EFSA studies to be made public in proposed General Food Law reform

On 11 April the EU Commission announced a new legislative proposal for improving transparency in scientific studies about food, by reforming the General Food Law (Regulation (EC) No 178/2002) The Proposal is based on a European Citizens’ Initiative and supported by the findings of the fitness check on general food law, as both pointed out issues relating to transparency of the studies. What is surprising is that the press release points out that the fitness check is in need of updating even though it was published in 2018. The General Food Law fitness check has been a long time coming, as it had been announced from 2013.

The Proposal suggests a targeted revision of the General Food Law. It is worth remembering that the General Food Law was introduced in response to the food crises in late 90s, such as the BSE crisis, which had a big impact on consumers’ trust to food safety. But which are they key changes included in the proposal?

All studies submitted to EFSA are to be made public, proactively and automatically, thus increasing transparency with the exclusion of confidential information. In practice, when an applicant submits a dossier for a study they will submit a confidential and a non-confidential version. The confidential version will be made public immediately and the confidential version will be assessed by EFSA and additional data may be made available to the public, if EFSA qualifies the as non-confidential.

A consultation procedure is to be established to allow stakeholders as well as the general public to have their say on submitted studies. What is important is that the consultation will include not only studies for the authorisation of new substances but also studies on the renewal of previously authorised substances. This ensures that renewal processes will not avoid the scrutiny of the public as new scientific evidence as to their effects may come to light after the initial authorisation. 

Furtermore, it includes measures on the governance of EFSA including the choice of experts for the scientific panels of EFSA to be made from a pool of candidates put forward by the Member States, thus involving them further in the process, as well as allowing EFSA to commission studies on a case to case bases in exceptional circumstances, such as when a substance is highly controversial.

This Proposal will not necessarily mean a higher standard of protection for consumers. What it means is that citizens will be able to be more involved in the law making process in this area and the legislators and will be held accountable with greater ease. That it will be possible to check the objectivity of the evidence used to inform regulation. Food law legislation can be highly divisive and one that generates great interest from civic society from environmental organisations to parent associations for issues such as GMOs or food additives. 

This signifies a new era in food law where citizens are more involved than ever before; this can be seen also in the origin of the proposal, a European Citizens’ Initiative, only one of four successful ones making this truly bottom-up regulation. Even though that particular initiative was focused on stopping glyphosate the Commission took on the comments on improving transparency to effect a lasting structural change. The Commission appears keen to push the proposal forward aiming for it to be adopted by mid-2019.

Joined cases Krüsemann - the Court disagrees with AG Tanchev

Dear readers, 

it feels like yesterday - and indeed it was just a couple of days ago! - that we were discussing the Advocate General's opinion in the joint cases concerning "wildcat" strikes at Tuifly. With incredible speed, the judgment was published today. 

The main question addressed in the opinion, and also the only question discussed in the judgment, is whether strikes of an airline's own personnel - and in particular informal strikes such as that at stake in the case before the Court - represented extraordinary circumstances within the meaning of the Passenger Rights Regulation. If you had read my previous post, you will know how much as a surprise the AG's opinion had come to me (and a few of my senior co-teachers in consumer and contract law to be honest!). 

Luckily, reading the Court's decision, it seems we will not have to change our teaching after all!

The decision, clearly excludes strikes arising from conflicts internal to the airline from the remit of "extraordinary circumstances"- including, for sound legal reasons, wildcat strikes. 

As to strikes in general, the Court observes that extraordinary circumstances have to meet two cumulative conditions: they must not be inherent to the normal exercise of the carrier's activity and they must not be within the carrier's sphere of control [para 32]. 

In the situation under consideration, according to the Court, it is clear that the strike action followed the unexpected announcement, by the company, of a restructuring plan. As the Commission had apparently submitted, the Court considers restructuring to be a normal component of the exercise of economic activity [para 38-40]. `To the extent that conciliatory actions on the side of the company were effectively able to stop the strike after a few days, the Court also considers the strike not to fall outside Tuifly's sphere of control [para 43-45].

