Double jeopardy in Volkswagen cases - CJEU in Volkswagen Group Italia and Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft (C-27/22)

Last Thursday the CJEU adjudicated in the Volkswagen Group Italia and Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft case (C-27/22 - see here). We have previously written about the Volkswagen scandal on the blog (see here) - that is, on the unfair commercial practice that Volkswagen engaged in by installing a defeat device in its cars, which led to marketing them as more environmentally-friendly in 2009. As our past blog posts mention, various national authorities were active in their investigation of Volkswagen's conduct. And here lies the problem that the CJEU tackled in this new case: Could different national procedures against Volkswagen (for the breach of consumer protection rules, esp. prohibition of unfair commercial practices) breach the principle of ne bis in idem? 

Eliott Van Buggenhout on Unsplash

Two national authorities' decisions were at stake here. The Italian authority (AGCM) imposed a fine of 5 million Euro on Volkswagen in August 2016 for the unfair marketing practices in Italy. This decision was promptly challenged in court by Volkswagen. Then, the German authority (Public Prosecutor's Office of Braunschweig) imposed a fine of 1 billion Euro for the 'negligent breach of the duty of supervision' in developing and installing relevant software worldwide. Volkswagen did not challenge this decision and paid the fine, which means it became final in June 2018. Part of the German decision indicated that the amount of 5 million Euro from the total fine would indeed penalise for the conduct mentioned in the Italian decision, whilst the rest of the fine aimed at taking away the economic advantage that Volkswagen derived from engaging in the unfair practice (para 19). This then led to Volkswagen claiming that the Italian authority's decision infringes the principle of ne bis in idem (embedded in Article 50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights), as it would duplicate the penalty for the same acts against the same person when it became final. To be able to claim this, Volkswagen argued that administrative fines placed on it were of a criminal nature. 

The Court of Justice agreed that administrative fines for breach of unfair commercial practices may be of a criminal nature. What is necessary is that the penalty has a punitive aim and a high degree of severity (determined on the basis of its amount compared to maximum allowed penalty under relevant provisions) (paras 45, 53-54). If these criteria are fulfilled, the penalty should be seen as of a criminal nature, even if national law classifies it as an administrative penalty (para 48). The Court mentions that if the fine was merely trying to repair the damage (possibly take away the unfair advantage), then it would be unlikely that it had a punitive or deterrent character, which characterises criminal sanctions (para 49). However, e.g. the fact that there is a maximum amount that can be set as a fine suggests that it would not always allow for taking away the achieved unfair advantage (para 52).

Consequently, if the Italian and German procedures penalise Volkswagen on the basis of identical material facts, not just similar facts and regardless of the national legal qualification of these facts, Italian law would not be able to allow for maintaining of the proceedings (paras 66-67, 70). This would indeed infringe the principle of ne bis in idem. This would only be different if the following three conditions were satisfied (para 96): 1) duplication of proceedings would not excessively burden Volkswagen (interestingly, since the Italian fine amounts to only 0.5% of the German fine, CJEU would not consider awarding it alongside the German fine as an excessive burden - para 97); 2) there needs to be transparency and predictability of which acts or omissions could be subject to duplication of proceedings (could Volkswagen predict then that their practices could give rise to proceedings in various countries? - para 98); 3) proceedings should be duplicated within a proximate timeframe and coordinated (and it seems that the Italian authority did not engage in any attempts initiated by the German authority to coordinate these proceedings - paras 101-102).

Volkswagen hit by a multi-million fine from the Polish consumer protection authority

Last September we informed our readers about an interesting report from BEUC summarizing the developments in law enforcement following the Dieselgate scandal. Last week a fine of over PLN 120 million (approx. EUR 28 million), imposed on Volkswagen Group Polska by the President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection in Poland (UOKiK), was added to this list. The violations established by the decision (the operative part is available in Polish here) are anchored in the Polish provisions implementing Directive 2005/29/EC on unfair commercial practices (UCPD), specifically Art. 4(1), Art. 5(1), Art. 5(3)(2) of the Act on counteracting unfair market practices (Ustawa o przeciwdziałaniu nieuczciwym praktykom rynkowym). These correspond, respectively, with: the general clause on unfair commercial practices, the specific provision on misleading actions, specification on misleading actions related to the main characteristics of the product.

According to the press release, the President of the UOKiK contested following behaviours of the trader: disseminating false information in advertising materials which suggested that Volkswagen, Seat, Skoda and Audi cars were environmentally-friendly and met the requirements for nitrogen oxide emissions; providing incorrect nitrogen oxides emission parameters in EC certificates of conformity; issuing guidelines for sellers of these cars which suggested that consumers' complaints should not be taken into account. 

Besides imposing a fine, the President of the UOKiK also obliged the trader to send a letter to the affected consumers and publish the content of the decision on its website. VW can appeal the decision to the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection (SOKiK) in Warsaw.

On stowaway protection - AG Pitruzzella in Kanyeba (C-349/18 to C-351/18)

AG Pitruzzella published his opinion today in an usual referral asking for the interpretation of the provisions of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive as applicable to stowaways (travellers without a valid ticket). The odd-egg character of the Belgian case Kanyeba (joint cases C-349/18 to 351/18) concerns a possibility of there not being a consumer contract and the question of whether the UCTD could apply in administrative, non-contractual disputes.

