Consumers' access to interim relief - the CJEU in Myszak (C-324/23)

In case C-324/23 (Myszak) the Court of Justice of the European Union was asked again to deal with the consequences of mortgage loan agreements indexed in Swiss francs. 

The case concerns a mortgage loan contract indexed in Swiss francs whose voidance was claimed by three consumers against the Getin Noble Bank S.A. Consumers claimed the unfairness of the contractual term in question, according to Directive 93/13/EEC. Accordingly, sought interim relief in court, in order to suspend the execution of the contract containing unfair terms.

Meanwhile, however, the Bank went through a resolution procedure. Polish law bars the possibility to ask interim measures against bank dealing with special resolution procedures, according to the law implementing Directive 2014/59/EU (the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive). 

The Polish court asked the CJEU about the compatibility with Articles 6(1) and 7(1) of UCTD and Article 70(1) and (4) of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive of the national law. Pursuant to relevant Polish law it is not possible to grant a consumer’s application for an interim measure to suspend, during the course of the court proceedings, the obligation to pay the loan instalments under a loan agreement which is likely to be declared invalid, on the sole ground that it was granted by a bank declared to be under special resolution.

The CJEU affirmed that a statutory provision barring consumers to obtain interim relief during resolution procedures impairs consumers to exercise their rights, and thus goes against EU law.

The Court invoked the principle of effectiveness, claiming that impeding consumers to exercise their rights because of a bank’s resolution would impact on the effective enforcement of the UCTD. The Court of Justice has, on a number of occasions, made general statements on the need for national courts to be able to adopt interim measures for the full effectiveness of court decisions concerning rights granted by EU law (see, among others, Case C-213/89, Factortame).

Although the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive allows Member States’ laws to specify and define the procedural means of its implementation, national laws implementing it should not impede consumer protection. Accordingly, a provision barring the enforcement of UCTD, precluding adoption of interim measures, is contrary to EU law.

The decision reinforces a well-established pattern in the Court of Justice’s rulings: when in doubt, in favour of the consumer!

A milestone for Polish consumers claiming unfairness of Swiss francs mortgage loans - CJEU in Lubreczlik (C-396/24)

Yesterday, the CJEU issued a new judgment in the Swiss franc mortgage loans and their unfair contract terms saga, following a referral from a Polish court, in the case known as Lubreczlik (C-396/24). The referral was based on two cases, in which consumers concluded mortgage loans indexed to the Swiss franc rate. In both cases consumers claimed repayment of sums they had paid to the bank on the basis of their mortgage contracts being void due to unfair contract terms they contained. The bank counterclaimed seeking that consumers paid the full loan amount back to the bank. 

Previously, the Polish Supreme Court issued a judgment with a so-called 'two claims' theory (see declaration III CZP 11/20 from 16 February 2021 - in Polish here). This theory acknowledged that after a loan agreement is declared invalid, both parties (consumer and lender) have a right, "distinct and independent of each other, to repayment of monetary payments made in performance of that agreement. Each of the parties could therefore claim full repayment of the sums paid, whether or not it is still a debtor of the other party and regardless of the amount of its own debt" (para 26).

Imagine now situations (very common in practice), in which consumers have already paid the whole amount of their loan to the bank, or even paid to the bank sums exceeding the total loan value, on the basis of high interest rates. While waiting for their claims of unfairness to be adjudicated by Polish courts or the judgments to become final and the bank to return their money to them, they receive a lawsuit from the bank for the repayment of the full amount of the loan. Often, such a (de facto, repeated) repayment would either be financially impossible or significantly detrimental to consumers (even if made in the expectation of the eventual repayment by the bank of the same or higher sum of money) (para 27). Further procedural rules make it also feasible that any repayment by a consumer of the money to the bank will be immediately enforceable, while the bank's obligation to repay the consumer may take a long time to reach that stage (para 32). Consumers could theoretically argue for a set-off of reciprocal claims, but Polish procedural rules make such a declaration complex and not necessarily favouring consumer interests (para 28).

Repayment of the loan amount by a consumer

The CJEU leaves no doubt that Polish (case) law may not allow banks to claim repayment of the full loan amount, regardless of the value of repayments already made by consumers in performance of the loan agreement and "irrespective of the amount remaining due" (para 44). The CJEU recalls the need for the Member States to ensure that the national protection against unfair contract terms is a deterrent for sellers and suppliers against embedding such terms in their contracts (para 38). Further, national law needs to protect consumers against the detriment of having their contract's annulled as a result of them containing unfair contract terms (para 39). These obligations may result in Polish courts being required to "change established case-law", if following such national case law would lead to undermining EU consumer protection's objectives (para 43).

