract being null and void, Polish law prohibits this court from examining this issue further. Under Polish law, even if the unfairness of contract terms had not been previously raised by the consumer, the bankruptcy court is only competent to approve or reject a repayment plan based on a list of claims drawn up by the trustee (paras 26-27). At most, the court may stay the proceedings and refer the unfairness' matter to another competent, supervisory authority (paras 29 and 45). 

Unfairness assessment by the bankruptcy court 

Decision: Incompatibility with EU law. Unsurprisingly, the CJEU found Polish law incompatible with EU law. Specifically, it held that the Unfair Contract Terms Directive precludes national provisions that prevent a bankruptcy court from examining the unfairness of contract terms in a loan agreement underlying a claim included in the list of claims, or from amending that list, where no such assessment has been conducted by the authority preparing the list (para 58).

Although EU law leaves enforcement of consumer protection rules against unfair contract terms to the Member States, such national rules must comply with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness (para 40). The CJEU found that the principle of effectiveness was violated in this case. While Polish law allows a bankruptcy court to stay proceedings so that a supervisory court may assess the potential unfairness of contract terms, this process introduces delay and exposes consumers to further financial hardship. During the stay, the bankrupt's salary continues to be withheld by the bankruptcy estate, which may discourage consumers from raising objections based on unfair terms (para 46). Notably, monthly repayments set in bankruptcy proceedings are often lower than the salary amounts withheld during the proceedings (para 47), exacerbating the financial strain. Moreover, in this case, although the consumer had acknowledged all the claims listed by the trustee, this was done without legal representation and likely without understanding that an unfairness objection could be raised (para 52). The consumer only raised this issue. through legal counsel, once the case reached the bankruptcy court (para 53). The CJEU clarified that it is irrelevant whether the list of claims has become res judicata (para 55).

Interim measures by the bankruptcy court

Decision: The CJEU further ruled that national law must enable bankruptcy courts to grant interim measures to protect consumers while the fairness of a claim included in the list is under judicial review.

The Court reiterated that ensuring effective consumer protection against unfair terms may require granting interim measures, for example, adjusting monthly instalments during prolonged proceedings to prevent consumers from being forced to pay more than the amount actually due if the unfair terms were ultimately invalidated (paras 67-68). As noted by the referring court, the fear of higher interim payments to the bankruptcy estate may deter consumers from raising unfairness objections altogether (para 69). The court responsible for granting interim measures must consider: "whether there is sufficient evidence that the contractual terms concerned are unfair, whether there is a real possibility that the bankruptcy estate is already sufficiently funded to satisfy the creditors, with the exception, as the case may be, of the claim concerned, as well as the bankrupt's financial situation and the risk of that person having to endure a prolongation of the bankruptcy proceedings which could result in an unwarranted deterioration in his or her financial situation pending the conclusion of those proceedings." (para 71)

Consumers' access to interim relief - the CJEU in Myszak (C-324/23)

In case C-324/23 (Myszak) the Court of Justice of the European Union was asked again to deal with the consequences of mortgage loan agreements indexed in Swiss francs. 

The case concerns a mortgage loan contract indexed in Swiss francs whose voidance was claimed by three consumers against the Getin Noble Bank S.A. Consumers claimed the unfairness of the contractual term in question, according to Directive 93/13/EEC. Accordingly, sought interim relief in court, in order to suspend the execution of the contract containing unfair terms.

Meanwhile, however, the Bank went through a resolution procedure. Polish law bars the possibility to ask interim measures against bank dealing with special resolution procedures, according to the law implementing Directive 2014/59/EU (the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive). 

The Polish court asked the CJEU about the compatibility with Articles 6(1) and 7(1) of UCTD and Article 70(1) and (4) of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive of the national law. Pursuant to relevant Polish law it is not possible to grant a consumer’s application for an interim measure to suspend, during the course of the court proceedings, the obligation to pay the loan instalments under a loan agreement which is likely to be declared invalid, on the sole ground that it was granted by a bank declared to be under special resolution.

The CJEU affirmed that a statutory provision barring consumers to obtain interim relief during resolution procedures impairs consumers to exercise their rights, and thus goes against EU law.

The Court invoked the principle of effectiveness, claiming that impeding consumers to exercise their rights because of a bank’s resolution would impact on the effective enforcement of the UCTD. The Court of Justice has, on a number of occasions, made general statements on the need for national courts to be able to adopt interim measures for the full effectiveness of court decisions concerning rights granted by EU law (see, among others, Case C-213/89, Factortame).

Although the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive allows Member States’ laws to specify and define the procedural means of its implementation, national laws implementing it should not impede consumer protection. Accordingly, a provision barring the enforcement of UCTD, precluding adoption of interim measures, is contrary to EU law.

The decision reinforces a well-established pattern in the Court of Justice’s rulings: when in doubt, in favour of the consumer!

"Young promise" or just a consumer? CJEU in C-365/23 [Arce]

Today the Court of Justice has delivered a truly remarkable judgment that I am eager to share with readers of this blog (available here, even though for now only in French and Latvian). The decision concerned a contract concluded between "A", a professional in the business of offering career development services for sports talents, and "C", then 17 and represented by his parents to the ends of concluding the contract. 

According to the contract, concluded on 14 January 2009 for a period of fifteen (15) years, A would offer a wide range of services in support of C's development as - hopefully, professional - basketball player. In return, C would pay A 10% of all the net revenue he was to earn for the duration of the contract, plus VAT, as long as such income would pass the threshold of 1500 euros per month. 

A bit over a decade into the contract, A sued C for failing to fulfil their obligations under the contract, with a claim amounting to over 1,6 million euro - 10% of what the player had earned from sport clubs until that point in time. [We are not sure how this was calculated, but A would likely know since accounting services were included in the contract]

Latvian tribunals, which were competent to adjudicate on the dispute, were not keen to grant A's claim: the demand was rejected in first and second instance on ground that the term was unfair under Latvian consumer law; A took the case to the Latvian Supreme Court, which in turn raised *twelve* preliminary questions for the CJEU. Luckily, not all questions have to be answered and not were equally challenging, so the analysis here will be limited to the most salient points. All have to be seen to pertain to the Unfair Terms Directive - from the definition of consumer under that directive to the scope of minimum harmonisation. 

