2030 Consumer Agenda is here – What's next for EU consumer law

On 19 November 2025, the European Commission adopted the long-awaited 2030 Consumer Agenda, its strategic plan for EU consumer policy for the next five years. This is the most recent rendition of the Commission’s periodic consumer policy blueprints, preceded by the New Consumer Agenda 2020-2025. The 2030 Agenda is entitled ‘A new impulse for consumer protection, competitiveness and sustainable growth’, clearly aligning with the new Commission’s priority on boosting EU competitiveness.

Here is a rundown of the main priorities together with concrete action plans in the 2030 Agenda:

1. Completing the single market for consumers: This part complements the previously announced Single Market Strategy. The Commission aims to remove obstacles for consumers to access goods and services across the single market through, for example, an evaluation of the Geo-Blocking Regulation and tackling Territorial Supply Constraints. Particular attention is given to fostering cross-border financial services (e.g. the possibility of opening savings and investment accounts in another Member State) and cross-border mobility services (especially for rail travel, through, e.g., a single ticketing service).
2. Digital fairness and consumer protection online: The Commission reaffirmed its commitment to introduce a Digital Fairness Act to act against practices such as dark patterns, addictive design features or unfair personalisation, with a particular focus on the protection of minors. This initiative has already drawn tremendous attention. Other actions include fighting against online fraud (e.g., revising the Payment Services Directive) and fostering fair and transparent use of AI in consumer markets (though no specific action has been tabled besides the reference to the AI Act, which says little about consumer contracts).
3. Promoting sustainable consumption: Sustainable consumption was the centrepiece of the preview consumer agenda, shaped by the European Green Deal, and several sustainability instruments have been adopted since then. So the Commission’s new priority in this regard focuses on implementation. New actions include a Circular Economy Act (which in itself does not concern consumers too much) and the accompanying promotion of consumer returns of unused goods, second-hand markets and product-as-a-service business models, as well as measures to foster ‘green by design’ in e-commerce. In this ‘sustainability’ section, the Commission has also discussed its actions to ensure affordability (transport, energy, housing, food) and public health (forever chemicals, tobacco).
4. Effective enforcement and redress: This has been a perennial issue that has practically reappeared in all of the consumer agendas. The Commission will propose a revision of the Consumer Protection Cooperation Regulation to promote coordinated action in consumer enforcement across the EU. A major new challenge to enforcement comes from e-commerce and the growing circulation of unsafe or non-compliant products originating from third countries, which has already been flagged in the E-Commerce Communication. In this regard, the Commission is set to reform the Market Surveillance Regulation in the announced European Product Act.

In a time when ‘simplification’ and deregulation secure the Commission’s top priority, the 2030 Agenda seems to maintain a rather high standard of consumer protection, though consumer lawyers should probably proceed with utmost caution to ensure that ‘simplification efforts shouldn’t come at the expense of consumers’. The twin transitions still drive the agenda of EU consumer policy. Besides enforcement, digital fairness and e-commerce are likely to be the most relevant fields of EU consumer law for years to come. Sustainable consumption has not disappeared, though its prominence has undoubtedly diminished compared with the previous agenda. 

A couple of more personal reflections from my first reading of the Agenda: First, it is positive that the Commission has explicitly acknowledged the everyday experiences of European consumers shaped by the cost-of-living crisis and vowed, albeit in quite abstract terms, to tackle the uneven impact of rising energy, housing and food prices. Second, the Agenda seems to signal a shift in the background understanding of the image of EU consumers. Instead of only talking about confident consumers ‘reaping the benefits of the single market’ and empowered consumers ‘driving the green and digital transitions through informed choices’, the 2030 Agenda began to highlight the structural barriers holding consumers back. In particular, the Commission noted ‘barriers to choosing genuinely sustainable options, such as price, limited choice, unclear and inaccessible labelling, and mistrust of environmental claims’ (italics added). In a sense, the Agenda appears to rebalance – or at least complement – the emphasis on consumer responsibility to make informed choices with a stronger focus on regulatory responsibility to ensure fairness, affordability and sustainability ‘by design’. Of course, this may be a far-fetched (and optimistic) reading, and it remains to be seen how these grand commitments will unfold in the coming years.

The right of withdrawal, linked agreements and vehicle purchase contracts- the CJEU in C-143/23

On the 30th of October 2025, the CJEU delivered a judgment in the joined cases of consumers KI and FA against Mercedes-Benz Bank AG and Volkswagen Bank GmbH in C-143/23 , advancing the interpretation of Articles 10 and 14 of Directive 2008/48/EC on Consumer Credit.

 

The consumers entered into a credit agreement with their respective banks to purchase a motor vehicle for private use; where the car dealers from whom the vehicles were purchased acted as credit intermediaries and to whom the loans were paid in directly. The credit agreements did not inlcude the interest rate applicable to late payments at the time the agreement was concluded. Months and years after the contract had been concluded, the consumers notified their banks that they wished to withdraw from their credit agreements, arguing that the standard 14-day period did not begin to run due to omissions in the mandatory information included in their contracts. The referring Landgericht Ravensburg asked several questions to the CJEU.

 

 

The first question addressed by the CJEU was whether the consumers' right of withdrawal began to run despite the absence of mandatory information in their contract. According to Article 14(1)(b) of Directive 2008/48 the 14-day withdrawal period begins to run only on the day on which the information provided for in Article 10 has been received by the consumer, if that day is later than the day on which the credit agreement was concluded. Article 10(2)(l) provided that a credit agreement must state, in a clear and concise manner, the interest rate applicable to late payments, arrangements for its adjustment and any charges payable for default.

 

In its analysis, the CJEU emphasises the importance of mandatory information for consumers' informed decision-making, aimed at helping consumers in a weaker position vis-à-vis the bank. The CJEU then underlined the importance of informing consumers of the specific interest rate for late payment to enable consumers to be aware of the consequences of any late payment, information which is likely to influence not only the consumer’s decision to enter into the agreement, but also their ability to organise the repayment of the loan.

 

In view of the these reasons, the CJEU ruled that Article 10(2)(l) and Article 14(1)(b) of Directive 2008/48 must be interpreted as meaning that the withdrawal period provided for in Article 14(1) does not begin to run until the credit agreement does not specify, in the form of a specific percentage, the interest rate applicable in the event of late payment at the time of conclusion of the agreement, and until such information has been duly communicated to the consumer. With this, the CJEU confirmed its earlier position in C-33/20 (see our analysis here).

