Thursday 8 July 2021

EU Justice Scoreboard 2021

Today, 8th of July, the EU Commission released the 2021 EU Justice Scoreboard (here). The Scoreboard is a comparative information tool, and it presents an annual overview of indicators measuring the efficiency, quality, and independence of justice systems in the EU.

According to the Scoreboard, ‘[a]n efficient justice system manages its caseload and backlog of cases, and delivers its decisions without undue delay’. The report presents data on the efficiency of consumer law litigation. In particular, the report shows data on the average length of judicial review cases against decisions of consumer protection authorities applying EU law (regarding the enforcement of the Unfair Terms Directive, the Consumer Sales Directive, the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, and the Consumer Rights Directive). The data allows for a comparison between 2013, 2016, 2018, and 2019. The most recent data (2019) shows that the Member States where consumer litigation takes the longest are Cyprus (around 1800 days, approximately 5 years), Greece (around 1700 days, approximately 4,5 years); and Poland (around 900 days, approximately 2,5 years). On the other hand, the Member States where consumer litigation is the fastest are Hungary (around 100 days, or 3,3 months), Lithuania (around 150 days, or 5 months), and Romania (around 160 days, or 5,3 months). Even though these results are not representative of all EU Member States (for example, Germany, Luxembourg, and Austria were not included in the study because consumer authorities do not have the power to decide on consumer law infringements), one of the conclusions to take is the stark difference in the length of enforcement of consumer rights within the EU. Nevertheless, several represented Member States achieved faster procedures than when compared to 2016 (with the exceptions of, for example, Slovenia and Poland).

Additionally, the report presents data on the length of proceedings by consumer authorities, including decisions declaring infringements of substantive rules, interim measures, and cease and desist orders (regarding the same Directives). The data presented also covers 2013, 2016, 2018, and 2019. In 2019, among the Member States where consumer authorities take the longest to decide, there is Poland (around 600 days, or approximately 1,6 years), Greece (around 350 days, or 1 year), and Slovakia (around 200 days, or approximately 6,6 months). It is interesting to note the parallel with the length of court procedures presented above. On the other hand, among the Member States where consumer authorities are fastest to decide, there is Romania (around 20 days), Estonia (around 20 days), and Slovenia (around 20 days).

It is also noteworthy that, when measuring the quality of justice systems, the Scoreboard shows data on legal aid in consumer claims of 6 000 euros. It is worrying that, in 2020, several Member States (including France, Slovakia, and Romania) may not consider people with an income below the poverty threshold as eligible for any type of legal aid (partial or total). The Scoreboard includes many more interesting insights, and it is definitely worth a read.

AG De La Tour on Volvo and others (C‑30/20): Article 7(2) of Brussels I establishes international and domestic jurisdiction in cases of tort harms and anticompetitive practices

Case C-30/20 (AG’s Opinion here) concerns the interpretation of Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 (Brussels I), which states that a person can be sued in the place where the harmful event occurred (regarding tort, delict or quasi-delict harms).

Between 2004 and 2009, RH (the claimant) purchased five trucks from Volvo for its road transport business. In 2016, the Commission found that there was a cartel between fifteen truck manufacturers, including AB Volvo, Volvo Lastvagnar AB and Volvo Group Trucks Central Europe GmbH concerning medium trucks and heavy trucks (in the period between 1997-2011). RH sued the Volvo group in Spain, even though three of the four sued companies are based outside of Spain. The Volvo companies contested the international jurisdiction of Spanish courts, and argued that Article 7 refers to the place where the ‘event giving rise to the damage occurred’, which would be the place where the cartel was formed. The referring court questioned whether Article 7 of Brussels I refers solely to international jurisdiction or also to domestic jurisdiction, especially considering existing national case law determining that this rule does not determine the territorial domestic jurisdiction of a court in private competition actions. In this sense, the referring court asked the CJEU whether Article 7(2) of Brussels I should be interpreted as imposing only international jurisdiction in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, and whether the domestic court with jurisdiction should be determined by national civil procedure rules, or if, on the other hand, Article 7(2) also determines domestic territorial jurisdiction without the need to refer to domestic regulation.