With reference to the possibility of differentiating between "regular" and "wildcat" strikes, the Court raises one important point: namely, a differentiation based on what is legal and illegal industrial action in the country where the dispute originates would make passenger rights dependent on national law and give rise to discrepancies in consumer protection - something that the Regulation by its own nature seeks to eliminate [para 47].

Thus, the CJEU concludes, wildcat strikes following the announcement of a restructuring decision cannot fall within the notion of extraordinary circumstances outlined in the Passenger Rights Regulation. 

Sorry, AG Tanchev, better luck next time!     

Addressing financial innovation: the Action Plan on FinTech

On 8 March 2018 the EU Commission adopted the FinTech Action Plan: for a more competitive and innovative European financial sector, following a Public consultation (on which we reported here). The Action Plan aims towards a future-proof regulatory framework by creating favourable regulatory environment for the flourishing of FinTech services and products throughout the EU.  This initiative fits well with parallel efforts to create the Digital Single Market and the Capital Markets Union.

Although the use of technology in the provision of financial services and creation of financial products is ever increasing, the existing (large) discrepancies between Member States in the regulatory framework under which FinTech firms operate had not been ameliorated. Some Member States like the UK have adopted tailored approach to some, arguably most common, FinTech services and products (such as peer-to-peer lending and crowdfunding) and created a 'Regulatory Sandbox' to subject selected FinTech firms to the existing regulatory environment. The majority of Member States however does not have special  rules and regulatory/supervisory approach to these firms and their products and services are being subject to general rules designed for  'traditional' services and products. The discrepancies in regulatory approaches (from setting up a FinTech firm to offering products and services and supervising their operations) is an obstacle for the development of Single Market in this sector.

In the Action Plan the EU Commission addressed the above regulatory discrepancies in various ways. Most importantly, the Commission invites the European Supervisory Authorities to map the current authorising and licensing approaches applicable for FinTech firms in contemplation of creating a European Passporting Regime for these firms (by analogy to the regime currently applicable to bank). It also aims to review the suitability of the existing regulatory framework, including setting up an expert group to identify regulatory obstacles for FinTech (call for applications is open). Finally, the Commission will set up an EU FinTech Law where European and national authorities will receive training and education on technology enabled solutions.

While there is no doubt FinTech services and products may be hugely beneficial for consumers, making their transactions easier and enabling access to personalization of products and services (see some benefits here), FinTech carries a great deal of risk ranging from cybersecurity and data protection risks to the potential of unsuitable transactional decisions and the placement of dangerous products on the market. Although the Acton Plan does intent to facilitate a high level of consumer protection, it does not take into account the nature of consumer markets as such. As most European instruments, this initiative is heavily focused on raising the competitiveness of the EU and in providing choice for consumers. A systematic approach to consumer protection is absent. From a consumer protection point of view, the approach of the Action Plan is partial, addressing for example, the problems of informed decisions on retail investors,  and a danger from creating and marketing harmful products in some forms of speculative investments (crypto-assets).

Nevertheless, the initiative should be welcomed. Technology enabled services and products are a reality that should be addressed sooner rather than later. However, in reviewing the exiting EU regulatory framework and in creating and EU regulatory/supervisory approach, it is imperative to keep consumer interests and the true protection of consumers at the forefront of the initiatives. To this effect, perhaps it is time to conceptualize what is meant by a 'high level of consumer protection' and to follow it up systematically in addressing the protection of consumers on EU markets, including EU financial markets.

New Deal for Consumers: proposals on online transparency

In our earlier post we reported on the behavioural study on transparency of online platforms published by the Commission as part of its „New Deal for Consumers” package. We noted that it is hard not to agree with the general recommendations arising from the study (following up on the earlier documents published as part of the Fitness Check of the European consumer acquis and evaluation of the Consumer Rights Directive); however, for them to actually work in practice a number of detailed issues needed to be solved. Interestingly, several matters of relevance to online transparency addressed in the study have already found their way to the legislative proposals tabled on Tuesday. Should we praise the Commission for this pace of action? Let’s have a closer look at these elements of the “New Deal”.