 

 

The second question tackled by the CJEU is interesting. The referring court asked directly whether the consumers’ potential intention to abuse their right can be considered here, in particular, that the consumer continues to use the vehicle until the national courts have ruled on the validity of the withdrawal and that the consumer refuses to pay compensation for the loss of value of that vehicle. The CJEU emphasised that a general legal principle is that EU law cannot be relied on for abusive or fraudulent ends. However, in the particular situation, the creditor cannot claim that the exercise of the right of withdrawal is unfair, as the withdrawal period has not, in such a case, begun to run. Under the circumstances, the credit cannot reply on the consumer’s improper exercise of the right of withdrawal provided for in Article 14(1).

 

The third question was what compensation should be provided to the creditor for the use of the vehicle. The CJEU referred to the 14th recital of the Directive, which stated that it was for the Member States to determine the conditions and arrangements following exercise of the right of withdrawal. Directive 2008/48 therefore grants Member States a margin of discretion leaving them to regulate matters relating to the return of the goods financed by the credit, which must follow the principle of effectiveness requiring that national provisions governing the consequences of the exercise of the right of withdrawal do not undermine the effectiveness and efficiency of that right to such an extent that it becomes impossible or excessively difficult to practice to exercise the right.

 

The CJEU, however, emphasised that compensation must be proportionate to the vehicle’s depreciation and its condition at the time of its return. Subject to the verifications to be carried out by the referring court, the CJEU was of the opinion that a method of calculation based solely on the difference in price between the purchase and resale of the vehicle, which includes factors unrelated to the use of that vehicle, such as commercial margins and resale costs – determined unilaterally by the car dealer – as well as value added tax, does not allow for the assessment of the depreciation of that vehicle resulting from its use by the consumer. In particular, if these circumstances are considered regardless of whether the vehicle has not been registered or used before the right of withdrawal is exercised. The CJEU concludes that this method, therefore, appears to impose on the consumer a burden resulting exclusively from the exercise of his or her right of withdrawal, and is likely to result in compensation that is disproportionate to the purchase price of that vehicle, making the exercise of the right of withdrawal impossible or excessively difficult to use in practice.

 

The CJEU ruled that Article 14(1) of Directive 2008/48 must be interpreted as precluding national case-law to calculate the amount of compensation for loss of value owed by consumer to the creditor by deducting from the sale price charged by the dealer at the time of the vehicle’s purchase the purchase price paid by the dealer at the time of the return of that vehicle, provided that that the method of calculation includes factors unrelated to the consumer’s use of that vehicle.

 

Fourth, the CJEU also addressed the question of payment of the interest for the credit agreement, ruling that Article 14(1) of Directive 2008/48 must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation under which a consumer who, after withdrawing from a consumer credit agreement linked to a vehicle purchase agreement, is required to pay the interest provided for in that first agreement for the period between the payment of the loan funds to the seller of the financed vehicle and the date of return of the vehicle to the creditor or seller.

 

Finally, the CJEU explicitly confirmed that Directive 2008/48 must be interpreted as not harmonising completely the rules relating to the consequences of the consumer’s exercise of his or her right of withdrawal from a credit agreement linked to a vehicle purchase agreement.

Why airlines can't rewrite the clock - CJEU in Corendon Airlines (C-558/24) on delay calculations

On 30 October, the CJEU delivered its judgment in Corendon Airlines (C-558/24), interpreting Articles 5(1)(c) and 7(1) of Regulation 261/2004, which regulate compensation for flight delays. 

Passengers were notified one day before departure that their scheduled departure and arrival times would be pushed back by 1 hour. On the day of travel, the flight was further delayed, and passengers ultimately arrived at their destination just under 3 hours later than the revised arrival time, but almost 4 hours later than the original schedule. The question referred to the CJEU was on the delay calculation. Should the delay be calculated against the original arrival time or the revised time notified to passengers in advance by the air carrier? 

The CJEU left no room for doubt: The delay must be calculated from the arrival time originally agreed between the parties. In this case, passengers are therefore entitled to compensation. This interpretation aligns with the Regulation's objective of ensuring a high level of consumer protection (para 25). It also prevents air carriers from unilaterally changing departure times from the ones contractually agreed upon (para 26). While advance notice of a  of a 1 hour delay may reduce inconvenience for passengers, it does not change the fact that the flight was postponed and qualifies as a delay in its own right (paras 19 and 27).

How can consumers' right to access payment accounts with basic features be reconciled with banks' anti-money laundering duties? AG de la Tour in Case C-81/24

The CJEU was recently asked to interpret Directive 2014/92/EU on access to payment accouts with basic features (PAD), which is to the best of my knowledge the first or at least one of the few preliminary rulings interpreting PAD. The question is how can the right to access payment accounts with basic features or basic bank accounts be reconciled with the bank's duty to comply with anti-money laundering rules. This essentially requires weighing two important policy goals, the financial inclusion of consumers, who have no other payment account, which is a cornerstone of financial inclusion,  and the aim to prevent the use of the the EU financial system for the purposes of money laundering and terrorist financing.

The question referred to the CJEU by the Slovenian Okrajno sodišče v Mariboru asks whether Article 16(4) of Directive 2014/92, read in the light of Directive 2015/849 or the Fourth Anti-Money Launderng Directive (4AMLD), may be interpreted as authorising Member States to require banks to reject a consumer’s application to open a payment account with basic features on the ground that he or she is included in a list of the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury. 

Article 16(1) of PAD provides a right for consumers to access basic payment accounts and confers a duty on Member States to ensure that all credit institutions or at least a sufficient number of them guarantee the provision of basic bank accounts. This right belongs to all consumers legally resident in the Member State, including asylum seekers or those with no fixed address (Article 16(2)). However, Article 16(4) provides an exception to the right. Banks can refuse the consumer's request to open the basic bank account where the opening of such an account would infringe the bank's duties to prevent money laundering and terrorism financing. The PAD therefore gives primary to national securty and financial stability matters over financial inclusion of individuals. However, the question is to what degree. The problem here was whether the mere fact of being included on an OFAC list, without having been convicted of any offence for which he is on that list, or having been subject to any restrictive measure from the United Nations, the European Union or a Member State is sufficient to constitute a breach of the provisions relating to the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing which may therefore justify a refusal to open a payment account with basic features. Even if inclusion on such a list constitutes a special circumstance justifying increased vigilance, it was not clear whether it can justify a refusal to open a payment account with basic features.

As Advocate General Richard de la Tour notes in his Opinion delivered 4 Sepember 2025, the difficulty is that both directives are minimum harmonisation, allowing Member States to adopt more stringent measures. Nevertheless, the 4AMLD in Article 8 at minimum requires that Member States ensure banks have in place policies, controls and procedures to mitigate and manage effectively the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing identified at the level of the Union, the Member State and the bank. These should include customer due diligence set out in Article 10, which includes identifying the customer and verifying the customer’s identity on the basis of documents, data or information obtained from a reliable and independent source, assessing the purpose and intended nature of the business relationship and conducting ongoing monitoring of the business relationship. As the AG rightly notes in his analysis, while the fact of being included in OFAC may be a red flag warranting a more thorough due diligence, it should not be sufficient to outright refuse the open a basic bank account.

