Merry Christmas Dear Readers!
We hope you are enjoying this festive time with your families and/or friends, as much as the restrictions in the place you live at, allow for this.
Stay safe and let us hope for the 2021 to be nicer to all of us!
Merry Christmas Dear Readers!
We hope you are enjoying this festive time with your families and/or friends, as much as the restrictions in the place you live at, allow for this.
Stay safe and let us hope for the 2021 to be nicer to all of us!
Digital Markets Act
The advantage of the Digital Markets Act for consumers lies definitely in the environment this regulation aims to promote: more competitive, encouraging consumers to seek for, access and conclude the best possible deal, not locking them into digital services contracts they conclude. The gatekeepers to the market are companies located anywhere in the world, provided they offer their core platform services to business users in the EU or end users in the EU (Article 1(2)). The end users do not have to be consumers (Article 2(16)) as they may be legal persons, as well as natural persons.
Core platform services could be (Article 2(2)): online intermediation services, online search engines, online social networking services, vide-sharing platform services, number-independent interpersonal communication services, operating systems, cloud computing services, advertising services.
Gatekeepers are defined (Article 3) as providers of core platform services who have a significant impact on the internal market (e.g. annual EEA turnover exceeds EUR 6.5 billion in the last 3 financial years and they provide the core platform service in min 3 Member States), operate a core platform service which serves as an important gateway for business users to reach end users (e.g. more than 45 million monthly active end users located in the EU and more than 10.000 yearly active business users established in the EU), and enjoy an entrenched and durable position in its operations (or could do so) (e.g. where it was an important gateway for the last 3 financial years). These thresholds are just an example, as the Commission has the power to designate other providers as gatekeepers (Article 3(6)). Generally, it is the gatekeeper who should notify the Commission that they have reached such a position (Article 3(3)).
Articles 5 and 6 specify the main obligations of the gatekeepers. These seem to focus on: limiting the scope in which platforms use personal data, not limiting a possibility for business users to offer the same products or services to end users on different platforms under different conditions, not restricting communication of business and end users outside the platform, allowing end users to un-install any pre-installed software applications on the platform, as well as facilitate installation of third party software applications, not prioritise in ranking products or services offered by the gatekeeper, limit bundling of services, facilitate switching of services, transparency obligations.
Further provisions of the proposal for this regulation are devoted mainly to various monitoring obligations, review processes and consequences for non-compliance (mainly fines).
Digital Services Act
The main advertised advantage of this act for consumers is that the provisions of the regulation will offer them 'more choice, lower prices', 'less exposure to illegal content' and 'better protection of fundamental rights' (see here). These benefits are to result if the aims of the Regulation as defined in its Article 1(2) are achieved. Similarly to DMA this Act also will apply to providers of intermediary services regardless of their place of establishment, as long as the services are provided to recipients established or located in the EU (Article 1(3)). A recipient of the service again does not need to be a consumer, as it may be a legal person (Article 2(b)).
The obligations imposed by this Act are to bind providers of intermediary information society services (Article 2(f)), that is services where providers are either a: 'mere conduit' (transmitters of information provided by recipients or providing access to the communication network, e.g. Internet access providers), 'caching' service (where they temporarily store the transmitted information to make its transmission more efficient), 'hosting' service (where they store the information provided for and as requested by the recipient of the service, e.g. cloud services).
Articles 3-5 specify when providers of various information society services in the above-mentioned categories may be exempted from the liability for the content of that information, i.e. when it is illegal content. These provisions aim then to ensure that consumers (citizens) are indeed exposed to less illegal content (will they suffice? that is the question that goes beyond providing a short summary here!).
Importantly, if a provider conducts a voluntary own-initiative investigation that does not change the status of their exemption from the liability as determined in Articles 3-5 (Article 6). Thus self-checks are to be encouraged. However, there remains no general obligation to monitor the information which providers transmit or store (Article 7), similarly to the current E-Commerce Directive provision.
Articles 8-9 regulate how providers are to comply with orders about removing illegal content and providing information about users, respectively.
Other interesting for us provision may be:
- Article 12 - which obliges providers to transparently outline any content moderation procedures and tools in their terms and conditions;
- Article 13 - requiring providers to publish an annual report on past year's content moderation; Article 23 adds also an obligation to provide reports on the number of disputes submitted to ADR, number of suspensions (Art 20) and any use of automatic means for the purpose of content moderation;
- Article 14 - providers of hosting services are required to facilitate users notifying them about illegal content and allowing them to act upon such notifications (notice and action);
- Article 15 - requires hosting services providers to notify, in a reasoned and transparent manner, users if their content is removed/disabled/etc as illegal;
- Article 17 - sets out rules on an internal complaint-handling system for online platforms, which they are to provide to recipients of services for min 6 months following either removal or disabling of access to the information provided by recipients, suspension or termination of the service, suspension or termination of the account;
- Article 17(4) and Article 18 - recipients of services should be informed about and have access to ADR;
- Article 19 - specifies rules for processing of notifications of trusted flaggers;
- Article 20 - determines when providers could suspend users' accounts due to misuse, i.e. frequent posting of illegal content;
- Article 22 - specifies that online platforms are required to obtain information from traders allowing to trace identity and location of such traders and should check the reliability of this information;
- Article 24 - online advertising has to be clearly displayed as such, together with parameters used to determine the recipient to whom the advertisement is displayed;
- Articles 26-33 - contain obligations for very large online platforms, in the same categories as described above, but with stricter provisions.