Consumer contract?

First: was the "career development services" contract a consumer contract? The referring court noticed (see para 31) that across different jurisdictions different stances were noticeable concerning similar cases, with a court in France having concluded that a young talent concluding a comparable contract had to be considered a consumer, while an earlier German case has excluded the applicability of consumer law to the type of services at hand. 

The Court of Justice answered that, to the extent that the minor at hand was not a professional player at the time of concluding the contract, they should be considered consumers - and hence enjoy consumer protection. The fact that the player later engaged in professional sports does not change this conclusion as the party's quality as consumer must be, for the purposes of unfair terms rules, ascertained only with reference to the moment that the contract was concluded. The fact that the contract concerned the player's "eventual professional career" doesn't change this conclusion either. 

While the Court recalls its previous decision in Costea, other decisions concerning the notion of consumer when "bordering" professional activities, such as Gruber, were not discussed. This means, however, that it is difficult to immediately assess the reach of the judgment: will this "generous" take also cover adults who engage comparable services in the hope to undertake a professional activity that they have not engaged in yet, or is this interpretation limited to the case of minors who have not engaged yet in the relevant professional activity? AG Rantos' reasoning in his opinion, as reported on in Joasia Luzak's overview of last month, seems to suggest a broad applicability (which may go against the common assumptions in several member states!).

"Price" term exempted from control?

Having established that the Directive was applicable to the contract under consideration, the CJEU had to consider whether the term was actually subject to the unfairness test. This was contentious since article 4(2) of the Directive famously dictates that the test shall not concern "the definition of the main subject matter of the contract nor to the adequacy of the price and remuneration". A claimed that the term should then not be subject to judicial control. The CJEU agreed as to the applicability of the exception - in line with the second part of article 4(2) then, the national courts would only be able to assess the term's unfairness if the term did not comply with the requirement of transparency - being "in clear and intelligible language". 

In this respect, the CJEU seemed to suggest that the term may not comply with the transparency requirement: it is however for the national court to ascertain whether the term was sufficiently clear that the consumer could understand its impact on their legal and economic position. In this respect, the Court considers that both the information provided to the consumer (and their representatives!) at the time of concluding the contract and, interestingly, the term spelling out what services A would provide against the agreed remuneration should be seen as relevant to the assessment. Furthermore, since Latvia had not yet explicitly implemented the exemption of article 4(2) by January 2009, it is possible that on the basis of minimum harmonisation the term would still be open to scrutiny even if transparent. The Court then proceeds to answer questions that would be relevant in case the term can be subject to control. 

Is the term unfair? 

As we know, it is for national courts to decide whether a specific term is unfair; the CJEU, however, can provide parameters to support the national courts, which they have done in a number of cases. In this specific case, the Court adopts a reasoning which is in some way new - at least to the extent that it seems to establish a hierarchy or order of reasoning between the two prongs of the unfairness test - that the term causes a significant imbalance contrary to good faith. While these two elements (good faith and significant imbalance) are often considered as hardly distinguishable, the Court here suggests that one should "at first" consider the possible violation of the principle of good faith, and "second" ascertain the eventual existence of a significant imbalance. This is not unheard of, as the references in the decisions show, but it is usually not regarded as more than a style clause. 

In assessing whether the term is unfair, thus, the CJEU asserts, the national court should consider on the one hand whether the professional, dealing in honest and reasonable way, could expect the consumer to accept the term in individual negotiations, while on the other hand considering national default rules to ascertain whether the clause created a significant imbalance in the rights and obligations of the parties (compared to their rights in case nothing had been agreed). In doing so, and this is genuinely new, it can consider "fair market practices" around the pricing of similar services at the time of the contract's conclusion, or "the obligations that a reasonably informed consumer could expect to incur" (see para 84). The Court takes these additional criteria from the AG's opinion and it will be interesting so see whether this reference to market practices will prove to be incidental (it is after all a rather niche subject!) or take hold. 

Fundamental rights?

Finally, the Latvian Supreme Court wanted to know whether fundamental rights should be considered in assessing the term - in particular the right to property (art 17 EUCFR) and the requirement for public authorities and private entities to pay the highest attention to the "best interest of the child" when taking decisions concerning minors (art 24 EUCFR). In this sense, the CJEU first observes that the Charter is applicable (see para 99) to the questions at issue since they fall within the MS's implementation of EU law (on this, the Court has been holding that this applicability is in no way affected by minimum harmonisation, which we won't be again questioning now). Setting aside with no further ado the relevance of article 17, the Court focusses on article 24: indeed, national courts should take it into account when making decisions concerning the unfairness of terms included in contracts concluded by (at the time of conclusion) minors. This is in line with fairly established idea on the indirect horizontal application of fundamental rights. At the same time, the CJEU seems cautious to avoid over-protective applications: consideration of the best interest of the child, the Court explain, does not exclude that the national court could consider the fact that the parents, concluding the contract on the child's behalf, were familiar with the environment of professional sports, or the fact that C was already 17 at the moment of concluding the contract (see para 103). 

Hence to conclude: C was a consumer; the clause is in principle exempted but may be open to control either because lacking transparency or because Latvian law did not incorporate the exemption at the time the contract was concluded; if the national court does assess the clause, they should consider national default rules, good market practices of the time as well as the best interest of the child, but also consider that supposedly competent parents acted as representatives. Also, not discussed here because not at all surprising, if the term would be found unfair the national court would not be able to proceed to mitigation of the due sum - which opens to the usual drama around consequences since the contract would then likely be invalid. 

What will happen once the case is back with the Latvian courts then? Readers who have access to Latvian sources - do reach out to let me know! This case has all the ingredients of an instant classic.