Legislative package: basic facts

The legislative part of the “New Deal for Consumers” consists of the following two proposals:

• a proposed directive amending Directive 93/13/EEC (unfair terms), Directive 98/6/EC (price indication), Directive 2005/29/EC (unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices) and Directive 2011/83/EU (consumer rights) as regards better enforcement and modernisation of EU consumer protection rules (COM(2018) 185 final)
• a proposed directive on representative actions for the protection of the collective interests of consumers, and repealing Directive 2009/22/EC (injunctions) (COM(2018) 184 final) – to which a separate blog post will be devoted.

It is particularly the former proposal in which the new provisions regarding the “digital” sphere are contained  – mainly in the form of amendments to Directives 2005/29/EC (UCPD) and 2011/83/EU (CRD). 

As regards the transparency of online transactions, the proposed amendments affect two of the three dimensions of transparency addressed in the behavioural study: 1) the criteria for ranking and the presentational features of search results and 2) presenting the identity of contractual parties. By contrast, proposals on quality controls for consumer reviews and ratings appear to be missing.

Amendments to the UCPD

One of the ways in which the Commission plans to improve transparency of search results is via the amendment of No. 11 of Annex I to the UCPD. Acording to the new wording

11. Using editorial content in the media, or providing information to a consumer’s online search query, to promote a product where a trader has paid for the promotion without making that clear in the content or search results or by images or sounds clearly identifiable by the consumer (advertorial; paid placement or paid inclusion)

Search results marked as "Ads" on Google

would be qualified as one of the commercial practices considered to be unfair in all circumstances. This does not seem to effect a major change to the state of affairs as, indeed, the providers of leading search tools already identify paid results as such. It should be observed that the proposal does not contain any reference to factors other than direct payment which could have an impact of the placement of a search result such as corporate ties between the operator of a search engine and the supplier of the product or service.

Amendments to the CRD

While the adjustments made in the UCPD would apply to any provider of an online search tool, the amendments made to the CRD with respect to the ranking of offers and identity of contracting parties are essentially limited to "online marketplaces". The latter are defined in the proposed Artice 2(19) as "service providers which allow consumers to conclude online contracts with traders and consumers on the online marketplace’s online interface". This invites several comments.

First of all, while the Commission presents its definition of an online marketplace as "future-proof" this does not necessarily mean that it is free from doubts. Indeed, unlike definitions found in Directive 2011/83/EU on consumer ADR and in Regulation 524/201342 on consumer ODR, the new wording does not refer to a "website", but makes use of a more technologically neutral notion of an "online interface", defined by reference to the newly adopted Regulation 2018/302 on geo-blocking. At the same time, however, the proposed act does not seek to amend Article 7(3) of the CRD which refers to a "trading website". 

Secondly, the decisive function of an "online marketplace" consists in "allowing consumers to conclude online contracts on the online marketplace’s online interface". This seems to suggest that a service provider only qulifies as an online marketplace if the actual contract is concluded by means of the software  provided (website, mobile app), thus excluding webites which merely identify the relevant customers and suppliers.

Thirdly, the definition of an online marketplace refers to the contract concluded by consumers "with traders and consumers". This seems to put an end to a debate whether something like a "consumer-to-consumer contract" can exist. The relevant debate, however, is not limited to the question whether someone who actually sells a good or provides a service can be called a "consumer". This seemingly minor change in wording might also be difficult to reconcile with some national provisions in which a consumer status is intrinsically linked to the professional capacity of his counter-party (see, for example, Article 22[1] of the Polish Civil Code). 

The specific transparency provisions for online marketplaces are found in the proposed Article 6a of the CRD. According to this provision: 

Before a consumer is bound by a distance contract, or any corresponding offer, on an online marketplace, the online marketplace shall in addition provide the following information:

(a) the main parameters determining ranking of offers presented to the consumer as result of his search query on the online marketplace;

(b) whether the third party offering the goods, services or digital content is a trader or not, on the basis of the declaration of that third party to the online marketplace;

(c) whether consumer rights stemming from Union consumer legislation apply or not to the contract concluded; and 

(d) where the contract is concluded with a trader, which trader is responsible for ensuring the application of consumer rights stemming from Union consumer legislation in relation to the contract. This requirement is without prejudice to the responsibility that the online marketplace may have or may assume with regard to specific elements of the contract.