Further provisions pertain to various enforcement and penalties issues, as well as the plans to encourage adoption of standards and codes of conduct.
Last month, on November 13 2020 the EU Commission adopted its new Consumer Protection Agenda 2020-25 that will provide the strategic framework of consumer protection policy for the next five years. The Agenda identified 5 key priority areas:
1) Green transition: empower consumers to behave 'green' to purchase sustainable and circular products.
2) Digital transformation: increase online consumer protection; this aim will entail the revision of several well established directives: General Product Safety Directive, Consumer Credit Directive and Distance Marketing of Financial Services Directive.
3) Effective enforcement and redress: places emphasis on the CPC Regulation.
4) Consumer vulnerability: means addressing the needs of different groups, including debt advice and safety of products designed for children.
5) Consumer protection in the global context: aims to promote overall high level of protection, including the safety of products sold online.
The strategy seems to have addressed the most pressing consumer protection issues of our everyday lives. Not surprisingly it is significantly influenced by the COVID pandemic and the ways in which it reshaped our lives.
Facts of the case and the questions referred
As we recounted in our previous post, the case involved a provider of a mobile application connecting drivers and passengers in urban transport. The business model of Star Taxi App was, however, not identical to the Uber platform. Firstly, the provider did not automatically select two parties for a ride, but rather displayed a list of drivers available for a journey, from whom the passenger was free to choose a party. Secondly, the fare was not set by and collected through the app, but was paid directly to the driver. Thirdly, only taxi drivers authorised and licensed to provide taxi services were allowed on the platform and no additional steps were taken to control the quality of the vehicles and drivers. Finally, unlike Uber, Star Taxi App was a Romanian platform, operating on the Romanian market.
The operation of the platform was considered to be in violation of applicable national rules, most notably as regards prior authorisation. The provider contested the sanctions imposed on him, arguing that the relevant norms were contrary to the EU law. Against this background, the Regional Court in Bucharest decided to stay the proceedings and ask the Court of Justice for an interpretation of the notions of "information society services" under Directive 2000/31/EC and "technical regulations" under Directive 2015/1535 on the provision of information in the field of technical regulations. Moreover, the reference provided the Court with an opportunity to clarify specific norms on freedom of establishment, contained in Directive 2000/31/EC (principle excluding prior authorisation) and Directive 2006/123/EC on services (conditions for establishing authorisation schemes and for granting authorisations).
Judgment of the Court
Finding 1: Star Taxi App provides information society services
Like the AG, the Court found that services provided Star Taxi App fulfil the criteria of "information society services", to which Directive 2000/31/EC applies (para. 42-48), and cannot be seen as "inherently linked" to the underlying transport services. Key to the latter finding was the fact that Star Taxi App did not create a new market for non-professional drivers, but was limited to licensed taxi drivers, i.e. a market for services which existed before (para. 52), and did not organise the general functioning of underlying transport services, as it did not select the drivers, set or charge prices or control vehicles or drivers (para. 53). Consequently, unlike in Uber cases, classification as "information society services" remained available.
Finding 2: Notification requirements under Directive 2015/1535 do not apply
The Court then reversed the order of the questions referred and moved to the assessment of notification requirements under Directive 2015/1535. Like the AG, the Court concluded that the Romanian requirements imposed on operators of taxi "dispatching"
services did not constitue technical regulations as they were not specifically aimed at information society services. Whether or not this finding remains in line with the Court's previous case law can be a matter of debate. To recall, the Court was not equally generous to the national regulator in VG Media, where it found that the German copyright rules (introducing publisher rights) were aimed, at least in part, at regulating information society services (the use of snippets on search engines). In Star Taxi App, the Court was satisfied with the fact that "taxi dispatching" have long been defined more broadly and referred to the activity consisting in receiving customer bookings by telephone "or other means" and forwarding them to a taxi driver. The fact that more recent local rules in Bucharest explicitly mentioned "IT applications" among those "other means" was deemed irrelevant. To support this conclusion the Court observed that the analysed requirements, for example to obtain a two-way radio, applied equally to all types of dispatching services (para. 65). The latter argument seems rather shaky, considering that the Court later (rightly) argues that such a requirement, applied to the providers of information society services, could, in fact, be contrary to Directive 2006/123/EC. An alternative reading of Directive 2015/1535 could, however, be difficult to reconcile with the subsequent interpretation of Article 4(2) of Directive 2000/31/EC, which was likely a consideration in this part of judgment.
Finding 3: Article 4 of Directive 2000/31/EC does not apply to the scheme at hand, but Articles 9 and 10 of Directice 2006/123/EC do
The last part of the judgment concerns the applicability of the principle excluding prior authorisation in Article 4(1) of Directive 2000/31/EC to the case at hand. Similarly to the AG, the Court found that the analysed scheme was not covered by this provision and instead fell under the exception set out in the subsequent paragraph. To recall, pursuant to Article 4(2) of Directive 2000/31/EC, the principle excluding prior authorisations for information society services remains without prejudice to authorisation schemes which are not specifically and exclusively targeted at such services. Like the AG, the Court observed that a mere clarification (extension?) of the scope of pre-existing rules to dispatching services relying on IT applications does not consistute an authorisation scheme which is specifically and exclusively targeted at such services (paras. 81-82). Accordingly, a conflict between Directives 2000/31/EC and 2006/123/EC did not arise and provisions of the latter were deemed applicable.