Validity of limitation periods for claiming mortgage costs back from banks - CJEU in Caixabank (C-484/21) and Banco Santander (C-561/21)

While many consumer lawyers are currently busy analysing the details of the opinion of AG Emiliou in Compass Banca case (C-646/22) (and we will add our own analysis of it in the coming days, too), on the same day (April 25) two judgments were issued by the CJEU clarifying the consequences of terms' unfairness on restitution of costs paid by consumers. Both in Caixabank (Délai de prescription) (C-484/21) and Banco Santander (Départ du délai de prescription) (C-561/21) Spanish courts posed questions concerning validity of various limitation periods for consumers raising a restitution claim for 'the costs clause'. The costs clause included in mortgage loan contracts obliged consumers to pay all the costs relating to the mortgage's creation. This may encompass notary, registry and agency fees.

The CJEU refers back to the Gutiérrez Naranjo and Others case (C-154/15 - with our comment here) to reaffirm the obligation of national courts to facilitate restitution of amounts consumers paid, which were imposed by an unfair contract term (e.g. paras 16-17 in C-484/21). Could national limitation periods stand in the way of such consumer claims? Previously, the CJEU already confirmed that limitation periods could be set in national laws as applicable to restitution claims brought by consumers in enforcing their rights from UCTD, however, these cannot make it in practice impossible or excessively difficult to exercise such rights (para 27 in C-484/21).

In short, regarding limitation periods for restitution claims, which are raised by consumers following a declaration of unfairness of terms setting the payment obligation, CJEU decided as follows:

1. They cannot start running from the date of the payment, irrespective of whether consumers were or could reasonably have been aware of the unfairness of terms at the time of the payment, or before the term was found to be void (paras 30, 32, 34-35 in C-484/21).
2. They cannot start running from the date on which the national supreme court delivered a judgment in a separate, earlier case, declaring a corresponding term unfair (C-484/21 and C-561/21). To pay attention to: The CJEU highlights here the lack of obligation for service providers to inform their consumers that terms in their contracts are equivalent in scope to terms in other contracts that have been found unfair (para 41 in C-484/21). Further, it mentions that average consumers cannot be 'required not only to keep himself or herself regularly informed, on his or her own initiative, of decisions of the national supreme court relating to standard terms contained in contracts of a similar nature to those which or she has concluded with sellers or suppliers, but also to determine, on the basis of a judgment of a national supreme court, whether a term included in a particular contract is unfair' (para 45 in C-484/21).
3. They cannot start running on the date of the CJEU's judgments, which confirmed, in principle, that limitation periods for actions for restitutions are compatible with EU law (provided they are equivalent and effective) (C-561/21). (for similar as above reasons + the fact that CJEU often leaves determination of unfairness to national courts - para 58 in C-561/21)
4. They can start running on the date on which the decision about unfairness of a term in a given case becomes final, without prejudice to the trader's right to prove that consumers were or could have been reasonably aware of the unfairness before the decision was made (paras 35-38 in C-561/21).

May airlines use T&Cs to prohibit passengers from assigning their rights to claim damages? - CJEU in Air Europa Lineas Aéreas (C-173/23)

In today's Air Europa Lineas Aéreas judgment (C-173/23) the CJEU looked into the application of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive (UCTD) to contracts concluded between air passengers and air carriers. Specifically, the passenger in case suffered damages as a result of a delay in receiving his checked-in baggage. He assigned his claim for damages against the air carrier (Air Europa) to a third party (Eventmedia). The air carrier disputes the transfer of rights to Eventmedia, claiming that assignment of passenger rights is prohibited by a clause in its general conditions of carriage (para 12). The referring court had sufficient evidence to declare this clause unfair ex officio but had doubts whether it could do so procedurally. First, the consumer was not part of the judicial proceedings, as he was represented by the assignee of his rights (whose standing was contested). Second, if the court declared the clause unfair the consumer, still remaining outside the judicial procedure, would not have received a chance to object to the application of this finding. 

Ex officio unfairness testing after consumers assigned their claims

First, the CJEU reminds that it has already previously declared (in the DelayFix case - C-519/19) that the UCTD's application is based on the capacity of the parties when they were concluding a contract (B2C) rather than the identity of parties entering into a dispute (paras 17-18). Therefore, the UCTD applies to more cases than just the ones, in which a dispute is between B2C contractual parties (para 25).

The CJEU reminds further that the ex officio judicial mechanism aims to compensate for the imbalance between consumers and professional parties (para 29). Other procedural issues remain in the discretion of the Member States, provided that they comply with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness (para 31).

To comply with the principle of equivalence here, the national court needs to determine whether national law allows it to ex officio assess whether a contractual term is contrary to national rules of public policy. If the answer is affirmative, the unfairness assessment also needs to take place ex officio (paras 34-35). This conclusion is not impacted by the consumer's presence in the judicial procedure, as if conditions for the applicability of the UCTD have been fulfilled (e.g., contract concluded B2C) its provisions benefit from having been assigned an equivalent status to domestic rules of public policy.

The assessment differs regarding the observance of the principle of effectiveness, as this considers the specifics of each procedure and the role that the contested legal provision plays in it. Specifically, " (...) whether a national procedural provision makes the application of EU law impossible or excessively difficult must be analysed by reference to the role of that provision in the procedure, its progress and its special features, viewed as a whole, and, where relevant, the principles which lie at the basis of the national legal system, such as the protection of the rights of the defence, the principle of legal certainty and the proper conduct of proceedings (...)." (para 37). Here then the fact that the procedure occurs between two professional parties weakens the need to provide as much protection against unfair terms, as if a consumer was one of the parties in the dispute, as there should be more balance between parties in the dispute (para 38). The principle of effectiveness does not require then the national court to test unfairness ex officio (para 39), unless the professional assignee of the consumer's claim had no real chance to rely on the unfairness in the procedure (para 40).

Consequences of unfairness in light of audi alterem partem when consumers are not part of the judicial process

When national courts find a term unfair ex officio, they follow the rules of audi alterem partem, of a fair hearing, by apprising parties in the dispute of court's findings and giving them an opportunity to debate these and to be heard (para 44). This applies also in case the dispute is between the assignee of the consumer rights and it is this assignee that needs to be informed of the unfairness finding, alongside the trader (para 46). As the consumer is not a party to the dispute, they do not need to be informed of the court's finding of unfairness and do not need to address it (para 49). It is the assignee of their rights that may object to it instead (para 47), although, obviously, they are unlikely to do so as they would then lose standing in the procedure (para 48).