Concluding thought

Improving online transprency clearly belongs to the rationale of legislative proposals submitted by the Commission earlier this week. The specific proposals made promise to bring more clarity to consumers, but do not address all the identified problems. If the proposed directive was to be adopted in the current form, a further question might be asked as to the extent to which Member States could still intervene in ensure transparency of online platforms (considering the full harmonisation nature of both the UCPD and the CRD). The current wording of the proposals also leaves a range of interpretative questions open. Should these not be addressed in the legislative process, this important task will, once again, be left to the Court of Justice. 

No loophole for airlines- ECJ says an electronic complaint is a complaint in writing

On 12^th April the ECJ judgement on the Finnair case was published on article 31 of the Montreal Convention, with the main question revolving around what qualifies as a complaint in writing.

This is important as a complaint in writing is a requirement for bringing an action against the carrier.

The Court followed the AG Opinion (you can find the blog post on the AG opinion here).

 

Facts

Ms Mäkelä-Dermedesiotis travelled from Malaga to Helsinki on a Finnair flight in 2010. Upon arrival she discovered that items were missing from her checked-in luggage. On the same day of the flight, Ms Mäkelä-Dermedesiotis contacted the customer service of Finnair to report the incident. In that phonecall, she identified the lost items and informed the Finnair representative of their value. The representative entered the information provided by Ms Mäkelä-Dermedesiotis into the Finnair electronic information system. Ms Mäkelä-Dermedesiotis had taken out insurance and received compensation for her loss and the insurance company, Fennia, was subrogated in her place in the claim against Finnair. Finnair argued that Ms Mäkelä-Dermedesiotis had not filed a written claim within the periods laid down in Article 31 of the Montreal Convention.

 

Judgement

The first question was used to establish whether the requirements for bringing an action against the carrier are both filing a complaint within a certain time limit and in writing. The Court answered that indeed art. 31(4) of the Montreal Convention is to be interpreted in conjunction with art. 31(2) and 31(3), meaning that the complaint must be made in writing within the period specified in art.31(2).

For the second and main question, the Court chooses to interpret the term ‘in writing’ in a broader way stating that it ‘must be interpreted as referring to any set of meaningful graphic signs, irrespective of whether they are handwritten, printed on paper, or recorded in electronic form’ (para 35). The court adopts this broad interpretation of a complaint in writing which allows it to catch up to technological developments, as electronic complaints are common practice, especially for air carriers.

A narrow interpretation that would exclude electronic complaints would place a disproportionate barrier to consumers seeking to complain, as highlighted by the Court (para 34). As the Court leaves the form of the complaint open it draws attention to another element, that of being able to identify the passenger which made the complaint. In essence, the Court moves away from the written requirement, as one that needs to be made on paper, to any medium, including an electronic one, which allows for retrieval of information and identification of the complainant.

The third question asks whether the requirement of writing is fulfilled when a representative of the carrier records the complaint in the carrier’s electronic system with the knowledge of the passenger. The court does not view it as problematic that the passenger may be assisted to file the complaint. However, it sets an additional requirement that the passenger should be able to review the complaint and amend it or supplement it within the deadline for filing a complaint. (para 47). Not only is there a positive answer to the third question, but the court places an additional obligation to air carriers, not specifically listed in the Montreal Convention.

Finally, the fourth question was whether art.31 of the Montreal Convention prescribed any other requirements except that of giving notice of the complaint. The Court decided that since the Montreal Convention specifies the time limit for the filing of the complaint as well as the form (in writing) and the consequences of failure to comply with these requirements, there is no other substantive requirement (para 53).

 

Conclusion

To sum up, this is a sensible judgement that protects the interests of consumers and showcases that the Court understands the realities of air travel, as experienced by passengers daily. It also sends out the message to air carrier companies that they cannot circumvent their obligations from the Montreal Convention on the basis of an anachronistic interpretation of the wording of the Convention.

AG Tanchev: Wild-cat strikes are extraordinary circumstances (joined cases Krüsemann)

When a large number of British Airways flights were cancelled in 2017 due to strikes of the company's personnel, the competent UK regulator advised disappointed passengers to claim compensation under the Air Passenger Rights regulation: while the point had never been expressly decided upon by the CJEU, it the restrictive way in which the concept of extraordinary circumstances had generally been applied by the court suggested that only strikes truly "external" to the airline would excuse them from paying compensation. 