There is a debate in Belgian law as to the character of the legal relationship between passengers who have not purchased a ticket for their journey and public transport providers. Some scholars argue that even if a traveller does not purchase a ticket, they enter into a contractual relationship with transport providers by walking into the 'travelers-only' zones (adhesion contracts). If this interpretation is followed, then when a stowaway is found and charged the price of the ticket plus any accompanying surcharges (increasing drastically if the ticket is not purchased at the moment of the ticket control), it would be possible to consider, e.g. whether the surcharges are based on fair terms and conditions, pursuant to the UCTD. Other scholars claim that it is a contractual relationship only when the traveller purchased a valid ticket for their journey. They recognise that in other cases a stowaway would not have had an opportunity to accept terms and conditions of the transport, and that the relationship would need to have been regulated by law rather than by contract. Interestingly, in the opinion the attention is drawn to the fact that in Belgian law the unfairness test may also be applied to either type of the legal relationship (para. 28). Regardless the answer as to the nature of the relationship between a stowaway and a transport provider, the UCTD might still apply in Belgium then.

AG Pitruzzella leaves it to national laws, and national courts, to determine the character of the legal relationship between stowaways and transport providers (paras. 40, 43). If the national law does not determine the matter, it is for the national court to establish. In the referred cases, it was clear that passengers had no intention of being bound by the transport contract, as they did not consent to its core conditions: the price (paras. 52-53). This should preclude the relationship as being determined as contractual, although AG Pitruzzella leaves the space for national courts to still do so (paras. 54-58). If the relationship is non-contractual, the UCTD normally would not apply (para. 60). This does not preclude Belgian law from extending the application of the UCTD to all relationships between consumers and traders, also non-contractual ones (para. 62).

We may find specific tips in the opinion of AG Pitruzzella on how to assess the unfairness of surcharges in such circumstances. Namely, as the unfairness test should consider all circumstances surrounding the conclusion of an agreement (or alternatively of the legal relationship between the parties), it seems crucial for national courts to balance private and public interests in stowaway cases. After all, surcharges are supposed to discourage illegal behaviour of a travel without a valid ticket and to protect traders' interests in easier enforcement of travel prices (paras. 63-64). If passengers consider such surcharges as being of a significant detriment to them and distorting the contractual balance, they could have protected themselves against them by a timely ticket purchase.

Italy fines Facebook for data related unfair commercial practices

Yesterday the Italian Competition Commission fined Facebook 10 million EUR for breaching the relevant provisions of the Italian Consumer Code implementing the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive. The Competition Commission found that not-disclosing that consumers' data is provided for commercial purposes amounted to a misleading practice and that the pre-selected consent on data sharing comprised aggressive practices. Interestingly, in addition to the large fine, Facebook was also ordered to issue an apology to its users on its website and on its app (see for more here).

This is an important step in the aftermath of the Cambridge Analytica scandal (see for more here, and our report here), and it will be hopefully followed in other Member States where due to the global nature of social media, it is very likely that similar breaches occurred. This then leads us back to an 'old' problem of national enforcement of EU wide infringements of consumer law, and the question of whether there is a need to overhaul and improve the existing enforcement regime of EU consumer law by empowering the EU Commission to take enforcement actions against EU-wide infringements (which we discussed here). What do you think?

Record fine for Google for breaching EU antitrust rules: is there anything for consumers?

Earlier this week, on the 18^th of July, the European Commission fined Google €4.34 billion for breaching EU antitrust rules. This is so far the largest fine ever imposed for such violations.

It is now evident that since 2011 Google imposed illegal restrictions on other Android device manufacturers and mobile network operators abusing their dominant position on the markets of: general internet search services, licensable smart mobile operating systems and app stores for the Android mobile operating system.

In particular Google 1) required manufacturers to pre-install the Google Search app and browser app (Chrome), as a condition for licensing Google's app store (the Play Store), engaging in the so called illegal practice of ‘tying’: 2) made illegal payments to certain large manufacturers and mobile network operators on condition that they exclusively pre-installed the Google Search app on their devices; and 3) illegally prevented manufacturers wishing to pre-install Google apps from selling even a single smart mobile device running on alternative versions of Android that were not approved by Google. Google's conduct prevented a number of large manufacturers from developing and selling devices based on Amazon's Android fork called "Fire OS".

The antitrust decision requires Google to bring its illegal conduct to an end in within 90 days of the decision. At a minimum, Google has to stop any of the above three types of illegal practices. The decision also requires Google to refrain from any measure that has the same or an equivalent object or effect as these practices. The Commission will monitor compliance with the decision, and in the event of failure to comply, Google can face payment of a fine of up to 5% of its average daily worldwide turnover.

This decision is beneficial for consumers in two ways. First, by stopping the abuse of dominant position, the decision is likely to result in increased competition in the given markets that brings better products and lower prices for consumers. Second, harmed consumers are able to claim compensation in civil actions for damages in their national courts based on the new EU Antitrust Damages Directive.