The AG therefore is of the opinion, that Article 16(4) of Directive must be interpreted as meaning that a banking institution may not refuse to open a payment account with basic features solely on the ground that the name of the consumer applying to open such an account is on the OFAC, unless, the applicable national law expressly provides for such a more stingent approach, given the minimum nature of the directives.

On the assignability of consumer claims under credit contracts: CJEU in Zwrotybankowe.pl (C‑80/24)

As consumer law remains under-enforced, it becomes all too common for consumers to assign their claims to third-party claim management companies, which typically operate on a contingency basis and take a percentage of the amounts successfully recovered. In Case C‑80/24, the consumer assigned their claim against a bank to Zwrotybankowe.pl, one such claim management company, which would retain 50% of the recovered amounts as remuneration. The assigned claim arose under Art. 30(1) of the Polish Law on Consumer Credit, which implements Art. 23 of the Consumer Credit Directive 2008 and imposes a penalty for the bank’s failure to comply with information obligations. In a proceeding brought by Zwrotybankowe.pl against the creditor bank, questions arose as to the assignability of the consumer claim in question and the court’s duty to assess the assignment agreement ex officio under the Unfair Terms Directive.

The first question concerns whether the Consumer Credit Directive precludes the assignment of consumer claims thereunder. This is because Art. 22(2) of said Directive prohibits the consumer from waiving their rights under it. A broad interpretation of this provision could suggest that consumers cannot assign claims arising under the Directive to third-party companies that make a profit from these legitimate claims (paras 13-14). However, the CJEU rejected such an interpretation. In particular, it drew an analogy with its reasoning in Case C‑11/23 concerning Art. 15 of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004, which similarly provides an ‘exclusion of waiver’. In that case, the airline’s general conditions included a prohibition of the transfer of passenger rights, in particular the right to compensation. The Court disallowed such a prohibition, in order ‘to ensure a high level of protection for air passengers and to enable [consumers] effectively to exercise their rights’, including ‘the freedom to choose the most effective way in which to defend his or her right’, such as ‘to transfer his or her claim to a third party in order to spare him- or herself difficulties and costs that might deter him or her from taking steps personally in relation to that carrier with the prospect of a limited financial return’ (para 27). Based on an analogous reasoning rooted in the rationale of weaker party protection, the Court held that Art. 22(2) of the Consumer Credit Directive likewise does not preclude the assignment of consumer claims arising under the Directive.

The second question goes on to ask: if the claim is assignable, should courts assess the unfairness of the assignment agreement ex officio – when the dispute before them arises from a different contract, namely the credit agreement? Recalling its case law on ex officio review under the Unfair Terms Directive, the Court confirmed that such a duty is limited to ‘the subject matter of the dispute’ (para 38). In this case, the assignment agreement ‘does not come within the limits of the subject matter of the dispute before it’ and therefore falls outside the ex officio review obligation under EU law (para 40). Moreover, since the consumer was not a party to the proceedings, the imbalance between a consumer and a trader, which justifies ex officio intervention, was also absent (paras 41-43). Accordingly, the Court concluded that the Unfair Terms Directive does not require national courts to assess the assignment agreement ex officio in such circumstances. Finally, the Court added that, where national law does allow such an ex officio review, the principle of effectiveness should serve to safeguard consumers’ procedural rights (para 46).

The reasoning in Zwrotybankowe.pl seems to give away a rather permissive stance towards third-party enforcement of consumer claims. Given that many instruments within the EU consumer acquis contain comparable prohibitions on waiver, one may ask whether the Court’s analogy extends to those regimes as well. Sure, consumers should have the freedom to spare themselves from the ‘difficulties and costs’ of private enforcement, but how much should they pay for such convenience? And if these ‘difficulties and costs’ stem from a systematic failure in consumer enforcement, is the privatisation of enforcement – and the shifting of its costs to consumers whose rights have been infringed in the first place – really the right call?

From dream vacation to legal dispute: CJEU in Tuleka (C-469/24)

Tirana Post 

Some consumers have truly bad luck, but their misfortune raises interesting legal questions. In Tuleka (C-469/24), the applicants booked a 1-week, all-inclusive package holiday in a 5-star hotel in Albania. What was meant to be a dream vacation quickly turned into an ordeal due to: 1) Demolition of hotel swimming pools, commissioned by Albanian authorities and carried out in the presence of media and police; 2) Consequential destruction of the seafront promenade and waterfront infrastructure, blocking access to the sea; 3) Long queues and limited meals at the hotel restaurant; 4) Construction work to add a fifth floor, with building materials transported by guest elevators. Unsurprisingly, the travellers filed a claim for damages upon their return. They sought compensation for material damages equal to the full price of the package (due to non-performance) and non-material damages (exceeding the amount of material losses). 

Article 13 of the Package Travel Directive 2015/2302 makes organisers responsible for the performance of the package, with an option for the Member States to extend that responsibility to retailers, as well. This is irrespective of which travel service provider is to perform the service. Organisers must offer alternative arrangements and otherwise remedy lack of conformity, unless doing so is impossible or entails disproportionate costs. In that case, Article 14 entitles travellers to a price reduction and appropriate compensation, unless the lack of conformity is "attributable to a third party unconnected with the provision of the travel services included in the package travel contract and is unforeseeable and unavoidable". The hotel indeed argued that the swimming pool's demolition was attributable to a third party (Albanian authorities) and constituted an extraordinary circumstance.

Burden of proof: Attribution does not require fault

Polish law implementing the PTD placed a burden of proof on organisers that the lack of conformity was due to the fault of a third party to escape liability. This higher threshold limited organisers' ability to exonerate themselves. The CJEU held this approach incompatible with Article 14(3)(b) PTD. The phrase "attributable to" must be interpreted autonomously, given its lack of definition in the PTD (para 31). Its ordinary meaning refers to an outcome resulting from a person's conduct - without implying intentional or negligent failure (para 32). Consequently, attribution does not require fault. This interpretation gives organisers more scope to avoid liability (para 33). This interpretation is further aligned with the Directive's structure and context (para 36). As the PTD provides maximum harmonisation, the Member States cannot impose stricter standards (para 38).