The opinion issued today by AG Wahl in a number of joint cases Krüsemann brought against TUIfly suggests a different answer to this general question. 

In the case at stake, a wild-cat strike had taken place agains the carrier due to unpopular restructuring plans: without a strike being officially announced by the unions, much of the staff called in sick on a number of consecutive days, effectively disrupting the airline's operations. This is a rather specific case because, technically, strikes of this kind are not legal - which makes it harder to impute them to someone who, like the carrier, is not breaking the law. 

AG Tanchev's opinion makes at points larger, at points smaller differentiations between regular and irregular industrial action.

On the one hand, the AG argues [at para 57] that 

the objectives of Regulation No 261/2004 point toward the inclusion of ‘strikes’ within the concept of ‘extraordinary circumstances’. This is buttressed by the case-law of the Court, detailed above, at least in the context of substantial absences affecting operational capacity, on the interpretation of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ to date. 

On the other hand, the following paragraph [58] states that 

 in a Union governed by the rule of law, so-called ‘wildcat strikes’ are not inherent in the normal exercise of the activity of the air carrier concerned. They are not akin to something that is intrinsically linked to the operating system of the aircraft, so that it is inherent in the normal exercise of an air carrier’s activity. I further take the view that informing the employees of a potential restructuring did not bring the wildcat strike within the control of TUIfly, given that a wildcat strike was not the inevitable consequence of this action.

This last paragraph seems particularly focussed on the illegal nature of the strike at hand, even though the last sentence could be generalised to legal strikes - of course it was not informing employees of the restructuring that led to the strike, but the intention to do so - and this would be no less true of a "regular" strike. 

He also notes in one of the footnotes (fn 35) to the opinion that 

the conclusion to the effect that a wildcat strike is an extraordinary circumstance is in conformity with a recent Commission proposal to amend Regulation No 261/2004 which provides a non-exhaustive list of circumstances considered as ‘extraordinary circumstances’ for the purposes of the regulation. This proposal includes ‘labour disputes at the operating air carrier or at essential service providers such as airports and Air Navigation Service Providers’.

Thus, according to AG Tanchev, it seems that all strikes would fall under the notion of extraordinary circumstances.

The impact of this conclusion on consumer rights, however, is mitigated by the answer he gives to another question raised in the preliminary ruling request: when the Regulation refers to extraordinary circumstances "which could not have been avoided even if all reasonable measures had been taken", does it intend that the circumstances as such could not have been avoided, or that their consequences could not be prevented?

AG Tanchev considers the latter to be the correct interpretation: the fact that a certain event cannot be avoided does not mean that it is impossible to prevent it, through appropriate arrangements, from causing delays or cancellations. It is for the national court invested with the question to determine whether, in the circumstances of a specific case, all reasonable measures have been taken in order to prevent the unforeseen circumstances from causing significant disruptions. 

The opinion seems destined to bring about quite some forehead-scratching. On the one hand, there are bits in it that will be welcome both on the side of the industry and on that of consumer advocates; on the other hand, by making much depend on national courts' appreciation of the circumstances of a specific case, it seems destined to increase uncertainty. It also seems likely that air carriers would use the case, if the opinion were taken up by the court, to oppose all requests a prima facie denial - and then see whether consumers are going to take their claim to court. 

It remains to be seen whether the Court will follow the AG on this path.

Behavioural study on transparency of online platforms - let's try this again

Aside the New Deal for consumers, parts of which we have already commented on (see POLITICO publishes draft Commission proposal on collective redress for European consumers), and which we will keep on discussing in the coming days further, the Commission has also published today an interesting behavioural study on the transparency of online platforms (executive summary may be found here, the whole final report - here). Admittedly, I have not yet read the 206 pages long final report fully, but having studied the executive summary and checked a thing or two in the final report, here are some of my thoughts on the study.