AG De La Tour considered that Article 7(2) does not only impose international jurisdiction, but also determines domestic jurisdiction. The Advocate General analyzed the literal, systematic and teleological element of interpretation. When comparing Article 4(1) of the Brussels I Regulation with Article 7(2), the Advocate General stated that, while the former refers to ‘the courts’ of the Member State where the persons sued are domiciled, the latter refers to ‘the courts for the place’. This difference in wording seems to point towards different jurisdiction scopes. Additionally, since Article 7(2) is a special jurisdiction rule, AG De La Tour reminded that these rules are meant to protect a weak party, and, in that sense, these special rules have a nature of derogation. Finally, these special rules are meant to allow the party to choose the courts of a Member State based on the place with which the dispute has a particular connection, as well as to facilitate the sound administration of justice.

In addition, AG De La Tour considered that this analysis should be supplemented by further details as to the place where the alleged damage occurred, as well as to the specific designation of the court having special jurisdiction. In this sense, the Advocate General differentiated the current case from related cases (such as Tibor-Trans, where the CJEU determined that ‘where the market affected by the anticompetitive conduct is in the Member State on whose territory the alleged damage is purported to have occurred, that Member State must be regarded as the place where the damage occurred for the purposes of applying Article 7(2)’). The Advocate General concludes that, in the relevant related cases, the justification of the connecting factor adopted by the CJEU indicates that the ‘distinctive feature of competition litigation was taken into consideration in concrete terms’ (para 66). 

AG De La Tour also stated that the determination of the place where the damage occurred operated by the CJEU in Tibor Trans is not sufficient to specify the exact location of the court having territorial jurisdiction, which constitutes a source of legal uncertainty (para 70). The AG considered, therefore, that the CJEU should complement the answer given in Tibor Trans, particularly by taking into account ‘the number of proceedings which could be brought due to the extent of the cartel at issue’. In particular, the Advocate General noted that it is necessary to consider that, especially in the vehicle sales and transport sector, the place where the market (affected by the cartel) leads to additional costs is not necessarily the place where the goods were purchased (para 79).

For these reasons, the Advocate General calls for the CJEU to clarify the criteria for identifying the relevant court when interpreting the expression ‘place where the harmful event occurred’ (Article 7(2) Brussels I Regulation), and for the CJEU to draw a parallel with case Verein für Konsumenteninformation, where the CJEU held that ‘the place where the damage occurred is that where the vehicle in question was purchased’. The Advocate General also highlighted that it is important to assess the meaning of ‘purchase’ because, in the context of these proceedings, RH concluded leasing agreements, under which it became the owner of the trucks. This assessment should be done from an economic perspective, because the claim for compensation is based on competition law (para 86). AG De La Tour then interprets it as meaning ‘the place where [the] transaction was concluded’, understood in a wide sense as the place where the agreement was reached (and not where the price was paid) (para 88). Therefore, according to the Advocate General, the criterion of ‘the place where the transaction was concluded’ is sufficient to identify the court ‘objectively best placed to analyse the constituent elements of the defendant’s liability’. In this case, that means the place where the trucks were purchased by RH.

However, the Advocate General also highlighted that, to protect the objective of providing easier access to evidence, two criteria for establishing the location of damage can coexist (para 108). In that case, AG De La Tour also proposes that ‘if the place where the damage occurred does not correspond to that where the injured party carries on business, the action may be brought before the court in whose jurisdiction the injured party is established’ (para 110).

Finally, the Advocate General also considered that, despite the fact that Article 7(2) of the Brussels I Regulation determines territorial jurisdiction at both an international and domestic level, the CJEU should interpret it as allowing Member States to centralize the jurisdiction in certain specialized courts (para 130).