Full refund for serious non-conformity 

The second question inquired whether travellers could claim a full price reduction, that is the total cost of the package, even if some services were performed, but the lack of conformity was serious. Article 14(1) PTD grants an "appropriate" price reduction, assessed objectively across the entire period of non-conformity (para 45). The assessment must consider not only organisers' obligations "explicitly stipulated in that contract, but also those linked to it as a result of the purpose of that contract" (para 46). The longer and more serious the non-performance or improper performance, the greater the price reduction (para 47). Considering the objective of the high level of consumer protection behind the adoption of the PTD, the CJEU determines that where the lack of conformity is so severe that the package travel no longer serves its purpose, that is it is objectively no longer of interest to the traveller, travellers are entitled to a full refund (para 49).

Price reduction and compensation: Restorative, not punitive

The PTD allows claims for non-material damages, which are always more difficult to quantify. A question arose whether in estimating travellers' damages any punitive damages should be considered (para 56). The CJEU emphasises the language of Article 14 PTD and clarifies that it aims to restore contractual balance (para 57), and does not mention or permit punitive damages (para 58). Punitive damages are therefore excluded (para 60).

Extraordinary circumstances: Was demolition unforeseeable?

Finally, the Court considered whether the demolition order issued by national authorities qualified as an unavoidable and extraordinary circumstance. Article 3(12) PTD defines such circumstances as events beyond the control of the organiser that could not have been avoided with reasonable measures (para 62). Recital 31 PTD contains a non-exhaustive list (para 63) and prior case law likens this concept to force majeure (para 64), demanding these events were unforeseeable (para 65). An order to demolish the swimming pool was unlikely unforeseeable, as such decisions are typically debated and publicised (para 67). The national court must determine whether either the organiser or hotel manager was notified of the administrative procedure or the content of the decision before it was implemented (para 70). 

Reforming Consumer Alternative Dispute Resolution in the EU

Online shopping has transformed how we buy goods and services, but it has also exposed a recurring challenge: resolving disputes when things go wrong. Damaged products, delayed deliveries, or disputes over contract terms, can leave consumers frustrated. Traditional litigation is often slow, costly, and intimidating, particularly for low-value claims. Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) provides a faster, cheaper, and more accessible way for consumers and traders to settle disputes outside the courts. 

For the past decade, the EU has relied on ADR Directive, complemented by the European Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) platform established under ODR Regulation.

Over time, it has become evident that the existing ADR framework is unable to adequately address emerging types of disputes, such as those involving digital content, personal data in exchange for services, and pre-contractual obligations. According to the 2023 Consumer Conditions Scoreboard, one in four EU consumers faces a problem worthy of complaint, yet only a small proportion make use of ADR. Although the ODR platform, operational since 2016, attracted significant web traffic, it processed only around 200 cases per year across the EU, rendering its continuation both economically and practically unjustifiable. These shortcomings underscore the need to modernise the ADR provisions and replace the underutilised ODR platform with a more responsive mechanism that better reflects the realities of today’s digital market.

In response, the European Commission proposed a legislative package in October 2023, including a revision of the ADR Directive and the repeal of the ODR Regulation. Supporting this initiative, on July 17, 2025, the Council and the European Parliament reached an agreement on the final compromise text of the Proposal for a Directive amending the ADR Directive, currently pending formal adoption.

Forthcoming Changes in the ADR and ODR Regime

Expanded Scope: The proposed amendments extend the ADR Directive to pre- and post-contractual disputes, including misleading advertising, missing mandatory information, and digital content paid for with personal data. Non-EU traders may participate voluntarily, providing broader protection for EU consumers in cross-border cases.

Minimum harmonisation: Member States will be required to meet the baseline standards while retaining discretion to provide stronger consumer protection and extend ADR to additional disputes under EU or national law. Once adopted, consumer ADR will be governed under a single instrument, as the ODR Regulation has been repealed.

Clear deadlines: Traders must respond to ADR bodies within 20 working days (or 30 for complex disputes). Non-response counts as refusal to participate.

Automation: Digital tools and automated systems may be used, provided that: 

• Consumers are informed before the process begins;
• Consumers retain the right to human review;
• Personal data processed by automated systems complies with GDPR.

Incentives for participation: Member States are encouraged to introduce financial and non-financial incentives, such as reduced fees, awareness campaigns, or certification for compliant businesses. Sectors with low ADR participation or high complaint volumes, such as air transport and tourism, will receive special attention.

ADR contact points: Newly established ADR contact points will replace former ODR contact points, guiding consumers and traders to the competent ADR entity and explaining procedural rules. Contact points will be assigned based on the consumer’s residence, and Member States may extend their mandate to domestic disputes.

Additional measures:

• Consumers may be assisted by third parties (for example, consumer organisations or claims management companies), with transparency obligations maintained;
• ADR entities may bundle similar disputes to improve efficiency, with consumer consent;
• ADR entities will be required to publish biennial activity reports (Member States may set shorter reporting periods);
• Natural persons handling disputes will need to possess relevant expertise, including private international law.

The text is expected to be adopted by the European Parliament between 15-18 December 2025, followed by the Council. This indicates that the Proposal still remains subject to change and its final content may differ, so the current version should be considered provisional. 

Another key legislative step by the Parliament and the Council was Regulation (EU) 2024/3228 of 19 December 2024, repealing the ODR Regulation with regard to the discontinuation of the European ODR Platform. The document entered into force on January 19, 2025, and the ODR platform was discontinued on July 20, 2025. The European Commission was tasked with developing a new digital tool facilitating cross-border ADR with machine translation, which has yet to be developed.

Potential Implementation Challenges

While these reforms promise a more accessible and efficient system, implementing them in practice may present several challenges. Relying on automation can improve efficiency in ADR processes, but it may raise fairness and data protection risks. While GDPR compliance, transparent decision-making, and mandatory human review are essential to maintain consumer trust, implementing these safeguards in practice can be complex and resource-intensive. At the same time, Member State discretion allows for tailored approaches, yet risks creating inconsistent consumer experiences across the EU. Adequate resource allocation is also a concern since training staff and maintaining digital tools require investment, which may be challenging for smaller or less-resourced Member States. Finally, expanding ADR to non-EU traders broadens consumer protection but introduces cross-border enforcement challenges that necessitate clear guidance and oversight to ensure compliance. 

Looking Ahead

The proposed amendments to the ADR Directive aim to make dispute resolution faster, more accessible, and better suited to the digital age. Monitoring Member State implementation will be essential to evaluate effectiveness. Applied consistently, these changes could create a reliable, inclusive, and digitally integrated system for resolving consumer disputes outside the courts.

By Sitora Saidova

PhD Candidate, School of Law

University of Essex

Conference: 50 Years of Consumer Law in the European Union: Past, Present, and Future

On Friday, November 21, a conference "50 Years of Consumer Law in the European Union: Past, Present, and Future" takes place at the University of Luxembourg. With the conference speakers including prominent European consumer law scholars, judges and AG of the Court of Justice of the EU, as well as representatives of the European Commission, this event promises to deliver engaging and informative discussions on the trends of consumer protection. The registration is free of charge (on this website) and you may also participate in the event online.