The study focused on the possibilities of improving transparency of online platforms (such as Airbnb or Amazon) due to their potential for 'posing significant risks to consumer protection and market competition'. However, out of the three examined areas (criteria for ranking and presentational features of search results; presenting identity of contractual parties; quality controls on consumer reviews and ratings) only the first one could be presented as more unique for online platforms than other websites. Generally, establishing the identity of a counterparty online (regardless of the use of a platform) and the quality of the controls they use (rankings, endorsements) is problematic for most internet users. The question then is whether the Commission intends to extrapolate the findings from the online platform study to other online websites and consumer protection whilst using them.

The geographical scope of the study was limited to 4 countries (Germany, Poland, Spain and the UK); some of the biggest European countries in terms of population and size. Can we expect the results to then be representative for the EU?

Further methodological evaluation of the study is probably best left to the experts, but I do wonder e.g. whether the names chosen for restaurants and hotels that were being compared have been consulted with communication specialists as to not biasing consumers at the get-go.

In any case, the overall finding of the study: that online transparency is clearly in the interests of consumers - is hardly surprising or new. I guess it is always good to receive a confirmation thereof though. The study suggest that to achieve greater transparency:

- criteria used to order search results should be apparent to consumers and it should be possible to re-order search results using a range of criteria;

- consumers' awareness of the identity of contractual parties and their understanding of legal implications should be raised;

- platforms should be encouraged to implement quality controls for improved authenticity and greater number of reviews.

Again, hardly groundbreaking suggestions. It would be more noteworthy if the Commission indicated specifically how these objectives could be achieved (should we not start finally talking e.g. about particular font sizes and information placement?). Moreover, these suggestions could be misused by online platforms and traders. E.g. it is relatively easy (technically speaking) to introduce a search criteria 'popularity' to a platform, but what does it signify? The amount of clicks on a particular link or the amount of transactions concluded with the given product/service provider? It the clicks counted, it would not be surprising if a particular product or service was 'popular' because it was listed first when the measurement started. There are ample opportunities then to still not provide transparent information to consumers even by following the Commission's recommendations.

Nihil novi from the CJEU in Uber France

In a judgment delivered yesterday the Court of Justice once again looked at the legal environment of Uber’s business model. Similarly to its earlier ruling (see our post CJEU gives Member States a green light to regulate Uber), the Court classified the services provided by Uber not as information society services, but rather as services in the field of transport and denied the applicability of the European framework on services liberalisation to the analysed context. 

Setting the scene

The background of Uber France was analogous to Uber Spain. Both cases referred to the UberPOP business model, i.e. the one in which the smartphone app provided by Uber Technologies Inc. is used to connect passengers with non-professional drivers (the situation is different in a yet another pending case concerning Uber Black). The differences were subtle: in Uber Spain, the case referred to the civil proceedings brought against Uber by a taxi drivers’ association based on general rules on unfair competition. By contrast, Uber France dealt with a private prosecution and a civil action brought against Uber by a specific taxi driver based on a newly introduced provision of French criminal law. On both occassions the provider of the contested smarthphone app sought to rely on EU law to protect its freedom to provide information society services across EU. Both times - in vain.

The legal dilemma in Uber France

The more specific question in the commented case was whether the aforesaid provision of French law - which prohibited and penalised the organisation of a system for putting customers in touch with persons who engage in the carriage of passengers in breach of applicable market access requirements - constituted "technical regulation" within the meaning of Directive 98/34/EC as amended by Directive 98/48/EC (later replaced by Directive 2015/1535). Relying on such an interpretation, Uber argued that the provision could not be enforced against it because it had not been notified to the European Commission.

Indeed, Article 8(1) of Directive 98/34/EC, as amended, required Member States to immediately communicate to the Commission any draft technical regulation including any "rules on services". Article 1(5) defined a rule on services as "requirement of a general nature relating to the taking-up and pursuit of [information society] service activities ..., in particular provisions concerning the service provider, the services and the recipient of services, excluding any rules which are not specifically aimed at [information society] services". The directive did not elaborate on the consequences of a failure to notify; however, according to the settled case law of the Court, such a failure renders the adopted technical regulation inapplicable and therefore unenforceable against individuals (see paras. 35-39 of Advocate-General's opinion).