The Court then moved to the interpretation of Articles 9 and 10 of Directive 2006/123/EC on freedom of establishment, referring numerously to its recent judgment in Cali Apartments. Like in the Cali case, the Court underlined that a separate and consecutive assessments must be made of, firstly, whether the very principle of establishing that scheme is justified, and, secondly, the criteria for granting the authorisations provided for by that scheme (para. 87). Since the information provided by the referring court in this regard was not sufficient (e.g. so as to assess if the scheme could be justified by reasons of consumer protection), the Court limited itself only to brief observations regarding the criteria apparent from the file. Most notably, it shared the view expressed by the AG that an obligation, imposed on service providers, to comply with technical requirements which are not appropriate for the service in question and thus generate unjustified burdens and costs for service providers could not be deemed compatible with Article 10(2) of Directive 2006/123/EC (para. 90). This could be the case for the requirement to obtain a two-way radio, which was nonetheless for the referring court to verify (paras. 91-92).
Concluding thoughts
Overall, the judgment in Star Taxi App is a reasonable ruling, seeking to strike a balance between the internal market goals and the public interest goals pursued by national regulators. One cannot fail to note, however, that the Court has taken a long way to arrive at this outcome. As apparent from the Star Taxi case, the EU rules at hand provide for significant safety vaults, which Members States can rely upon to regulate the provision of information society services in the public interest. The principle excluding prior authorisation in Article 4(1) of Directive 2000/31/EC does not apply to authorisation schemes which are not specifically and exclusively targeted at information society services and notification requirements in Directive 2015/1535 do not apply to rules which are not specifically aimed at this kind of services. Also the country of origin principle, which is laid down in Article 3(1) of Directive 2000/31/EC and was analysed in the Airbnb Ireland case, is not without limitaitons. Admittedly, the development of the platform economy has pushed some of these norms to its boundaries and a case could be made, for example, for making Article 4(1) of Directive 2000/31/EC less categorical. This, however, is a task for the EU legislature and a potential subject for the Digital Services Act. For the time being, the judgment in Star Taxi App shows, together with Airbnb Ireland, that classification of services of platform operators as activities falling outside of the scope of Directive 2000/31/EC should not be made too lightly and that EU free movement rules are to be reckoned with.
* The author carries out a research project on consumer protection in the collaborative economy, financed by the National Science Centre in Poland on the basis of decision no. DEC-2015/19/N/HS5/01557.
Another interesting piece of news from the past few days is the UK government announcing the setting up of the Digital Markets Unit ('New competition regime for tech giants to give consumers more choice and control over their data, and ensure businesses are fairly treated') within the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA). The Unit's main task will be to introduce and enforce 'a new code to govern the behaviour of platforms that currently dominate the market'. Is the UK attempting to follow the example of the German Federal Cartel Office (Bundeskartellamt) that has been cracking the whip against the potential abuses of the dominant position on the market of such digital service providers like Facebook (see The Facebook Decision: First Thoughts by Podszun)?
Perhaps, the government's announcement draws attention to the risks associated with the concentration of power in the tech sector, bluntly giving notice to the dominant players on the digital marketplace that they will be under enhanced surveillance in the foreseeable future. They will be expected to follow the new rules for behaviour set out in the code, which will likely require more transparency (as to the use of consumer data?), opt-in options for personalised advertising (the issue that was at play in the German Facebook case), facilitating users' swapping to use any rival platforms.
The DMU is to start their work in April and is supposed to be able to 'suspend, block and reverse decision of tech giants, order them to take certain actions to achieve compliance with the code, and impose financial penalties for non-compliance'. What is of interest to us, of course, is to what extent this new unit will be able to benefit consumer protection in the UK? This is uncertain at the moment, but it seems that any consumer protection benefits may be coincidental rather than intentional here. First, the Guardian reported that the new unit will have oversight only over platforms funded by digital advertising and having 'strategic market status' (Digital Market Unit: what powers will new UK tech regulator have?). This would limit the unit's purview, possibly even only to Facebook's and Google's activities. Second, the DMU will focus on preventing damage to news media... which suggests that the interests of UK news outlets may play out more centrally, over consumers' interests.
A lot will depend on the new code of conduct set by/for the DMU. We will then definitely let our readers know when the new code for the behaviour of these digital platforms is adopted!
Dear readers,
if you were hoping for some inspiring CJEU news to keep your mind away from pandemics, impending festivities and other disasters, we may this week have just what you were looking for - or not, but only time will tell :)
Yesterday, the CJEU's first chamber delivered a judgement sparked by the creativity of Romanian courts which could make courts in other Member States take a closer look at their potential role in unfair terms dispute. To understand the case, it is useful to take a small step back.
As you may remember, in a string of cases culminating famously in the Dziubak decision, the court had established that unfair terms may not be replaced unless two+1 conditions are fulfilled:
a) the contract must, under the applicable national law, not be capable of existence without the unfair term
and
b) the invalidity must be to the consumer's disadvantage.
If these two conditions apply, the term may be replaced with otherwise applicable non-mandatory rules - the existence of which is a third condition. What if there are no otherwise applicable rules?