Polish courts should then disregard the Polish Supreme Court's theory of "two claims" in assessing the banks' claims for repayment of the full amount of loan by consumers, if consumers already had paid back at least part of the mortgage loan to the bank. This should mean in practice that banks claims filed against consumers should be scaled down in consideration of the actual repayments that consumers have already made. Strategic litigation by banks against consumers for the repayment of full loan amounts becomes much more risky as a result of this judgment.

Immediate enforceability of consumer repayments

The CJEU also addressed the matter of Polish courts being required to award of their own motion immediate enforceability to repayment claims made by banks against consumers, if consumers accepted such claims (and they may have good reasons to accept them - see para 51 of the judgment for more information). The Court considers also this practice contrary to EU consumer protection objectives, as long as Polish courts are not allowed to consider in their decision-making detriment to the consumer that such an immediate enforceability order would have (para 58). 

This part of the CJEU's judgment protects consumers against the immediate need to repay the money to the bank, which could have dissuaded them from progressing with their unfairness claims.

Overall, this judgment raises financial risks for these banks that were not keen so far to settle consumer cases and which have used various intimidation tactics to dissuade consumers from pursuing their claims. It may also lead to banks proposing more beneficial settlements to consumers and encourage consumers to negotiate settlement terms.

Validity of limitation periods for claiming mortgage costs back from banks - CJEU in Caixabank (C-484/21) and Banco Santander (C-561/21)

While many consumer lawyers are currently busy analysing the details of the opinion of AG Emiliou in Compass Banca case (C-646/22) (and we will add our own analysis of it in the coming days, too), on the same day (April 25) two judgments were issued by the CJEU clarifying the consequences of terms' unfairness on restitution of costs paid by consumers. Both in Caixabank (Délai de prescription) (C-484/21) and Banco Santander (Départ du délai de prescription) (C-561/21) Spanish courts posed questions concerning validity of various limitation periods for consumers raising a restitution claim for 'the costs clause'. The costs clause included in mortgage loan contracts obliged consumers to pay all the costs relating to the mortgage's creation. This may encompass notary, registry and agency fees.

The CJEU refers back to the Gutiérrez Naranjo and Others case (C-154/15 - with our comment here) to reaffirm the obligation of national courts to facilitate restitution of amounts consumers paid, which were imposed by an unfair contract term (e.g. paras 16-17 in C-484/21). Could national limitation periods stand in the way of such consumer claims? Previously, the CJEU already confirmed that limitation periods could be set in national laws as applicable to restitution claims brought by consumers in enforcing their rights from UCTD, however, these cannot make it in practice impossible or excessively difficult to exercise such rights (para 27 in C-484/21).

In short, regarding limitation periods for restitution claims, which are raised by consumers following a declaration of unfairness of terms setting the payment obligation, CJEU decided as follows:

1. They cannot start running from the date of the payment, irrespective of whether consumers were or could reasonably have been aware of the unfairness of terms at the time of the payment, or before the term was found to be void (paras 30, 32, 34-35 in C-484/21).
2. They cannot start running from the date on which the national supreme court delivered a judgment in a separate, earlier case, declaring a corresponding term unfair (C-484/21 and C-561/21). To pay attention to: The CJEU highlights here the lack of obligation for service providers to inform their consumers that terms in their contracts are equivalent in scope to terms in other contracts that have been found unfair (para 41 in C-484/21). Further, it mentions that average consumers cannot be 'required not only to keep himself or herself regularly informed, on his or her own initiative, of decisions of the national supreme court relating to standard terms contained in contracts of a similar nature to those which or she has concluded with sellers or suppliers, but also to determine, on the basis of a judgment of a national supreme court, whether a term included in a particular contract is unfair' (para 45 in C-484/21).
3. They cannot start running on the date of the CJEU's judgments, which confirmed, in principle, that limitation periods for actions for restitutions are compatible with EU law (provided they are equivalent and effective) (C-561/21). (for similar as above reasons + the fact that CJEU often leaves determination of unfairness to national courts - para 58 in C-561/21)
4. They can start running on the date on which the decision about unfairness of a term in a given case becomes final, without prejudice to the trader's right to prove that consumers were or could have been reasonably aware of the unfairness before the decision was made (paras 35-38 in C-561/21).