***

The first part of the judgment has enormous practical relevance, as air passengers commonly assign their rights for compensation to third parties. It is, therefore, important for the effectiveness of passenger protection framework that air carriers could not block this process by prohibiting the transfer of rights in their general terms and conditions. This judgment will help assure this further, following the previous judgment in the DelayFix case (see our comment here), as professional assignees of consumers' claims will be able to raise unfairness of the prohibition of transfer of rights themselves. If this is prohibited or hindered, they could then rely on the breach of the principle of effectiveness and expect national courts to test unfairness ex officio (pursuant to para 40). This way assures more legal certainty than relying on the ex officio unfairness testing due to the principle of equivalence, as it could differ between the Member States whether ex officio testing of measures of public policy was allowed.

Facilitating enforcement of unfairness control - CJEU in Getin Noble Bank and Others (C-531/22)

Happy 2024 Dear Readers!

We are starting a new year of reporting with the reference to the last week's judgment in the Polish case referred to the CJEU as Getin Noble Bank and Others (C-531/22 - not yet available in English, but accessible in other languages). This judgments continues to provide guidance on the application of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive to terms in mortgage contracts indexed in Swiss Francs. The CJEU considered two questions/issues: 

1. Ex officio judicial authority to test unfairness while overseeing enforcement of a final payment order with res judicata status

To not keep you in suspense: The CJEU decided that national courts may ex officio assess unfairness in such circumstances, provided that: 1) national law did not allow for unfairness test at the moment of issuing of a payment order, or 2) if such unfairness test is only allowed if a consumer would have objected to the issued payment order, provided that there is a significant risk that a given consumer is not going to issue an objection. This risk could result from: the short time allowed for filing the objection, objection's costs compared to the debt amount, or the lack of obligation to provide consumer with all the information necessary to determine their rights in this respect (para 61). This is, in large extent, confirming Court's previous judgment in Leasing România judgment (C-725/19) (paras 50-51).

This is an important judgment to address some inefficiencies of the Polish civil law procedure that may limit the scope of the unfairness testing. Specifically, payment orders may be issued by Polish courts upon an electronic request by creditors, without the courts having either legal or technical access to contractual documents, on the basis of which this payment order is issued. If the debtor does not file an objection to the issued payment order within 2 weeks from its delivery, they become final with the res judicata status. This means that they may not be further questioned in enforcement proceedings (para 49). As the CJEU previously considered a 2 week timeframe too short to reasonably give a chance to consumers to file an objection (paras 54-55), this judgment clearly indicates the lack of compliance of the Polish civil procedural rules with the effective consumer protection framework against unfair contract terms. This finding is not weakened by the inertia of the consumer during previous judicial proceedings with them as a party, as the option to file an objection to the payment order is the only opportunity for the consumer to procedurally stop the enforcement proceedings, and as such the consumer needs to be given a real chance to do so (considering the timeframe, costs etc.) (para 60).

2. Recognition of an unfair character of a contract term, upon it having been entered into a register of unfair contract terms, also in subsequent judicial proceedings against a given consumer, even with a different trader involved and when the term has been differently drafted, but when it retained the same substance and led to the same consequences.

The CJEU first (paras 69-73) recalls the conditions for the validity of a register of unfair contract terms in national legal systems, which were first discussed in the Biuro case (see our comment here). Pursuant to the Court, the opportunity for national courts to compare a given contract term to a term already entered into a register after previous judicial proceedings, may lead to a more efficient and faster enforcement of the unfairness control, freeing consumers from harmful consequences of unfair terms in many contracts simultaneously (para 75). The finding of unfairness of a given term could then indeed be recognised and applied also in subsequent judicial proceedings - even with a different trader involved, and when the term has been differently drafted, but when it retained the same substance and led to the same consequences (para 78).

Consequences of unfair core terms - CJEU in mBank (C-140/22)

Last Thursday the CJEU issued a new judgment in the saga of Swiss francs mortgage loan contracts (C-140/22 - there is no English language text available yet). It was a Polish court who asked for a clarification of a few issues related to voiding such contracts as a result of them containing an unfair contract term, the removal of which would not enable the contract to remain in force.

Declaring unfairness 

The CJEU recalls its past judgment emphasising the obligation of national courts to assess (un)fairness of contract terms and ensure that any finding of unfairness results is fully remedied (Karel de Grote-Hogeschool Katholieke Hogeschool Antwerpen C-147/16 - with our comment - and Abanca C-70/17 - with our comment) (paras 53-55). Previous case law mentioned that consumers could, however, object to national courts attaching all the consequences resulting from finding of an unfair contract term, pursuant to the UCTD. Namely, when consumers are informed by courts about the presence of an unfair contract term in their contract, they could then decide, while fully informed, to still be bound by that term, which would give effect to the freedom of contract  and the UCTD's protection (para 57). The CJEU rightly emphasises now that this right for consumers to object to courts applying the UCTD provisions should not be interpreted as placing an obligation on consumers to declare that they do not object to the UCTD's application (para 56). This could deter consumers from benefiting from the scope of the UCTD's protection and further discourage traders from agreeing to consumers' out-of-court settlement claims (para 61). The CJEU reminds also that even if consumers are not present at court, the CJEU has an obligation to ex officio assess the unfairness of a contract term and apply the consequences following from the UCTD (para 60).

In short, the CJEU decided that the Unfair Contract Terms Directive should not be interpreted by national courts as requiring consumers to declare: 1) their consent to voiding an unfair contract term; 2) their awareness of the consequences that this voidness would have (voiding the whole contract); and 3) their consent to voiding the whole contract.

Financial consequences of unfairness

The CJEU recalls that when a mortgage loan contract is declared void, due to the finding of an unfair core term, consumers should only reimburse the bank by the amount of a borrowed loan, and possibly also statutory interest if they delay this reimbursement (para 62; also Bank M, C-520/21 - see our comment). Any further claims for reimbursement by banks would limit the deterrent effect of the UCTD (para 63).