In the case at stake, Romanian courts were struggling with exactly this problem. While on occasion, as in Dziubak, a consumer may actually prefer the whole contract to be invalidated, in several Romanian cases courts were left alone with the prospect of invalidating contracts or facing a stalemate. Some courts had sought to apply non-mandatory rules which had entered in force at a later stage and were thus not applicable to the contentious contracts, but other courts had decided to instate "regulated" negotiations between the parties. In its decision, the CJEU endorses - and, to a certain extent, even requires, this approach, making space for a new wave of procedural innovation in unfair terms adjudication. To what extent this will materialise, though, will of course depend on a number of factors, including importantly national legislation. Let's see what the court says.
According to the CJEU, the Directive's article 6 does not seek to "prescribe uniform solutions" after a term has been declared unfair [see para 39]. However, once it has found a term unfair, the national court invested with the dispute must, "while taking into account all of its national law, take all the measures necessary to protect the consumer from the particularly unfavourable consequences which could result from the annulment of the loan, notably the fact that the seller or supplier could immediately claim the debt from the consumer" [para 41].
The above means that, in circumstances such as the ones at stake, nothing precludes a court from instating negotiations between the parties in order to establish a viable method for calculating the interest rate "provided that it sets out the framework for those negotiations" and that the negotiations themselves seek to establish "an effective balance" between the parties' rights an obligations, considering in particular the objective of consumer protection underlying the Unfair Terms Directive [see para 42]. In doing so, however, they should keep in mind that their intervention should not go beyond "what is strictly necessary to restore the contractual balance", which in turn means "to protect the consumer from the particularly unfavourable consequences" that annulment would bring about. A more substantive intervention would undermine the achievement of the paramount objectives pursued by the directive, namely restoring equality between the parties and deterring professionals from using unfair terms [para 44, para 38]
Combined, the elements in the reasoning seem to suggest not only that the Directive does not preclude the instigation of "regulated" negotiations, but even that courts are required to take action in this way when this is allowed [or not prohibited] under the applicable national rules. While the CJEU's caveat against substantive intervention leaves open questions as to what courts should do in case negotiations stall, the decision seems mainly aimed at moderating the possibly harsh effects of the case-law which came to be epitomised in Dziubak while preventing consumer-unfriendly readings which some MS courts may be a bit too eager to embrace.
On November 11th the CJEU delivered a judgment in C-287/19 DenizBank AG v Verein für Konsumenteninformation on
the interpretation of Directive 2015/2366 on Payment Services (PSD2).
The facts
VKI an Austrian consumer protection organization brought proceeding for
a prohibitory injunction infront of Handelsgericht Wien asking the court to
prohibit DenizBank from using several clauses in their standard terms with
consumers on grounds that they are null and void. The validity of these clauses were questions in relation
to the card’s NFC (Near Field Communication) functionality that enables customers to use contactless
payment for low value transactions. The case provided an opportunity to the
CJEU to provide interpretation on several aspects of PSD2.
Validity of
tacit consent to contract variation
With the first question the Austrian Supreme Court asked whether Article 52(6)(a)
of Directive 2015/2366, read in conjunction with Article 54(1), should be interpreted
to mean that the payment service providers may agree with the payment service
users (who are in this case also consumers) in the framework contract to include
a presumption that when the conditions laid down in the contract are satisfied,
the payment service users tacitly consented to contract variation.
The CJEU reminded that the tacit consent that is provided for and
thus agreed between the parties in advance at the point of contract conclusion
of the framework contract is only valid if the change in terms and conditions
is of minor importance to the contract. The court emphasized that in case of changing
any of the essential terms that would result in a new contract, tacit consent
would not be enough. Although the CJEU does not specify, it might be important
to note that a framework contract here should be the contract that provides the
card, in case of debit cards, this would be the bank account.
The CJEU confirmed that the provision indeed provide for a freedom
of payment service providers and users to include these kind of clauses into
their contracts, because PSD2 does not lay down restrictions regarding the
status of the user or the type of contractual terms that may be the subject of
such tacit consent. In principle therefore the validity of tacit consent could
not be ruled out. However, in transactions with consumers, the clause should
also be subject to an independent review under the Directive 1993/13/EC on
unfair terms and may thus be removed from the contract for being unfair.
Meaning of a ‘payment instrument’
With the second question the referring national court asked for clarifying
meaning of payment instrument in Article 4(14). More specifically, whether the NFC
functionality of personalised multifunctional bank cards by means of which
low-value payments are debited from the bank account associated with that card
constitutes a ‘payment instrument’.
Under Article 4(14) a ‘payment instrument’ is ‘a personalised
device(s) and/or set of procedures agreed between the payment service user and
the payment service provider and used in order to initiate a payment order’.
According to the CJEU, the NFC functionality of a multifunctional
bank card associated with a specific bank account does not constitute a
‘personalised device’, since the use of that function, in itself, does not
allow the payment service provider to verify that the payment order was
initiated by a user authorised for that purpose, unlike the other functions of
that card which require the use of personalised security data, such as a PIN
code or a signature. However, the NFC functionality is capable of constituting,
in itself, a non-personalised ‘set of procedures’, within the definition and
can thus be considered a ‘payment instrument’ for the purposes of the
application of PDS2.
Meaning of ‘anonymous’ use
Further on, the CJEU also had an opportunity in this case to
interpret the meaning of ‘anonymous’ within Article 63(1)(b), specifically,
whether contactless low-value payment using the NFC functionality of a
personalised multifunctional bank card constitutes ‘anonymous’ use of the
payment instrument.