When Lightning Strikes: CJEU in AirHelp Germany (C-399/24)

On 16 October, the CJEU issued another flight-related judgment in the case of AirHelp Germany (C-399/24), offering further interpretation of the concept of "extraordinary circumstances" under Regulation 261/2004. The central question was as follows: Does a lightning strike to an aircraft, leading to mandatory safety inspections and a delayed return to service, qualify as an extraordinary circumstance exempting the air carrier from compensation obligations? 

The CJEU ruled that it does. While the notion of "extraordinary circumstances" must be interpreted strictly, since it creates exceptions to the high level of air passenger protection (para 18), meteorological conditions are explicitly recognised as such circumstances (para 21). This includes "the risk of the aircraft being struck by lightning" (para 23). 

The Court emphasised that this risk is not inherent to the normal nature of activities of air carriers, even though planes are designed to withstand such events (para 22). Drawing a parallel with bird strikes, the Court classified both as "collision with a foreign body" (para 24). Moreover, the mandatory safety inspections following a lightning strike are considered distinct from routine malfunctions of aircraft components. These inspections are not "intrinsically linked to the operating system" of the plane (para 26). The lightning strike itself is deemed an event outside the actual control of the air carrier (para 31). As a result, the two cumulative conditions required to classify an event as an "extraordinary circumstance" were found to be satisfied.

The judgment leaves it to national courts to assess whether the air carrier took all reasonable measures to avoid long delay for passengers. This includes evaluating whether the airline acted diligently, without being expected to make "intolerable sacrifices in the light of capacities of its undertaking at the relevant time" (para 37).

Pets as baggage in air travel - CJEU in Iberia (C-218/24)

From an outsider's perspective, the recent judgment may appear controversial. "Pets as baggage" is likely to strike non-lawyers as dehumanising - suggesting that animals are treated as mere objects. However, lawyers may appreciate the legal advantages of such classification. Under international travel rules, such as the Montreal Convention, categorising pets as baggage can trigger compensation mechanisms if they are lost, or damaged, during transit. But does this legal framing actually benefit pet owners? 

In the given case, passengers on a flight from Buenos Aires (a city known for its large dog population) to Barcelona were travelling with a dog. Due to its size, the dog could not be accommodated in the cabin and was instead to be placed in the aircraft hold, inside a special pet carrier. The owner checked in the pet carrier, but tragically, "the dog left the pet carrier, ran around in the vicinity of the aircraft and could not be recovered" (para 16).

The Montreal Convention standardises compensation for lost baggage, unless passengers make a "special declaration of interest in delivery at destination" during check-in, and pay any required surcharge. In this case, the dog's owner did not make such a declaration. The legal issue then became whether the owner could claim compensation for non-material damages, or whether the Montreal Convention's baggage rules limited such claims. Spanish law recognises pets as sentient beings, and thus does not equate their loss with that of material things typically found in baggage (para 19).

The CJEU emphasised that the Montreal Convention is designed to define the limits of air carriers' liability for transporting passengers and their baggage (para 23). Since the Convention does not explicitly define "baggage," the term must be interpreted uniformly and autonomously (para 26). 

While the ordinary meaning of "baggage" refers to objects (para 29), the CJEU noted that for the Montreal Convention to apply to pets, they must be classified either as "passengers" or "baggage". Given this binary, the Court found "baggage" to be the more appropriate legal category (paras 33-34). Importantly, the Convention's liability limits for lost baggage cover both material and non-material damages, meaning the pet's owner could not claim further compensation from the air carrier (para 41).

This ruling ultimately favours air carriers by providing greater legal certainty regarding the types of claims passengers can make for lost items - including pets. It also shields carriers from the complexities of differing national laws on non-material damages. The decision reflects the pragmatic logic of international air travel law.

Financial inlcusion and access to payment accounts with basic features: the current state of play in the EU

Financial inclusion, or access to affordable and useful financial services, is essential for our modern-day living. Access to payment accounts or bank accounts is a cornerstone of financial inclusion. It enables access to other essential services, such as receiving salary or pensions, social benefits, paying rent, making purchases at more favourable rates, paying bills, and accessing other financial services, including credit. Basic bank accounts move consumers from unbanked to banked.

The importance of basic bank accounts is recognised by the EU. Directive 2014/92 on the comparability of fees related to payment accounts provides a right to access payment accounts with basic features (Article 16), laying down minimal rules for Member States on providing access, ensuring affordability and raising awareness. 

While the objective of the Directive is to facilitate access to basic bank accounts across the EU, the 2023 Report from the European Commission on the application of Directive 2014/92 and the 2024 report from Finance Watch on Breaking down barriers to basic payment accounts suggest the Directive falls short of meeting its objective. 

The Finance Watch study relied on mystery shopping to provide a real picture of what is happening in the EU, based on examples of selected Member States, Spain, Germany and Romania. It has been found that:

• Basic bank accounts are often not affordable, e.g. in Germany, fees can reach up to £150, and in Spain, basic bank accounts are more expensive than standard accounts;

• These accounts are frequently not accessible; e.g. banks often impose documentary requirements such as a work contract, which then leaves out the unemployed, a poof of address that prevents homeless people from accessing these accounts. Often, these accounts cannot be opened online, and banks fail to offer them proactively; instead, consumers are pushed to ask for these accounts, explaining their own vulnerability;

• Perhaps most shockingly, the study shows little awareness of basic payment accounts. Bank staff are often unaware of these accounts or their eligibility, and there is little and hard-to-access information that consumers can access themselves.

Ten years after the adoption of the Directive, many, often the most vulnerable groups, are prevented from accessing these accounts.  According to the World Bank Findex (which has no data for Luxembourg), in 2021, 3.6% of Europe’s population were financially excluded. The highest number is recorded in Romania, where 30.9% of the population aged 15 or more did not own a bank account. They are followed by Bulgaria (16%), Hungary (11.8%), Croatia (8.2%), Portugal (7.4%), Cyprus (6.87%), the Czech Republic (5.6%), etc. 

These recent results signal the need for a more robust European legal regulatory framework that strengthens the above duties of access, affordability and awareness, and a need for better enforcement of the existing national rules.

Key GDPR Fines in Mid-2025: Luka (Replika), TikTok, and ING Bank Śląski

This post discusses three recent decisions of Data Protection Authorities imposing fines for GDPR infringements on Luka Inc., TikTok, and ING Bank Śląski. While most of our analyses usually focus on judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union, in this case we turn to decisions of national authorities. Such decisions tend to attract significant attention, either because of the seriousness of the violations or the high amounts of the penalties, which makes them a frequent subject of debate. The three cases selected meet these criteria and, moreover, were issued within the past few months. They are also directly relevant to consumers, as they highlight risks that many of us face in everyday life when using apps or online services where personal data may be mishandled.