Consequently, if as the result of finding an unfair core contract term the entire mortgage loan contract is voided, the UCTD prohibits national courts from calculating the impact of that voidness in a way that deducts from the consumer compensation of loan amounts paid to the bank, amounts of interest that the bank would have received if the contract remained in force.

Alternative terms on performance, average consumers... tune in to CJEU in mBank (C-139/22)

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Today the CJEU decided another case on unfairness in mortgage loan agreements with an index-link to Swiss francs - in the Polish mBank case (C-139/22). The first part of the judgment is Poland-specific, as it refers to the validity and effect of a national register of unlawful terms, which Poland happens to have. This issue has already been considered in the previous Biuro case (see our comment on case C-119/15 here). The Court now reiterated that as long as the register is transparent, kept up to date, and the traders have an opportunity to question the applicability of the register in their particular case, national courts could benefit from such registers (paras 41-43). Hence, contested terms could be declared by national courts as unfair if their content has previously  been registered as unfair, provided that the court warns parties to the proceeding about this and gives the trader the opportunity to challenge this finding (para 45). 

The second question was more interesting: What happens if the mortgage loan contract contains a term that is likely to be unfair, however, it also contains another term, which allows consumers to disregard the unfair term and follow a different path for contractual performance? In this case, the contract included a term that obliged consumers to reimburse a loan index-linked to Swiss francs 'exclusively in the national currency as converted according to a rate of exchange freely determined by the bank' (para 52). This term was previously determined as unfair by Polish courts. However, the contract also included a term that allowed consumers instead to reimburse the bank directly in Swiss francs. This would allow consumers to choose where to obtain Swiss francs from, avoiding the conversion rates set by mBank. According to the bank, consumers could have then avoided the detrimental effect of the first term, which, again pursuant to the bank. would not lead to unfairness. The Court rightly rejects this argumentation. Contrarily, it emphasises that a contract containing such a mechanism - two alternative terms referring to the same obligation, one of which is unfair and one of which is lawful - per definition should be considered unfair (para 55). The trader could be seen as counting on consumers' 'lack of information, failure to pay due attention or a lack of understanding', which would lead them to re-pay the loan in the way set out by the detrimental, unfair term, with the other term then only providing a mechanism to avoid liability by the trader (para 55).

Interestingly, the Court makes the above-finding fully aware of the average consumer standard that applies to the interpretation of the UCTD provisions. On its basis, we could expect that reasonably well-informed and circumspect consumers, who are to read and attempt to understand the contract and its consequences, should recognise the better of the two options for re-payment. And yet... the Court does not think so.

The average consumer is mentioned by the Court when giving the answer to the third question: Does the fact that one of the borrowers worked for the bank exclude them from the scope of protection of the UCTD? The answer is: No. As the concluded contract does not pertain to the employment relationship, the sole fact that it is concluded with the employer does not mean that it could change its non-commercial purpose (para 69). Further, even if the consumer in this case had insights into exchange rates of mBank, which were not available to consumers not working for this bank, this did not mean that their 'more specialised' knowledge should exclude them from the scope of protection of the UCTD. The CJEU reminds that we refer to the objective benchmark of an average consumer and their knowledge. Thus neither less nor more consumer knowledge in a given case will matter (para 66).

Bad faith of sellers in unfairness cases - CJEU in CAJASUR Banco (C-35/22)

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In a recent case, from 13 July, in CAJASUR Banco (C-35/22), the CJEU reflects further on the need of national laws providing effective and equivalent consumer protection against unfair contract terms. In this Spanish case, the consumer succeeded in claiming unfairness of terms in a mortgage loan agreement. However, the bank appealed the order to repay consumer fees for the legal proceedings. Pursuant to Spanish law, only defendants who were in bad faith would need to pay such costs. The bad faith would be established if before the legal action the bank 'has received a due and substantiated demand for payment, mediation proceedings have been initiated or a request for conciliation has been made...' (paras 9 and 29-30). The consumer did not take such actions in this case. 

The question posed to the CJEU boiled down to: Whether if national laws prevented consumers from claiming back costs of legal proceedings, when such consumers have not taken any actions prior to brining proceedings against sellers, this would contradict Article 6 UCTD - providing effective sanctions against unfairness of contract terms. As the Member States have procedural autonomy, they may set rules regarding costs of legal proceedings, provided that these comply with the principles of effectiveness and equivalence (para 24). The CJEU reiterates its various previous rulings on the impact that awarding (or not) of costs may have on consumers' willingness to exercise their rights against unfair contract terms (paras 25-28). 

In light of facts of the given case, what struck the CJEU was the one-sidedness of the Spanish law requirement to initiate mediation/conciliation before legal proceedings. This burden is purely placed on consumers as plaintiffs in cases against unfairness (para 31). Whilst taking of such steps may help with releasing the pressure on the judicial system (argument of the Spanish Government), the CJEU legitimately then expects this burden to be shared between the parties. For example, banks could be expected to pro-actively approach consumers with contracts containing terms that have been established as unfair in settled national case law (para 32). If national law places such burdens solely on consumers, it does not encourage sellers 'to draw, voluntarily and spontaneously, all the consequences of the case-law on unfair contract terms and thus promotes the continuation of the effects of those terms.' (para 34). The CJEU, expecting active behaviour from the sellers, then continues to state that if in case of 'inertia on the part of the seller...' in contacting consumers and disapplying unfair terms to them, consumers start legal actions, this should not be held against them (para 35). Conclusively, the CJEU then recognises that national law could choose bad faith as a requirement for awarding costs of proceedings (para 38). However, national courts should be ready to recognise such bad faith also when banks, aware of consumers' weaker position, wait with admitting the claim until consumers' take action, just to avoid having to pay the costs of proceedings, instead of informing them of terms' unfairness of their own will (paras 36-37).