Article 63 allows for contracting parties to agree to several
important derogations from the protective framework of PDS2 for low value individual
payment transactions not exceeding EUR 30 or which either have a spending limit
of EUR 150, or store funds which do not exceed EUR 150 at any time. These include
derogation from Article 72 which requires the provider to prove the
authentication and execution of payment transactions; from Article 73
which establishes the principle that the service provider is liable for
unauthorised payment transactions; and from Article 74(1) and (3) which
enables the parties to confer some responsibility for unauthorised payments on
the payer for up to EUR 50. These derogations are only possible under Article
63(1)(b) where ‘the payment instrument is used anonymously’ or where ‘the
payment service provider is not in a position for other reasons which are
intrinsic to the payment instrument to prove that a payment transaction was
authorised’.
The CJEU held that despite the facts that the card itself is
personalized, connected to a bank account of a particular customer, the use of
the NFC functionality for the purpose of making low-value payments constitutes
‘anonymous’ use, within the meaning of Article 63(1)(b). The payment
service provider is objectively unable to identify the person who paid using
that functionality and thus unable to verify, or even prove, that the
transaction was duly authorised by the account holder.
Consequently, contactless low-value payment using the NFC
functionality of a personalised multifunctional bank card constitutes
‘anonymous’ use of the payment instrument in question, within the meaning of Article
63(1)(b).
The ways to prove impossibility to block or prevention of future
use of payment instrument
Article 63(1)(a) allows the payment service provider and the
user to agree on further derogations from the protecting framework of PDS2,
that is, from Article 69(1)(b) which requires the user to inform the
provider without delay of the loss, theft, misappropriation or any unauthorised
use of the payment instrument concerned; from Article 70(1)(c) and (d) of which
requires the provider to make available to the user means to make that
notification free of charge or to request unblocking of that instrument; and from
Article 74(3) which relieves the payer, except where he or she has acted
fraudulently, from the financial consequences of any use of the lost, stolen or
misappropriated instrument that takes place after that notification.
These derogations are possible to achieve if the payment instrument does
not allow its blocking or prevention of its further use. So the question
infront of the CJEU was whether payment service providers may simply declare
that it is
impossible to block the payment instrument concerned or to prevent its
continued use, where, in the light of the objective state of available
technical knowledge, that impossibility cannot be established.
The CJEU concluded that this is not the case. The ‘payment service provider wishing to exercise the option provided for in Article 63(1)(a) … may not, in order to relieve itself from its own obligations, simply state, in the framework contract relating to the payment instrument concerned, that it is unable to block that instrument or to prevent its further use. That service provider must establish, with the burden of proof being on that provider in the event of a dispute, that that instrument in no way allows, on account of technical reasons, its blocking or prevention of its further use. If the court hearing those proceedings considers that it would have been physically possible to carry out such blocking or to prevent such use, having regard to the objective state of available technical knowledge, but that the provider did not make use of that knowledge, Article 63(1)(a) may not be applied to the benefit of that provider’ (para 98).
The dispute goes back to a fine imposed by the Romanian data protection authority on the provider of mobile telecommunications services, Orange România, for an allegedly unlawful storage of the copies of customers' identity documents. In particular, the authority argued, the data controller failed to demonstrate that the data subjects had given their valid consent to the contested processing. What makes the case interesting is that the storage of ID cards was, in fact, explicitly mentioned in the contracts which Orange concluded with its customers. Specifically, the following wording is cited:
As seen from above, both the declaration of "consent" and the confirmation of having
received the associated information were pre-forumlated by
the trader. At least in certain cases they were also already "pre-ticked". In fact, however, consent to the storage of the copies of ID cards was not necessery for entering into a contract and customers, who refused to consent, were not prevented from the contract conclusion. Data subjects who did not wish their ID cards to be copied, though, were asked to go through additional steps, most notably confirm their refusal in a specific form, which, like pre-ticked checkboxes, can be regarded as an example of dark patterns in action (or, in this case, "sludge").
Against this backgroud, doubts have been raised, among others, as to whether the clauses on data processing were sufficiently distinct from the remaining parts of the documents, whether the data subjects were not
misled about the possibility of refusing consent to the storage of ID cards and, if so, whether this could have an impact on the validity of their consent.
Legal provisions
Even though the contested fine was imposed on Orange România prior to the date of application of the GDPR, the Court of Justice decided to provide guidance on both Directive 95/46/EC and Regulation 2016/679. Key norms subject to the analysis where those laying down conditions for a valid consent. Focusing on the GDPR, attention should be drawn to its Article 6(1)(a), listing data subject's consent among the grounds for the lawful professing of his or her personal data, and to Article 4(11), which defines "consent" as any freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject's wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear affirmative action, signifies agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her. Of relevance are further the associated information duties in Article 13 as well as (non-binding) clarification of the above in recitals 32 and 42.
Judgment of the Court
While the specific assessment of the case at hand has been left to the national court (in line with the nature of preliminary reference procedure), the judgment provides important guidance on the legal provisions to be applied. In particular:
Concluding thoughts
Overall, the judgment provides for a range of important reference points, which may help to increase the level of consumer and data protection in the EU. Worth noting are the recurring references to the requirement of an "informed" consent, which appears to complement and reinforce all other conditions. The judgment underlines the close connection between data protection and consumer law stricto sensu, which has long been observed in the literature. Recognition of the role of (substantive) transparency and of potentially misleading practices in assessing consent validity is also to be welcomed. Both seem especially relevant in the digital market, where the consequences of consent are often difficult to determine and where dark patterns remain prevalent.