 

 

Luka Inc. 

On 10 April 2025, the Italian Data Protection Authority (Garante per la protezione dei dati personali) issued a decision against Luka Inc., the U.S. company behind the Replika chatbot. Replika is marketed as an AI “companion” designed to boost users’ mood and wellbeing, and can be set up as a friend, mentor, therapist or even a romantic partner. But according to the Garante, the way Luka handled users’ personal data fell far short of what the GDPR requires.

The investigation showed that Replika’s privacy policy did not clearly identify the legal ground for the many different ways in which users’ data were processed – for example, data used for running the chatbot versus data used for developing the large language model behind it. Instead of specifying purposes and corresponding legal bases, the policy only gave vague, generic statements like: “We care about the protection and confidentiality of your data. We therefore only process your data to the extent that: It is necessary to provide the Replika services you are requesting, you have given your consent to the processing, or we are otherwise authorized to do so under the data protection laws” (btw – doesn’t that sound familiar from many privacy policies?). This lack of granularity made it impossible for users to understand how their data were really being used, in breach of Articles 5(1)(a) and 6 GDPR.

What’s more, the privacy notice was only available in English, even though the service was offered in Italy. It also failed to explain key points required under GDPR: what kinds of data were collected, how long they were stored, whether data were transferred outside the EU, and for what purpose. Some statements were even misleading, for instance, suggesting that personal data might be transferred to the U.S., while the company later claimed no such transfers took place. Such gaps and contradictions meant that users could not make informed choices about their data.

However, the most troubling finding was that the Garante concluded Luka had failed to implement effective safeguards for children. Although the service was formally intended for adults, it lacked genuine age-verification mechanisms. Registration required only a name, email address, and gender, which allowed minors to create accounts. Even when users declared they were under 18, no technical barrier prevented them from accessing the platform. In practice, this meant that children could be exposed to age-inappropriate content, including sexually explicit material. Moreover, even after updates to the privacy policy, technical testing showed that under-18 users could still bypass the age restriction simply by editing their profile. 

 

For these violations, the Garante imposed an administrative fine of EUR 5,000,000, representing half of the maximum amount available under Article 83(5) GDPR.

 

 

TikTok Technology Limited

 

Another significant decision was issued by the Irish Data Protection Commission (DPC) in May 2025 against TikTok Technology Limited. Although the full text of the decision has not yet been published, the official press release provides insight into the reasons for the sanction.

 

The inquiry examined both the lawfulness of TikTok’s transfers of European users’ personal data to China and the adequacy of the company’s transparency regarding those transfers. The DPC concluded that TikTok had infringed the GDPR in two key respects.

 

First, the Commission found that TikTok’s transfers of user data to China violated Article 46(1) GDPR. The company failed to verify, guarantee, and demonstrate that personal data of European users – remotely accessed by staff in China – was afforded a level of protection essentially equivalent to that required within the EU. TikTok’s own assessments of Chinese law highlighted serious divergences from EU standards, particularly risks under the Anti-Terrorism Law, the Counter-Espionage Law, and the National Intelligence Law. Nevertheless, the company did not adequately address these risks or ensure that its contractual safeguards were effective.

 

Second, the DPC held that TikTok had not complied with the information duties set out in Article 13(1)(f) GDPR. Earlier versions of its privacy policy (in force between July 2020 and December 2022) failed to identify the countries involved in data transfers and did not explain the nature of the processing – for instance, that personnel in China could remotely access data stored in Singapore and the United States. This lack of clarity prevented users from understanding who could access their data and under what conditions.

 

The decision imposed not only administrative fines but also corrective measures. TikTok was given six months to bring its practices into compliance, failing which data transfers to China would have to be suspended altogether. The total fine amounted to EUR 530,000,000, comprising EUR 485,000,000 for the unlawful transfers and EUR 45,000,000 for the lack of transparency.

 

 

ING Bank Śląski

 

The third discussed decision was delivered on 23 July 2025 by the Polish Data Protection Authority (UODO) against ING Bank Śląski S.A., which was fined PLN 18,416,400 (around EUR 4,000,000). The case revolved around the bank’s widespread practice of copying and scanning ID cards of both existing and potential clients, even in situations where such a step was not required by law. The bank introduced this practice after the amendment of Polish anti-money laundering provisions, interpreting them as justifying the systematic copying of IDs.

 

The investigation revealed that between April 2019 and September 2020 the bank systematically scanned ID documents not only during customer onboarding, but also in contexts where no anti-money laundering (AML) obligations applied – for example, when a customer filed a complaint about an ATM. In practice, the bank’s internal procedures made the delivery of services conditional on handing over a scanned ID, leaving consumers with no real choice.

 

As emphasized in the decision, both AML law and the GDPR require banks to conduct a risk-based assessment and determine, case by case, whether copying an ID is genuinely necessary. ING failed to perform such assessments. Instead, it adopted blanket rules requiring ID copies in numerous situations, regardless of whether AML obligations applied. As a result, the bank processed extensive amounts of sensitive identifying information without a valid legal basis under Article 6 GDPR. Although no specific harm was demonstrated, the decision underscores that ID cards contain a wide range of personal data – including full name, date of birth, parents’ names, unique national ID number (PESEL), photograph, and document series. Taken together, these data significantly increase the risk of identity theft or fraudulent loans. Given that ING had millions of individual and corporate clients during the period in question, the potential consequences of such unnecessary data collection were substantial.

Produce Labels and the Circular Economy: CJEU interprets "Packaging" in Interfel (C-772/24)

On August 1, the CJEU delivered an interesting judgment in Interfel (C-772/24), which could assist in promoting sustainable consumption. 

Photo by amoon ra on Unsplash

In an effort to combat waste and support circular economy, French law prohibited the placing of labels directly on fruit or vegetables sold on French territory, unless the labels were home-compostable and made of bio-sourced materials (para 8). The idea was straightforward: consumers could more easily and sustainably dispose of spoiled fruit or vegetables. (Who has not spent hours of their life removing annoyingly sticky, unwilling-to-just-let-go labels from produce?) 

However, the question arose whether this national rule complied with Directive 94/62 on packaging and packaging waste. Article 18 of the Directive requires the Member States to permit the sale of products on their territory if their packaging complies with the Directive. This provision prevents Member States from imposing additional restrictions that could hinder the internal market.