May airlines use T&Cs to prohibit passengers from assigning their rights to claim damages? - CJEU in Air Europa Lineas Aéreas (C-173/23)

In today's Air Europa Lineas Aéreas judgment (C-173/23) the CJEU looked into the application of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive (UCTD) to contracts concluded between air passengers and air carriers. Specifically, the passenger in case suffered damages as a result of a delay in receiving his checked-in baggage. He assigned his claim for damages against the air carrier (Air Europa) to a third party (Eventmedia). The air carrier disputes the transfer of rights to Eventmedia, claiming that assignment of passenger rights is prohibited by a clause in its general conditions of carriage (para 12). The referring court had sufficient evidence to declare this clause unfair ex officio but had doubts whether it could do so procedurally. First, the consumer was not part of the judicial proceedings, as he was represented by the assignee of his rights (whose standing was contested). Second, if the court declared the clause unfair the consumer, still remaining outside the judicial procedure, would not have received a chance to object to the application of this finding. 

Ex officio unfairness testing after consumers assigned their claims

First, the CJEU reminds that it has already previously declared (in the DelayFix case - C-519/19) that the UCTD's application is based on the capacity of the parties when they were concluding a contract (B2C) rather than the identity of parties entering into a dispute (paras 17-18). Therefore, the UCTD applies to more cases than just the ones, in which a dispute is between B2C contractual parties (para 25).

The CJEU reminds further that the ex officio judicial mechanism aims to compensate for the imbalance between consumers and professional parties (para 29). Other procedural issues remain in the discretion of the Member States, provided that they comply with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness (para 31).

To comply with the principle of equivalence here, the national court needs to determine whether national law allows it to ex officio assess whether a contractual term is contrary to national rules of public policy. If the answer is affirmative, the unfairness assessment also needs to take place ex officio (paras 34-35). This conclusion is not impacted by the consumer's presence in the judicial procedure, as if conditions for the applicability of the UCTD have been fulfilled (e.g., contract concluded B2C) its provisions benefit from having been assigned an equivalent status to domestic rules of public policy.

The assessment differs regarding the observance of the principle of effectiveness, as this considers the specifics of each procedure and the role that the contested legal provision plays in it. Specifically, " (...) whether a national procedural provision makes the application of EU law impossible or excessively difficult must be analysed by reference to the role of that provision in the procedure, its progress and its special features, viewed as a whole, and, where relevant, the principles which lie at the basis of the national legal system, such as the protection of the rights of the defence, the principle of legal certainty and the proper conduct of proceedings (...)." (para 37). Here then the fact that the procedure occurs between two professional parties weakens the need to provide as much protection against unfair terms, as if a consumer was one of the parties in the dispute, as there should be more balance between parties in the dispute (para 38). The principle of effectiveness does not require then the national court to test unfairness ex officio (para 39), unless the professional assignee of the consumer's claim had no real chance to rely on the unfairness in the procedure (para 40).

Consequences of unfairness in light of audi alterem partem when consumers are not part of the judicial process

When national courts find a term unfair ex officio, they follow the rules of audi alterem partem, of a fair hearing, by apprising parties in the dispute of court's findings and giving them an opportunity to debate these and to be heard (para 44). This applies also in case the dispute is between the assignee of the consumer rights and it is this assignee that needs to be informed of the unfairness finding, alongside the trader (para 46). As the consumer is not a party to the dispute, they do not need to be informed of the court's finding of unfairness and do not need to address it (para 49). It is the assignee of their rights that may object to it instead (para 47), although, obviously, they are unlikely to do so as they would then lose standing in the procedure (para 48).

***

The first part of the judgment has enormous practical relevance, as air passengers commonly assign their rights for compensation to third parties. It is, therefore, important for the effectiveness of passenger protection framework that air carriers could not block this process by prohibiting the transfer of rights in their general terms and conditions. This judgment will help assure this further, following the previous judgment in the DelayFix case (see our comment here), as professional assignees of consumers' claims will be able to raise unfairness of the prohibition of transfer of rights themselves. If this is prohibited or hindered, they could then rely on the breach of the principle of effectiveness and expect national courts to test unfairness ex officio (pursuant to para 40). This way assures more legal certainty than relying on the ex officio unfairness testing due to the principle of equivalence, as it could differ between the Member States whether ex officio testing of measures of public policy was allowed.

Facilitating enforcement of unfairness control - CJEU in Getin Noble Bank and Others (C-531/22)

Happy 2024 Dear Readers!