Against this background the national court decided to stay the proceedings and ask the Court of Justice for an interpretation of Directive 98/34/EC, as amended.

Judgment of the Court

The judgment in Uber France does not come as a big surprise - indeed, the Court decided to follow its earlier line of reasoning as well as the argumentation of AG Szpunar (see also our post The Uber saga continues) and refused to provide the defendant with a helpful hand. The Court, once again, focused on the classification od services provided by Uber and found them to fall outside the scope of Directive 98/34/EC, as amended, and Directive 2006/123 on services in the internal market. Consequently, to the extent the national provision applied to services of this kind, the provision itself fell outside the scope of both liberalisation directives.

In this short entry I will not argue either in favour or against the classification made by the Court - the issue is by no means black-and-white and continues to divide the academic community. Instead, I will focus on the quality of legal reasoning in Uber France, of which, I believe, one could have expected more.

Comment

The questions referred by the national court in the commented case revolve around the nuanced terminology used in Directive 98/34/EC, as amended, particulary the notion of a "rule on services". One problematic element of this term - the quality of not being "specifically aimed" at information society services - was already highlighted before. In the subsequent paragraph Article 1(5) provides for further interpretative elements, which the referring court seemed to consider relevant.

The Court of Justice, however, did not elaborate on any of these elements. It limited itself to rejecting the qualification of services provided by Uber as information society services, holding that the intermediation service provided by that company was "inherently linked" to the offer transport services and thus constituted a service in the field of transport. In doing so, it relied on two criteria: the fact that the drivers and passengers would not have been led to provide or use the transport services without the Uber app and - the criterion which I personally find more convincing - the fact that Uber exercised "decisive influence" over the conditions under which the relevant transport services were provided (para. 21). The Court went on to recall that services provided by Uber also fell outside the scope of Directive 2006/123 on services in the internal market, which does not apply to transport. Because the judgment is essentially limited to these insights it does not bring anything new beyond what we already know from Uber Spain.

The Court's self-restraint may be frustrating to the reader, who may be tempted to look for more clues that the judgment actually provides. What, in my view, does not follow from Uber France is that an existence of a business model which falls under the national provision while not qualifying as an information society service automatically disqualifies such a provision as being "specifically aimed" at information society services. Assessment of the detailed wording of Article 1(5) of Directive 98/34/EC, as amended, including references to the statement of reasons of national provisions as well as to an implicit or incidental effect of such provisions on information society services can still be relevant. But does this make any difference for the procedural situation of Uber? The judgment in Uber France does not really tell.

* The author carries out a research project on consumer protection in the collaborative economy, financed by the National Science Centre in Poland on the basis of decision no. DEC-2015/19/N/HS5/01557.

The Facebook-Cambridge Analytica fallout and user privacy

Dear readers, this time we need to refer to slightly less usual sources to report on some rather interesting developments concerning themes that have been often brought up on this platform. 

First, yesterday Facebook's CEO Mark Zuckerberg had the chance to exchange views for over five hours with a number of US representatives and said something interesting about privacy policies. In the most extensive coverage I could find on the issue, ie on Vice (!) he is reported to have responded to a question on data privacy and what the company intends to change going forward that 

“This  gets into an issue that we and others in the tech industry have found challenging which is that long privacy policies are very confusing,” Zuckerberg said. “One of the things we’ve struggled with over time is to make things as simple as possible so people can understand it. We don’t expect that most people will want to go through and read a full legal document.

While making disclosures more effective is certainly a theme which is dear to many of us, the conundrum which Facebook seems to struggle with would probably best be addressed by means of more stringent rules on what data can be shared by social media and other service providers, with whom, and for what purposes. According to the Vice piece, Facebook is also taking a number of other steps to improve its practices in data use and encourage whistleblowing on "abusive" advertising.

Meanwhile, quite appropriately it seems, the GDPR will enter into force next month! While previously much criticism had been raised by the industry about the new and somewhat more restrictive rules introduced by the regulation, Zuckerberg has recently announced that Facebook will - with adaptations - seek to comply with the regulation's standard across its worldwide operations (see coverage on Gizmodo). In the wake of the Cambridge Analytica scandal, it seems that somewhat more privacy protection is in fashion after all.