In St. Kliment Ohridski Primary Private School (C‑429/24), the CJEU examined the applicability of the Consumer Rights Directive (CRD) to enrolment contracts between a parent and a privately funded school for the compulsory education of her children. Questions arose as to whether the parent and/or the children qualify as a ‘consumer’ under the CRD and whether the contract qualifies as a ‘service contract’. Moreover, as Bulgarian law mandates the same educational standards, including compulsory subjects, for both public and private schools, the CJEU was also asked whether, under Art. 27 CRD – which exempts consumers from paying for the unsolicited services – the parent or pupil may deny payment for compulsory subjects they did not request or for unsatisfactory education.
Regarding qualification, the CJEU relied on its previous case law under the Unfair Contract Terms Directive (see our previous comment here) and extended the ‘broad interpretation’ of the notion of ‘consumer’ to the CRD (para 38). In this case, the parent concluded the enrolment contracts solely to ensure her children’s education at a private school and not for any professional purpose (para 40). The fact that such education is compulsory under national law – and the contracts were thus concluded to satisfy a legal obligation – does not alter the qualification. The CJEU reiterated that ‘consumer’ is ‘an objective concept’, independent of the contract’s subject matter, including the reasons leading to that contract (here, to fulfil a legal obligation). Plus, the parent remains free to choose which private school to entrust (para 41). Therefore, the consumer status of the parent is confirmed. However, as the enrolment contracts were concluded between the parent alone and the private school, the children/pupils themselves are not covered by the concept of ‘consumer’ (para 42).
In light of such qualification, and given that Art. 2(6) CRD gives a broad definition of a ‘service contract’ that covers ‘all contracts which do not fall within the term “sales contract”’, the enrolment contracts should be characterised as a ‘service contract’ (paras 45-46). While not specified by the CJEU, the point here is also that such qualification applies to the enrolment contracts in their entirety and is not limited to components ‘not falling within the scope of compulsory education, such as the provision of meals, transport or extracurricular activities’ (see para 26).
Finally, the CJEU observed that the parent has concluded a contract for ‘a single overall service’ of the provision of full-time education in line with national education standards, ‘without it being possible to choose the subjects taught or to adjust the number of teaching hours’ (para 53). The provision of mandatory education is thus part of that overall service and does not constitute unsolicited service under Art. 27 CRD. As to the dissatisfaction with the quality of education, it is not covered by the CRD as stipulated by Art. 3(5) CRD and is thus left to national contract law.
This case is an interesting addition to the ever-expanding scope of European consumer law, extending beyond the traditional consumer to encompass travellers, homeowners and tenants, energy users, debtors, patients and, now, the parents of a pupil. As public services increasingly become privatised, the broad reach of consumer law serves an important welfare function by ensuring (minimum) protection across various aspects of individuals’ lives.