In Case C‑529/19 (here), the CJEU interpreted the Consumer Rights Directive, particularly the right of withdrawal and its exceptions (Article 16). In this case, the consumer bought a fitted kitchen from Möbel Kraft (a German furniture company) at a trade fair. Later, the consumer communicated to Möbel Kraft its wish to withdraw from the contract. Consequently, the consumer refused to accepted delivery of the kitchen. In response, Möbel Kraft sued for breach of contract. Möbel Kraft had not yet started to manufacture the kitchen parts at issue when the consumer withdrew from the contract.
While Article 9 of the Consumer Rights Directive gives consumer
the right to withdraw from an off-premises or distance contract, Article 16 lists
several situations where that right does not apply. One of those situations is
when the consumer buys goods made to the consumer’s specifications or clearly personalized
(Article 16(c)). Given Article 16(c), the referring court asked the CJEU whether
the consumer’s right to withdraw from an off-premises contract is also excluded
in case where goods are made according to the consumer’s specifications, but the
seller has not yet begun to produce the goods and therefore does not incur in
any (or few) costs in case of the consumer’s withdrawal.
The CJEU starts by clarifying that the contract in question can
only be considered an off-premises contract if it was not concluded at the
trade fair stand, which can be seen as ‘business premises’ according to Article
2(9) of the Consumer Rights Directive. Then, the CJEU states that there is
nothing in the Consumer Rights Directive that indicates that the exception of
Article 16(c) is dependent on the occurrence of any event after the conclusion
of the off-premises contract (para 24). In fact, the CJEU states that this
exception is inherent to the subject matter of such a contract. In other words,
the application of this exception is independent from the stage of performance
of the contract (or the stage of production of the products in question) (para
24). Consequently, the CJEU determines that the exception to the right of
withdrawal in off-premises contracts where the consumer acquires personalized
goods applies from the outset of the contract. The CJEU extracted this conclusion
not only from the literal element of Article 16(c) but also from its systematic
element, since Article 6(1)(h) and (k) of the Consumer Rights Directive impose
a pre-contractual duty on the trader to inform the consumer of the existence or
absence of a right of withdrawal (para 25). If the existence of a right of
withdrawal would be dependent on a decision of the trader (namely when to start
performing the contract), the goal of providing the mandated pre-contractual
information would be frustrated (para 27). Finally, to allow the right of withdrawal
to depend on the moment in time where the trader starts to produce the goods
would be contrary to legal certainty (para 28).
With this decision, the CJEU establishes the inflexible character
not only of the right of withdrawal but also of its exceptions. The CJEU’s
decision opts for legal certainty over consumer protection considering that, in
practice, this means that every time that a consumer acquires a personalized
product she can never withdraw from that contract, regardless of the actual
costs suffered by the business. Therefore, the CJEU directly contradicts national
case law from, for example, the Bundesgerichtshof, which previously determined
that the right of withdrawal is not excluded if the goods can be restored at a
low cost to the condition they were in prior to the personalization.
Last week the CJEU delivered its judgment in C-778/18 Association francaise des usagers de banque v Ministre de l'Economie et des Finances, interpreting Directive 2007/64 on Payment Services as repealed by Directive 2015/22366, Directive 2014/17 on Mortgage Credit and Directive 2014/19 on Payment Accounts.
This judgment answers a very interesting question on a practice that may be common in some Member States: is it compliant with EU law to require the transfer of consumers' income to the mortgage provider as a condition for approving their mortgage loan applications?
The facts
This claim was initiated by a consumer association representing banking clients. It sought annulment of the relevant French law implementing the above directives on grounds of misuse of power. The organization explained that the law disregards the objective of customer mobility pursued by the directives because it authorizes credit institutions to require consumers to deposit their salaries or other income with them and fixes the maximum period of 10 years for which consumers can ripe advantage of such deposited money irrespective of the amount, maturity and duration of the loan they were applying for.
The scope of Art. 12(2)(a) Directive 2014/17/EU
The CJEU was in effect faced with interpretation of the scope of Art. 12(2)(a) Directive 2014/17/EU. This provision provides an exception from the general rule of the Directive in Art. 12 that prohibits tying practices. The exemption in Art. 12(2)(a) provides creditors with an option to request from consumers or their family members to 'open or maintain a payment or a savings account, where the only purpose of such an account is to accumulate capital to repay the credit, to service the credit, to pool resources to obtain the credit, or to provide additional security for the creditor in the event of default'. Given this exemption, the CJEU noted that the obligation to deposit income is in principle consistent with the Directive (para. 54). However, the CJEU goes on to clarify that the exemption must comply with the requirements of proportionality, that is, it should provide account of the characteristics of the loan concerned, its amount, maturity and duration (para 56). Any different interpretation would jeopardize the achievement of the objectives of the Directive to provide a high level of protection for consumers, and to secure consumer mobility between banks, especially in circumstances when consumers wish to conclude a number of loans with different lenders. Tying them to a single bank would stand on the way of having an opportunity to shop around and make informed decisions for better deals. The CJEU therefore concluded that Art. 12(2)(a) must be interpreted to preclude national legislation that allows lenders to grant loans conditional on the deposit of all borrowers income on the payment account opened with the creditor (para 58). In regard to the duration of this obligation to have the account opened with the mortgage lender, the CJEU highlighted that the Directive does not provide any limitations as to the duration of the loan, and in principle therefore, this requirement is not inconsistent with the Directive, as long as the purpose of the deposit/account complies with the requirements set out in Art. 12(2)(a) (para. 61).