The CJEU began by emphasising the Directive's environmental objectives: to reduce the impact of packaging and packaging waste on the environment, covering all packaging placed on the market (para 12). To assess whether the French measures complied with EU law, the Court examined the Directive's definition of "packaging". The term must be interpreted broadly (para 13), but still fulfil one of the functions set out in the Directive, namely: "containment, protection, handling, delivery and presentation of goods" (para 15). Packaging must also fall into one of the three categories: "sales packaging, grouped packaging or transport packaging" (para 17). Ancillary elements integrated into packaging are also considered packaging (para 20). Annex I to the Directive provides illustrative examples of packaging, including "labels hung directly on or attached to a product" (para 21).

In answering the national court's question, the CJEU stressed that, to qualify as packaging, a product must meet the above criteria (para 25). Specifically, it must perform at least one of the three main packaging functions: containment/protection, handling/delivery, or presentation. Labels on fruit and vegetables are typically smaller than the produce itself and therefore unlikely to provide containment or protection (para 28). Nor are they generally used for handling or delivery purposes (para 29). The remaining question was whether labels serve a presentation function - a matter the Court noted could depend on the specific context/ label (para 30).

In conclusion, the CJEU indicated that France may impose additional sustainable requirements for such labels, but only where the labels do not perform any of the three functions assigned to packaging under EU law.

The Digital Services Act in action: combatting illegal and unsafe products

With the development of online marketplaces, combating illegal and unsafe products reaching EU consumers is not easy. In recent years, online platforms such as Temu, which offer heavily discounted goods that often directly ship from China, have become popular with consumers.

Temu first came under the 'spotlight' when BEUC- The European Consumer Organisation and national consumer protection organisations initiated an enforcement campaign against Temu (see our report here).

Then, in May 2024, the EU Commission designated Temu as a Very Large Online Platform under the Digital Services Act (DSA), which conferred obligations on Temu to assess and mitigate any systemic risks stemming from its services. 

Following this, in October 2024, the Commission opened formal proceedings to assess whether Temu may have breached the DSA in areas linked to the sale of illegal products, the potentially addictive design of the service, the systems used to recommend purchases to users, as well as data access for researchers. In July 2025, the Commission published preliminary findings that Temu was indeed in breach of the obligation under the DSA to properly assess the risks of illegal products being disseminated on its marketplace, and continues investigation in the other identified areas of concern.

Testing by consumer organisations has revealed that many parcels from Temu and similar online platforms contain products that are not compliant with EU consumer law and are even potentially harmful to consumers. These include, for example, clothing that contains banned chemicals, phone chargers that can explode, and balloons for children that contain illegal chemicals.

In an interesting and informative interview for Deutsche Welle, Augustin Reyna, Director General of BEUC, explains these developments (see here). 

Polish bankruptcy law fails consumers with unfair loan terms - CJEU in Wiszkier (C-582/23)

Photo by Towfiqu barbhuiya on Unsplash

In July 2025, the CJEU issued a judgment in Wiszkier (C-582/23), concerning a Polish case involving a consumer mortgage loan indexed to Swiss francs. In this instance, the consumer had to declare bankruptcy after being unable to meet, among other obligations, their mortgage payments. Although the bankruptcy court found that the contract potentially contained unfair terms, raising the possibility of the contract being null and void, Polish law prohibits this court from examining this issue further. Under Polish law, even if the unfairness of contract terms had not been previously raised by the consumer, the bankruptcy court is only competent to approve or reject a repayment plan based on a list of claims drawn up by the trustee (paras 26-27). At most, the court may stay the proceedings and refer the unfairness' matter to another competent, supervisory authority (paras 29 and 45). 

Unfairness assessment by the bankruptcy court 

Decision: Incompatibility with EU law. Unsurprisingly, the CJEU found Polish law incompatible with EU law. Specifically, it held that the Unfair Contract Terms Directive precludes national provisions that prevent a bankruptcy court from examining the unfairness of contract terms in a loan agreement underlying a claim included in the list of claims, or from amending that list, where no such assessment has been conducted by the authority preparing the list (para 58).

Although EU law leaves enforcement of consumer protection rules against unfair contract terms to the Member States, such national rules must comply with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness (para 40). The CJEU found that the principle of effectiveness was violated in this case. While Polish law allows a bankruptcy court to stay proceedings so that a supervisory court may assess the potential unfairness of contract terms, this process introduces delay and exposes consumers to further financial hardship. During the stay, the bankrupt's salary continues to be withheld by the bankruptcy estate, which may discourage consumers from raising objections based on unfair terms (para 46). Notably, monthly repayments set in bankruptcy proceedings are often lower than the salary amounts withheld during the proceedings (para 47), exacerbating the financial strain. Moreover, in this case, although the consumer had acknowledged all the claims listed by the trustee, this was done without legal representation and likely without understanding that an unfairness objection could be raised (para 52). The consumer only raised this issue. through legal counsel, once the case reached the bankruptcy court (para 53). The CJEU clarified that it is irrelevant whether the list of claims has become res judicata (para 55).

Interim measures by the bankruptcy court

Decision: The CJEU further ruled that national law must enable bankruptcy courts to grant interim measures to protect consumers while the fairness of a claim included in the list is under judicial review.

The Court reiterated that ensuring effective consumer protection against unfair terms may require granting interim measures, for example, adjusting monthly instalments during prolonged proceedings to prevent consumers from being forced to pay more than the amount actually due if the unfair terms were ultimately invalidated (paras 67-68). As noted by the referring court, the fear of higher interim payments to the bankruptcy estate may deter consumers from raising unfairness objections altogether (para 69). The court responsible for granting interim measures must consider: "whether there is sufficient evidence that the contractual terms concerned are unfair, whether there is a real possibility that the bankruptcy estate is already sufficiently funded to satisfy the creditors, with the exception, as the case may be, of the claim concerned, as well as the bankrupt's financial situation and the risk of that person having to endure a prolongation of the bankruptcy proceedings which could result in an unwarranted deterioration in his or her financial situation pending the conclusion of those proceedings." (para 71)

Delayed bags, immediate compensation rights - CJEU in Iberia (C-292/24)

On June 5, the CJEU issued a new judgment interpreting the Montreal convention, which governs rules for international air carriage, in the case Iberia (C-292/24). 

The case arose when passengers traveling from Frankfurt am Main (Germany) to Panama City (Panama), with a layover in Madrid (Spain), discovered that their checked-in luggage had not arrived in Panama. They reported the baggage as lost to Iberia and informed the airline that, unless they received an update within three days, they would buy replacement items and continue with their travel plans - which they ultimately did. They also had to rebook their outgoing flights from Panama City due to the delay. The luggage was eventually delivered to Panama City five days after their scheduled arrival. The passengers subsequently sought reimbursement for the cost of replacement items, additional travel expenses, and the rebooked flights. 