What looked at a glance as another judgment focused on a small procedural issue, actually  could have far-reaching consequences for consumer protection. If the reasoning of the CJEU is extrapolated to other situations when sellers have knowledge of unfairness of consumer terms but do not act on it, which would lead to the recognition of sellers acting in bad faith, in various national laws this could have further ramifications for award of damages, burden of proof, etc.

Average consumers not expected to conduct legal research - CJEU in Banco Santander (C-265/22)

 Patrick Tomasso on Unsplash

On July 13th, the CJEU issued a judgment further clarifying the principle of transparency under the Unfair Contract Terms Directive in variable-rate mortgage loan contracts, in the case Banco Santander (C-265/22). In such contracts the interest rate is variable with time, here: a new rate was to be determined every year for the following 12 months.  

In the Spanish case referred to the CJEU, consumers' interest rate was calculated with reference to the Mortgage Loan Reference Indices (IRPH). Consumers claimed that they were not informed as to the full impact of having such a reference rate, with relevant information either missing from the mortgage loan agreement or not being properly communicated to them. Whilst the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive was not yet applicable at the time the mortgage loan contract was concluded (2006), the Court could not consider whether the bank engaged in a misleading commercial practice. It was, however, able to assess that the UCTD may have been infringed if the bank's practice did not allow for applying to the IRPH a negative margin, in order to align the interest rate with the market rate.

The CJEU reiterates the main points on transparency from the Andriciuc and Others judgment (see our comment): Consumers require sufficient information to take prudent and well-informed decisions; mainly average consumers need to be able to estimate the total cost of the loan (para 53). This translates into an obligation, when variable-rate mortgage loan contracts are concluded, for average consumers to understand: the specific functioning of the method used for calculating that rate (para 55). This requires consumers to have easy access to the main elements relating to the calculation of the reference index (para 56). The national court in the given case needs to check whether the information provided in the agreement (with the index being published by the Bank of Spain and having been described in Annex VIII to the agreement) was sufficient for average consumers to become aware of the method of calculation of the variable interest rate (paras 57-58). Further, the national court should consider whether the lack of information in the loan agreement on a non-binding circular issued by the Bank of Spain could have been detrimental to the average consumer's ability to estimate the total loan cost. This in light of the circular stressing its significance for credit institutions (para 59). The CJEU seems to imply in para 60 that it would go to far to expect average consumers to conduct legal research, that is to try to find other documents of the Bank of Spain that could be applicable to the variable-rate mortgage loans, which have not been referenced in the agreement.

Whilst the CJEU reiterates the finding from the order in Gómez del Moral Guasch that the lack of transparency of a term does not render it, in itself, unfair, it would weigh in on the unfairness test (para 66). Further, the national court, when estimating whether the contract term introduces significant imbalance between parties' rights and obligations, has to look at what rules would apply in the absence of the agreement and assess to what extent the contractual provisions put the consumer at a detriment (Banco Primus - see our comment). With variable-rate mortgage loans this means comparing the interest rate to the statutory interest rate and the interest rates applied on the market at the date of conclusion of the agreement at issue... for a loan of a comparable sum and term (para 65).

UPDATED:

Readers interested in finding out more about the intricacies of the financial indexes used in Spain for calculating variable-rates in mortgage loan contracts, the legal value of circulars issued by the Bank of Spain, and the possible misconstruction of Spanish law by the CJEU - please check the comment of Prof. Ernesto Suárez from ESADE and UPF Law Schools in Spain.

Limits of unfair terms control, limits of harmonisation: CJEU in First Bank SA (C-593/22)

Is unfairness, like beauty, foremost in the eyes of the beholder('s Member State)?

Yesterday, the Court of Justice has decides a seemingly obvious case the systematic implications of which may be a bit more serious than they seem at first glance. In First Bank SA, the Court was asked to interpret the scope of application of Directive 93/13, in particular to the extent that its Article 1(2) declares that

"contractual terms which reflect mandatory statutory or regulatory provisions and the provisions or principles of international conventions to which the Member States or the Community are party, particularly in the transport area, shall not be subject to the provisions of this Directive." 

This is a more radical exclusion than the one dictated by Article 4 for core terms, which was inserted at a relatively late stage in the legislative process and in any event requires terms to be drafted in plain and intelligible language, in accordance with the same Directive's Article 5. 

The justification for this exclusion is a presumption in favour of national laws - the latter being trusted to have established a fair balance between the rights and duties of the parties to the contract. The exclusion of Article 1(2), in this sense, is an absolute presumption: As the Court has put it, the idea of a national fair balance is not a requirement for the exclusion, but just a rationale. Whether the legislatively established balance is fair or not does not really matter. 

Against this background, some Romanian customers tried to challenge terms in credit contracts that put all the risk for currency exchange fluctuations onto them. It appeared plausible, however, to claim that such terms were in line with a general provision in Romanian contract law expressing the principle of "monetary nominalism", namely the idea that the debtor always owes the amounts agreed in the given currency and not a specific value in terms of purchase power. 

Two questions were raised in this context: 1) whether the exception only applies when the contract terms literally reproduce legal provisions; 2) whether it matters, to the ends of applying the exception, that the consumer may have not understood that the term at stake was in fact equivalent to valid provisions of national law. 

Both questions were answered rather swiftly and without intervention of an AG. As to the first, the Court [see para 25] concluded that national courts must ascertain whether the clause at stake incorporates the same "normative content" as the corresponding provisions of national law; in that case, the terms can be assumed to "reflect" legal provisions, with no need for literal reproduction. 

Only slightly more interestingly, the Court dismissed the idea that understanding by the consumer may matter: relying on an unpublished order [see para 32], the Court clarifies that it has already once established that the professional's compliance with its disclosure and transparency obligations is not relevant to the ends of Article 1(2). This is ultimately the necessary implication of assuming that the exclusion must be interpreted objectively and not on the basis of parties' understandings. 

All in all, this is hardly a surprising decision. However, from a consistency perspective, it brings to the fore interesting questions concerning the tensions implied in the Directive's original choices - isn't it a problem [that this not-all-too-restrictive interpretation of] Article 1(2) further undermines the harmonising effects of the Directive? How does it fit with the role of transparency in respect of core terms? Is it acceptable that obviously extractive interest fluctuation clauses are assessed differently in the different Member States? 

