Tuesday 30 July 2024

Hidden plane defects and cancelled flights - CJEU in C-385/23 (Finnair) and C-411/23 (D.)

This June the CJEU issued two judgments analysing the scope of the application of the 'extraordinary circumstances' exception to airlines' scope of liability for cancelled flights, where cancellation was a consequence of a hidden plane defect.  

In Finnair (C-385/23) a relatively new plane (5 months old) had a failure of a fuel gauge, which became evident during refuelling shortly before take-off. Due to flight safety concerns the flight was cancelled and passengers only flew the next day, arriving at their destination ca 20 hours late. Investigation of the defect showed that even though this plane was the first one to experience this defect, all other aircrafts of the same type suffered from this defect.

In D. (C-411/23) the carrier has received a notification of a hidden design defect in the engine from its manufacturer together with a list of restrictions on the future use of an aircraft. A few months later, the defect manifested and the engine had to be sent out for a repair. Due to a global engine shortage, engine replacement was not possible for almost a week in that plane. This meant that the passenger's flight was delayed by more than 3 hours, as an alternative aircraft had to be used to operate the flight.

Manufacturer reveals design defect after the technical failure occurred

Finnair's case is a relatively straightforward one. The CJEU confirms that the 'extraordinary circumstances' defence from Article 5(3) Regulation 261/2004 on air passenger rights applies also when the manufacturer of a plane discovers the existence of a hidden defect after that defect manifested and caused harm. The time of recognising a defect as a hidden one is irrelevant, thus this recognition does not have to precede the occurrence of a technical failure. While dealing with consequences of technical failures could normally be seen as falling within the normal exercise of airlines activity and within their control, the CJEU has previously recognised an exception for hidden manufacturing defects of planes (paras 30, 33-35).

Carrier's knowledge of the design defect before the technical failure occurred

Similarly, in D. the CJEU recalls previous case law on when technical failures may amount to 'extraordinary circumstances', i.e., when hidden design defects manifest themselves, as these are not inherent in airlines' normal activity and remain beyond their actual control (paras 34, 36-38). It then also stresses the irrelevance of the timeframe in which the manufacturer reveals the existence of a hidden defect to air carriers "since that defect existed at the time of the cancellation or long delay of the flight and the carrier had no means of control to correct it" (para 40).

This is an interesting conclusion, as we could have anticipated that if air carriers are informed about one of their aircrafts belonging to a class of planes with a hidden design defect, they would then have (some) control on the follow-up steps: repair or replacement. Taking remedial measures would also remain consistent with the objective of assuring a high level of flight safety (para 41). 

This brings us to the second part of Article 5(3) Regulation 261/2004 which only releases air carriers from their liability if they took 'reasonable measures' when extraordinary circumstances occurred, i.e. "conditions which are technically and economically viable for that carrier" (para 44). The CJEU leaves it to the national court to determine whether all reasonable measures have been taken by the carrier, both after the notification of a hidden defect and after this defect manifested itself (para 48). This could have included the airlines' capability (financial and technical) to have this engine repaired while replacing the grounded aircraft with a chartered one or by fitting a replacement engine in it (para 50). Alternatively, if this was viable, the airline could have arranged for a back-up fleet or aircraft and crew on standby (para 51). What the CJEU does not consider a reasonable measure is the airline resizing its operations just in case of a hypothetical occurrence of a defect (para 52).