The legal question concerned the interpretation of the reporting deadlines set out in Article 31(2) of the Montreal Convention in cases of delayed or lost baggage. Article 31(2) states that 

'the person entitled to delivery must complain to the carrier forthwith after the discovery of the damage, and, at the latest, within seven days from the date of receipt in the case of checked baggage and fourteen days from the date of receipt in the case of cargo. In the case of delay, the complaint must be made at the latest within twenty-one days from the date on which the baggage or cargo have been placed at his or her disposal.'

The key issue was whether this deadline prevents passengers from claiming compensation for damage caused by a baggage delay before the baggage is returned, or whether they may do so only after they receive the baggage as the full scope of their damage may only then materialise. 

The CJEU adopted an interpretation of Article 31(2) of the Montreal Convention that is favourable to passengers. It held that passengers may submit a claim for damages arising from delayed baggage before the baggage is returned. According to the Court, the 21-period specified in Article 31(2) marks the latest possible moment to file a complaint - but not the earliest (para 20). By applying a literal interpretation of the provision, the CJEU found that passengers are entitled to submit a claim for compensation at any time between the moment their baggage is delayed and the expiry of the 21-day period following its return (para 21). 

Interestingly, the CJEU also noted that this interpretation benefits air carriers, as well. Early notification allows airlines to investigate the situation promptly, potentially mitigating the damage, and collect evidence to demonstrate that they took all reasonable steps to prevent the harm (paras 29-30).

Consumers' access to interim relief - the CJEU in Myszak (C-324/23)

In case C-324/23 (Myszak) the Court of Justice of the European Union was asked again to deal with the consequences of mortgage loan agreements indexed in Swiss francs. 

The case concerns a mortgage loan contract indexed in Swiss francs whose voidance was claimed by three consumers against the Getin Noble Bank S.A. Consumers claimed the unfairness of the contractual term in question, according to Directive 93/13/EEC. Accordingly, sought interim relief in court, in order to suspend the execution of the contract containing unfair terms.

Meanwhile, however, the Bank went through a resolution procedure. Polish law bars the possibility to ask interim measures against bank dealing with special resolution procedures, according to the law implementing Directive 2014/59/EU (the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive). 

The Polish court asked the CJEU about the compatibility with Articles 6(1) and 7(1) of UCTD and Article 70(1) and (4) of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive of the national law. Pursuant to relevant Polish law it is not possible to grant a consumer’s application for an interim measure to suspend, during the course of the court proceedings, the obligation to pay the loan instalments under a loan agreement which is likely to be declared invalid, on the sole ground that it was granted by a bank declared to be under special resolution.

The CJEU affirmed that a statutory provision barring consumers to obtain interim relief during resolution procedures impairs consumers to exercise their rights, and thus goes against EU law.

The Court invoked the principle of effectiveness, claiming that impeding consumers to exercise their rights because of a bank’s resolution would impact on the effective enforcement of the UCTD. The Court of Justice has, on a number of occasions, made general statements on the need for national courts to be able to adopt interim measures for the full effectiveness of court decisions concerning rights granted by EU law (see, among others, Case C-213/89, Factortame).

Although the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive allows Member States’ laws to specify and define the procedural means of its implementation, national laws implementing it should not impede consumer protection. Accordingly, a provision barring the enforcement of UCTD, precluding adoption of interim measures, is contrary to EU law.

The decision reinforces a well-established pattern in the Court of Justice’s rulings: when in doubt, in favour of the consumer!

Deferred payment option as a ‘promotional offer’: CJEU in bonprix (C-100/24)

In bonprix (Case C-100/24), the CJEU was asked to clarify the meaning of ‘promotional offers’ under Art. 6(c) of the E-commerce Directive. According to this provision, any such offers must clearly outline the conditions for eligibility. The disputed practice was an advertising message that bonprix, an online trading company, put on its website: ‘Convenient purchase on invoice’. It was contested that this message is misleading as it leaves out the fact that such a payment arrangement is subject to a prior assessment of the consumer’s creditworthiness. It is thus necessary to establish whether the message on bonprix’ website is a ‘promotional offer’ in the first place – a concept that is not directly defined under the Directive.

First, according to a literal interpretation, ‘promotional offers’ can include ‘any form of communication by which a provider seeks to promote goods or services to the recipient by giving him or her an advantage’ (para 24), which is still rather broad.

Second, according to a contextual interpretation, since Art. 6(c) of the E-commerce Directive included some illustrative examples such as ‘discounts, premiums and gifts’, for ‘reasons of consistency’, ‘promotional offers’ must have ‘the characteristics common to’ these examples (para 25). The CJEU outlined three such characteristics: the conferral of an advantage that is

1. objective, i.e. not left to ‘the subjective assessment of that recipient’ (para 26),
2.  certain, i.e. ‘does not depend on chance or selection’ (para 27, per the distinction between ‘promotional offers’ under Art. 6(c) and ‘promotional competitions and games’ under Art. 6(d)), and that is
3. ‘capable of influencing that recipient’s consumption behaviour’ (para 28).

In response to bonprix’ arguments, the CJEU added that ‘promotional offers’ are neither defined by ‘the existence of a substantial monetary advantage for its recipient’ nor by ‘its exceptional nature’ (paras 29-31). The form and extent of the advantage is ‘immaterial’ and may be ‘monetary, legal or mere convenience, such as to enable the recipient to gain time’ (para 32). In the context of the disputed practice, the CJEU highlighted some potential benefits of bonprix’ offer: the deferral of payment provides the consumer with ‘a cash advance’ and represents ‘a monetary advantage, albeit minimal’ (para 43); in the event of extinguishment of the contract due to withdrawal or termination, ‘the purchaser does not need to claim reimbursement of the price’ (para 44).

Third, according to a teleological interpretation, the CJEU confirmed that subjecting the disputed practice to Art. 6(c) of the E-commerce Directive can ‘contribute to a high level of consumer protection, without, however, entailing unreasonable economic burdens for service providers’ (para 34). By informing the consumer that the deferred payment option is subject to a creditworthiness test and thereby making the consumer realise that they may be refused the option, it ensures consumer protection ‘at all stages of contact between the provider and the recipient of a service’ (para 35). Finally, the CJEU also added that its interpretation of Art. 6(c) of the E-commerce Directive is fully compatible with the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (particularly its Art. 3(4) and its general prohibition of misleading practices) and the Consumer Rights Directive (particularly its Art. 6(8)).

The Court’s broad interpretation of ‘promotional offers’ should be welcomed as a positive move to strengthen consumer protection through information. It represents a more inclusive understanding of the factors that drive consumers’ purchase decisions, in particular convenience. Of course, it should also be borne in mind that the disputed practice in this case is in any event a ‘commercial practice’ within the scope of EU law.