The meaning of ‘charges’ or ‘fees’ in Directive 2007/64, Directive 2015/2366 and Directive 2014/92
The second question raised in this case related to the meaning of 'charges' and 'fees' within Directive 2007/64, Directive 2015/2366 and Directive 2014/92. To promote consumer mobility and account switching, these rules provide consumers with a freedom to terminate framework contracts such as a current account contract without being liable to pay compensation in the form of fees or charges. French law however provides that if borrowers case to satisfy the income deposit requirement, lenders may terminate for remainder of the duration of the mortgage loan any individual advantages that were conferred on consumers, for instance, a better interest rate. The question infront of the CJEU was whether this denial of the benefit can be understood as a fee or charge within the meaning of the above directives. The CJEU ruled that it cannot.
Our evaluation
This judgment tackles a very interesting legal question. However, in addition to the bank account being extra security for the provided loan, another important aspect of transferring income in the mortgage provider bank is not considered in the judgment. Namely, not only that consumers' incomes provides additional security for banks that loans are going to be or at least they can be repaid, it also provides banks with additional data on customers. This enables banks to pull on a larger amount of data for profiling customers and monitoring their behavior. On the one hand, this may be beneficial for consumers, data could help banks to identify problems in repayment and income stream of the customer and address this with early intervention measures such as payment holidays. On the other hand, this additional information can help banks to provide new products to consumers that are tailored to their behavior and needs, that are arguably more likely to be taken by consumers than any products or services that does not suit them as much. The use of big data in banking is still in its infancy but having a bank account certainly provides extra opportunities for banks to get to know their customer, and represent a potential for extra profit. Perhaps this aspect could have also been taken into account in shaping the concept of fees and charges in the present context.
As mentioned in our previous post on
the Digital Finance Package (see here) on the September 24 the EU Commission also published a renewed Retail Payments Strategy as part of the
Digital Finance Package.
The logic behind the need for a renewed strategy
is the ever-increasing importance of payments for EU financial markets.
Payments are the lifeblood of European economy. This is a very dynamic market,
highly innovative and fast changing raising new opportunities and risks that
needs to be dully mitigated. As the Commission notes:
"Innovation and
digitalisation will continue to change how payments work. Increasingly payment
service providers will abandon old channels and traditional payment instruments
and develop new ways to initiate payments, such as ‘wearables’ (watches,
glasses, belts etc.) or parts of the body, sometimes even eliminating the need
to carry a payment device, building on advanced authentication technologies
such as those relying on biometrics. As the internet of things further evolves,
devices such as fridges, cars and industrial machinery will increasingly
connect to the internet and become conduits for economic transactions".
The renewed strategy sets out the EU
Commission's vision of payments market:
The vision will be achieved by following four strategic aims set out in detail; some of the key points would be the following:
1) Increasingly
digital and instant payment solutions with pan-European reach
The development of instant payment systems is the top priority or is envisaged as the 'new normal'. Instant payments make payment immediately available- the framework should result in payment solutions that are efficient and work cross-border. Consumer trust is also of key importance here, and instant payments can create instant fraud. It is therefore crucial that payment service providers have in place appropriate and real-time fraud and money laundering/terrorist financing prevention tools.
Further in this context and within the upcoming revision of PSD2 the Commission will assess the extent to which the EU’s existing consumer protection measures (e.g. rights to refunds) can provide consumers with the high level of protection offered by other payment instruments. The Commission will assess the impact of charges levied on consumers for instant payments and, if relevant, require that they are no higher than those levied for regular credit transfers.
Finally, the Commission is keen on supporting European or home-grown payment solutions that will withstand competition from foreign big-tech companies that increasingly penetrate the payments market. Payments is a network industry yet at EU level there is no trend of fintech companies scaling up in the internal market to become global players.
2) Innovative and competitive retail payments market
Within this strategic aim the Commission is strongly in favour of fully supporting open banking. Again, open banking will come under scrutiny within the review of PSD2 and interestingly the Commission also plans to present a legislative proposal for open finance that would include a broader range of providers in data sharing than only banks.
Further, within this strategic pillar the Commission needs to make sure the regulatory parameter is working well and that it is coupled with efficient supervision. As the Strategy notes, "big payments conglomerates may include both regulated and unregulated entities. Problems encountered by unregulated entities providing technical services to support some of the Group’s affiliates could potentially have a spill-over effect."
The payments market should also secure a fair level playing field, as "the world increasingly dominated by digital platforms, large technology providers are taking advantage of their vast customer base to offer front-end solutions to end-users."
3) Efficient and interoperable retail payment systems and other support infrastructures
For a retail payment market to fully function it is necessary that there is efficient interoperability between clearing and settlement mechanisms. Payment service providers now must connect to several (national and/or European) clearing and settlement mechanisms.
In addition, it is also crucial to secure access for all payment service providers for necessary technical infrastructure, hardware and software for developing and offering innovative payment solutions.