In other words, if the Directive trusts both states (in respect of national rules) and private autonomy (in respect of core terms and price-service ration), why does the subjective understanding of the consumer not play even the least role in (applying) the exception? It looks like the stark reliance on the exemption rules as entirely formalistically interpreted and objectively applied reinforces the differences between Member States and takes the position of individual contractual parties in very little consideration. The reader will point to the obviously different formulation of the two provisions in Article 1(2) and 4 explained at the beginning of this post; whether a different formulation in the future would be acceptable to Member States and not end up diluting rather than improving consumer protection, in all honesty, is a prediction we will have to leave for another day.

PS In case you are wondering, immediate inspiration for today's title was provided by a paper written by my colleague Chantal Mak in re Gutierrez Naranjo a few years ago - also on dynamics of EU and national unfair terms rules. You find it on SSRN.

Suspending payments of monthly loan instalments for consumers awaiting finding of unfairness - CJEU in Getin Noble Bank (C-287/22)

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On June 15th, aside the Bank M judgment (see our previous comment here), the CJEU addressed Polish law implementing the Unfair Contract Terms Directive also in the case Getin Noble Bank (C-287/22). Also in this judgment the CJEU chose for a consumer-friendly interpretation of the UCTD, precluding national courts from dismissing a consumer's application for the grant of interim measures (namely, a suspension of the payment of the monthly instalments due under a loan agreement) when a decision on the invalidity of the loan agreement, due to unfairness of its terms, is pending. Such interim measures should be granted by national courts, if this is necessary to ensure 'the full effectiveness' of the invalidity decision. 

Polish consumers in the given case claimed unfairness of terms in a loan agreement converting the loan amount into Swiss francs at the purchase rate fixed by the bank, with monthly instalments repayable in Polish zlotys at the Swiss francs sale rate, also unilaterally fixed by the bank. What interests us, and the courts, however, is that in their claim they asked for the following interim measures being granted: 1) suspension of the obligation to pay monthly instalments until the final judicial decision; 2) prohibiting the bank to issue consumers with a notice of termination; 3) prohibiting the bank to publish any information that the applicants are in default on their loan payments during this time. The first sought measure could help with the improvement of the financial situation of consumers, who are likely to await the first court's decision for min of 2-3 years (para 53). The second measure would prevent the bank from taking punitive measure as a result of consumers' pursuing their claims. The third measure would not allow the bank to tarnish consumers' credit score.

Polish law allows to grant interim measures only when there is a 'legitimate interest' of the applicants in them, which amounts to showing that "the failure to grant interim measures would prevent or seriously impede the enforcement of the forthcoming judgment in the main proceedings or the achievement of the purpose of the proceedings in that case" (para 19). Polish courts have so far not been willing to recognise the existence of such an interest in Swiss francs loan cases, due to either of the following: 1) invalidity of a contract as a result of unfairness not leading to enforcement; 2) the need for interim measures to help avoid consumer harm, which could e.g. occur if the bank was in a poor financial situation; 3) consumers possibly being required to repay the loan capital when unfairness and invalidity is declared, which means that their continued payment of monthly instalments would be beneficial to them, limiting the final repayment amount (para 20).

The CJEU first refers to the past judgment in Aziz case (see our comment on it here), recalling that it already precluded national law from not allowing to grant interim measures to consumers awaiting a declaration of unfairness (and its consequences), when interim measures were necessary to ensure that the final national judgment is effective in protecting consumers (para 41). In Aziz case the interim measures were related to staying enforcement proceedings when consumers defaulted on paying their mortgages, which in Spain led to accelerated proceedings of mortgage enforcement.

Further, it reminds that in the case Fernández Oliva and Others (joined cases C-568/14-570/14 - see here) it considered granting of interim measures as necessary to protect consumers from the risk of paying higher than necessary monthly instalments during lengthy judicial proceedings (para 42).

As, pursuant to Polish law, consumers may only claim repayment of monthly instalments already paid at the moment of bringing an unfairness claim to court, this means that without the interim measures, they would need to bring a second claim to courts after succeeding in the first one (para 22). They would also be obliged to pay legal costs for the second time (para 50). The CJEU highlights that such an application of Polish law would make at least partially the forthcoming final decision ineffective, as it would "not have the effect of restoring the legal and factual situation of that consumer in the absence of that unfair term" (para 48).

Importantly, it is up to national courts to consider how likely the finding of unfairness is in a given case. If there is sufficient evidence of unfair terms, the removal of which could lead to invalidating the contract, plus there is evidence that consumers are likely to overpay banks without courts granting interim measures - the latter should be awarded (para 59).

Upon unfairness of mortgages, banks may suffer financially - CJEU in Bank M. (C-520/21)

Last Thursday the CJEU issued a much-awaited judgment in the Polish case Bank M. (C-520/21), another case dealing with the fallout of mortgage loans concluded by consumers in a foreign currency. This time the questions asked by the national court pertained to the consequences for the parties of the court declaring the whole contract null and void. When a mortgage loan contract is invalidated, it is clear to the referring court that that parties need to reimburse the sums payment (the bank should receive the loan principal, consumers - monthly payments, fees, commissions and insurance premium). But could other sums be claimed, mainly on the basis of unjust enrichment under national law? For example, could consumers claim from banks interest on the amounts they overpaid over the years, due to changes to currency exchange rates? Could banks in turn claim from consumers interest on the sum of money they were not able to otherwise invest as they provided it as a loan principal? Polish banks have indeed threatened consumers pursuing the unfairness of mortgage loan terms by asserting claims against consumers in such cases on the basis of the non-contractual use of the capital (Banki pozywaja frankowiczow, by przerwac bieg przedawnienia). 

The court relies heavily in its opening statement on the previous judgment in the case Gutiérrez Naranjo and Others (see our comment here), recalling the importance of the restitutory effect of the declaration of unfairness: Consumers must be brought back to the position (legal and factual), they would have been in if the unfair term had not existed (paras 61, 65). The second important function of the consumer protection against unfairness is to deter sellers and service providers from imposing unfair terms on consumers. National law then, in order to be compliant with the UCTD, needs to facilitate restoration of consumers to the position they would have been in if not for unfairness, as well as needs not to undermine the deterrent effect of the UCTD (para 68).

In this light, if national laws facilitate consumers claiming additional compensation from banks than the reimbursement of the monthly sums paid etc, this should not undermine the objectives mentioned above. To the contrary, such legal options may enhance the deterrent effect of the consumer protection framework against unfairness (paras 69-71). The Court recalls the need to adhere to the principle of proportionality though, which means that national courts should assess whether consumer claims do not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the above-mentioned objectives (para 73).

The same reasoning could not be applied to assess the compliance of national laws allowing banks to claim further compensation from consumers than the reimbursement of the loan principal. Such a legal option would undermine the deterrent effect of the protective framework (para 76). It could also discourage consumers from seeking to complain against unfair terms, as it may be more economically beneficial to continue with the performance of a contract containing unfair terms (para 79). The Court is not dissuaded from concluding this by arguments raised by banks indicating the fragility of the financial market at the moment, as well as claims that consumers will be receiving their loans 'free of charge' (para 80). The Court falls back on the principle nemo auditur turpitudinem allegans (no one may rely on their own wrongdoing). As banks chose to use unfair terms in their mortgage loan contracts, they may not now complain that they will lose their profits (para 82).

This judgment follows previously issued AG Collins' opinion. It has been rejoiced in Poland, where banks started counter-suing consumers not only for the return of the loan principal but also for the compensation for its use during the loan period, before the mortgage contract is annulled. Banks generally estimated such compensation to equal at least 50% of the loan principal, which would seriously impede any consumers' winning claim as to unfair mortgage loan terms. Now, if only the Polish courts were given additional resources to actually be able to handle all these cases, so that consumers could find their redress in a timely fashion.

CJEU confirms: consumer notions in contract law and private international law are not equivalent

Earlier today the Court of Justice issued the judgment in case C‑570/21, YYY. (Notion de consommateur). The case concerned, once again, the notion of the consumer under Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer contracts (UCTD). The Court has already dealt with similar problems in its earlier case law, recently e.g. in case C-485/21, S.V. (Immeuble en copropriété). The judgment confirmed that the notion of the consumer in mixed-purpose contracts under UCTD should be understood broadly. The ruling does not come as a surprise; what is nevertheless noteworthy is an explicit confirmation that the notion of the consumer in contract law is different from that in private international law. The Court, moreover, provided additional guidance on the interpretation of consumer notion in joint credit agreements.

Facts of the case

The case involved a credit contract concluded between a bank and two married debtors, one of whom self-employed. The loan amount was devoted partly to the professional purposes and partly to the private purposes. Specifically, 35% of the loan was used to make outstanding payments for the company of one of the debtors, while the remaining 65% was used to used to finance renovation works in the debtors' house. Against this background, a question was raised whether the contract qualified as a business-to-consumer contract and fell within the scope of the UCTD.

"Not predominant" vs. "negligible" purpose

The referring court requested the interpretation of Article 2(b) UCTD, which defines the notion of the consumer, explicitly enquiring about the relevance of the Gruber case law in that context. To recall, the Court established in Gruber that a person who concludes a contract for goods intended for purposes which are in part within and in part outside his or her trade or profession may not rely on the special rules of jurisdiction, unless the trade or professional purpose is "so limited as to be negligible" in the overall context of the supply. This seemed to be at odds with the wording on mixed-purpose contacts found, among others, in Directive 2011/83/EU on consumer rights (CRD). Specifically, pursuant to recital 17 of the CRD where the contract is concluded for purposes partly within and partly outside the person’s trade and the trade purpose is "so limited as not to be predominant" in the overall context of the contract, that person should also be considered as a consumer.

As mentioned, already the previous judgments of the Court suggested that the Gruber test cannot be applied more broadly to consumer law, but is limited to the specific context of applicable law and jurisdiction. The Court has now made this distinction explicit. It drew attention to a close connection between the UCTD and the CRD, recently strengthened via the Omnibus Directive (para. 43). The Court emphasised that both directives follow the same main objective, namely to provide for a high level of consumer protection (para. 42). It also observed that a wording similar to that in recital 17 CRD can also be found in the ADR Directive and the ODR Regulation, suggesting that the legislator intended such a broader reading to have a horizontal nature (para. 45). Accordingly, the notion of the consumer under UCTD must be understood as also covering a person who concludes a dual purpose contract if the trade purpose is so limited as not to be predominant in the overall context of the contract.

The more restrictive reading of the consumer notion in mixed-purpose contracts continues to be relevant in the domain of private international law. Here, as the Court noted, additional objectives must be considered, namely the legal certainty and predictability of the jurisdiction. The more recent Schrems judgment does not undermine this reading (para. 47). 

Joint credit agreements

Having clarified the outer boundaries of the consumer concept, the Court went on to provide more specific guidelines on its interpretation in the case at hand. Firstly, it stressed that the referring court should take all circumstances of the case into account, including the nature of the product or the service. In case of mixed-purpose credit contracts, the Court indicated that the scope of professional and personal components of the contract and the dominant purpose of the contract should be considered. The Court then went on to formulate more specific criteria, noting that they are neither exhaustive nor exclusive (para. 58). In particular, the quantitative breakdown of the borrowed sum between the two respective purposes may be an important criterion. However, also qualitative criteria may turn out to be relevant, e.g. the fact that only one of a larger number of debtors pursues a professional activity or that the granting of a loan, initially intended solely for private purposes, was made conditional upon the partial allocation of the borrowed amount to the repayment of trade-related debts.

Overall, the judgment in case C‑570/21, YYY, is a welcome ruling, dispelling some persisting doubts about the reading of consumer notion in different legal acts. Nonetheless, the differentiated interpretation may, in itself, pose practical challenges, as the second judgment issued on the same day illustrates.