Developing this pillar will require a cooperative approach of DG FISMA with at least the European Central Bank, DG Competition and DG Connect
4) Efficient international payments, including remittance
The EU being not just a regional market but also an important global market player and to this effect, the Commission highlights the importance of supporting the development of payment solutions with third countries. Payments across the EU’s external borders are slower, costly, opaque and complex. The objective therefore is to have faster and more efficient payments systems set up with third countries. The Commission aims to help this by supporting the use of payment standards such as ISO 20022 and SEPA-like initiatives across the globe.
In addition to the new Action Plan on
Capital Markets Union (see our report here), on the very same day, the 24
September 2020, the EU Commission also presented its Digital Finance Package. This very board package
consists of: 1) the Digital Finance Strategy; 2) the Retail Payments
Strategy; 3) the legislative proposal for an EU regulatory framework for
digital operational resilience and 4) the legislative proposals for
crypto-assets.
The package aims to improve Europe's
global competitiveness in financial services and products provision not only by
boosting consumer choice but also by ensuring consumer protection and financial
stability. With the coronavirus pandemic and the rise in the use of digital
services more than before, these sorts of initiatives from the Commission are
more than welcome. Embracing digital innovation should not only create consumer
choice, but also widen access to financial services for consumers, increase
business opportunities for firms, especially SMEs, and thus facilitate Europe’s
economic recovery.
The package is complex and far
reaching. The strategies are necessarily general providing high level overall
strategic aims, but some of the legislative proposals are concrete and
ground-breaking. Most importantly, the package of proposals has been drafted
based on careful consultation and intensive cooperation with business
stakeholders and consumer advocates through public consultations and the
innovative Digital Finance Outreach programme of DG FISMA over the summer (on
which we reported here) that enabled anyone interested to get
involved in shaping the solutions. DG FISMA continues its public approach, it
is now holding biweekly seminars on the Digital Finance Package and these are
open for attendance for anyone interested (see here). The first seminar focused on the Digital
Finance Strategy and so does this post.
The first and broadest element of the
Digital Finance Package is the Digital Finance Strategy. It provides
for the overall strategic objective to embrace digital innovation and the ways
in which the more concrete proposals and the existing legislative framework
fits within the picture. As the Commission rightly states: 'The future of
finance is digital: consumers and businesses are more and more accessing
financial services digitally, innovative market participants are deploying new technologies,
and existing business models are changing.' To reflect this the strategy
is focused around four key priority areas:
1) Tackle fragmentation in
the Digital Single Market: this is the most general aim that
intended to enable consumers to access financial services and products fully
remotely.
To this effect, on the one hand, the
strategy recognizes that the key to achieving this is the fitness of onboarding
process (the recruitment of new customers) for digital age for which a crucial
element is the interoperability of digital identities. Digital identification
of customers remotely will be enabled with a review of the current regulatory
framework provided by Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 on electronic identification
and trust services for electronic transaction. In addition to securing a
framework for the development and use of digital identities, this regulation
should also enable data sharing between providers to facilitate the advantages
of open finance. Taking identification fully online also requires the
strengthening of the anti-money laundering and terrorism financing
legislation.
The other aspect of having access to
digital financial services and product is passporting of firms. Passporting
enables consumers and businesses to have access to cross-border services
provided by firms established and supervised in another Member State in line
with commonly agreed rules. Although passporting currently may work for
mainstream providers, it does not seem to work well for fintech companies that
comprise the bulk of the digital finance ecosystem. To overcome this, the
Commission is planning a one-stop-shop licensing system for these firms that
combined with passporting rules should help their operation throughout the EU.
In addition, special passporting rules for areas of particular interest such as
crowdfunding are also being considered. Finally, the Commission proposed the
establishment of a new EU Digital Finance Platform to facilitate cooperation
and communication between firms and supervisory authorities.
2) Adapt the EU regulatory
framework to facilitates digital innovation: this aim relates to
the creation and the review of the existing regulatory framework to fit the
requirements of digital age. Within this aim, the EU Commission presented a
legislative proposal on crypto-assets and placed as a strategic aim
for a technology-neutral regulatory framework. It also pledges for
clarifying the supervisory standards on the application of this
legislative framework to artificial intelligence applications.
3) Create a European
financial data space to facilitate data driven innovation: this
dimension is connected to the European strategy for data and aims to facilitate access
to data and data sharing within the EU, creating broader access to public and
private data and real time data sharing. As part of these efforts, the
Commission aims to set up a common financial data space through a number of
more specific measures: promote innovative IT tools to promote supervision
and promote business to business data sharing in EU financial sector and
beyond. It is important to note that this open finance initiative is
not going follow the UK's approach in mandating data sharing for firms
(see our report here). Participation will be
voluntary. The Commission will therefore propose legislation on a
broader open finance framework that will build on the upcoming initiative
focusing on data access, including the upcoming Data Act, and the Digital Services Act. Finally,
the Commission is also reviewing its competition approach and the
upcoming review of PSD2 is also going to be part of this framework.
4) Address new challenges and risks that come with digital innovation: with this aim, the EU Commission aims to work on future-proofing EU prudential and conduct supervision and regulation that should be fit to address both traditional firms as well as new entrants, especially technology companies that are increasingly present on financial markets. The objective will be proportionate regulation and supervision, based on the principle of “same activity, same risk, same rules” and pay particular attention to the risks of significant operators.