We are starting a new year of reporting with the reference to the last week's judgment in the Polish case referred to the CJEU as Getin Noble Bank and Others (C-531/22 - not yet available in English, but accessible in other languages). This judgments continues to provide guidance on the application of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive to terms in mortgage contracts indexed in Swiss Francs. The CJEU considered two questions/issues: 

1. Ex officio judicial authority to test unfairness while overseeing enforcement of a final payment order with res judicata status

To not keep you in suspense: The CJEU decided that national courts may ex officio assess unfairness in such circumstances, provided that: 1) national law did not allow for unfairness test at the moment of issuing of a payment order, or 2) if such unfairness test is only allowed if a consumer would have objected to the issued payment order, provided that there is a significant risk that a given consumer is not going to issue an objection. This risk could result from: the short time allowed for filing the objection, objection's costs compared to the debt amount, or the lack of obligation to provide consumer with all the information necessary to determine their rights in this respect (para 61). This is, in large extent, confirming Court's previous judgment in Leasing România judgment (C-725/19) (paras 50-51).

This is an important judgment to address some inefficiencies of the Polish civil law procedure that may limit the scope of the unfairness testing. Specifically, payment orders may be issued by Polish courts upon an electronic request by creditors, without the courts having either legal or technical access to contractual documents, on the basis of which this payment order is issued. If the debtor does not file an objection to the issued payment order within 2 weeks from its delivery, they become final with the res judicata status. This means that they may not be further questioned in enforcement proceedings (para 49). As the CJEU previously considered a 2 week timeframe too short to reasonably give a chance to consumers to file an objection (paras 54-55), this judgment clearly indicates the lack of compliance of the Polish civil procedural rules with the effective consumer protection framework against unfair contract terms. This finding is not weakened by the inertia of the consumer during previous judicial proceedings with them as a party, as the option to file an objection to the payment order is the only opportunity for the consumer to procedurally stop the enforcement proceedings, and as such the consumer needs to be given a real chance to do so (considering the timeframe, costs etc.) (para 60).

2. Recognition of an unfair character of a contract term, upon it having been entered into a register of unfair contract terms, also in subsequent judicial proceedings against a given consumer, even with a different trader involved and when the term has been differently drafted, but when it retained the same substance and led to the same consequences.

The CJEU first (paras 69-73) recalls the conditions for the validity of a register of unfair contract terms in national legal systems, which were first discussed in the Biuro case (see our comment here). Pursuant to the Court, the opportunity for national courts to compare a given contract term to a term already entered into a register after previous judicial proceedings, may lead to a more efficient and faster enforcement of the unfairness control, freeing consumers from harmful consequences of unfair terms in many contracts simultaneously (para 75). The finding of unfairness of a given term could then indeed be recognised and applied also in subsequent judicial proceedings - even with a different trader involved, and when the term has been differently drafted, but when it retained the same substance and led to the same consequences (para 78).

Bad faith of sellers in unfairness cases - CJEU in CAJASUR Banco (C-35/22)

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In a recent case, from 13 July, in CAJASUR Banco (C-35/22), the CJEU reflects further on the need of national laws providing effective and equivalent consumer protection against unfair contract terms. In this Spanish case, the consumer succeeded in claiming unfairness of terms in a mortgage loan agreement. However, the bank appealed the order to repay consumer fees for the legal proceedings. Pursuant to Spanish law, only defendants who were in bad faith would need to pay such costs. The bad faith would be established if before the legal action the bank 'has received a due and substantiated demand for payment, mediation proceedings have been initiated or a request for conciliation has been made...' (paras 9 and 29-30). The consumer did not take such actions in this case. 

The question posed to the CJEU boiled down to: Whether if national laws prevented consumers from claiming back costs of legal proceedings, when such consumers have not taken any actions prior to brining proceedings against sellers, this would contradict Article 6 UCTD - providing effective sanctions against unfairness of contract terms. As the Member States have procedural autonomy, they may set rules regarding costs of legal proceedings, provided that these comply with the principles of effectiveness and equivalence (para 24). The CJEU reiterates its various previous rulings on the impact that awarding (or not) of costs may have on consumers' willingness to exercise their rights against unfair contract terms (paras 25-28). 

In light of facts of the given case, what struck the CJEU was the one-sidedness of the Spanish law requirement to initiate mediation/conciliation before legal proceedings. This burden is purely placed on consumers as plaintiffs in cases against unfairness (para 31). Whilst taking of such steps may help with releasing the pressure on the judicial system (argument of the Spanish Government), the CJEU legitimately then expects this burden to be shared between the parties. For example, banks could be expected to pro-actively approach consumers with contracts containing terms that have been established as unfair in settled national case law (para 32). If national law places such burdens solely on consumers, it does not encourage sellers 'to draw, voluntarily and spontaneously, all the consequences of the case-law on unfair contract terms and thus promotes the continuation of the effects of those terms.' (para 34). The CJEU, expecting active behaviour from the sellers, then continues to state that if in case of 'inertia on the part of the seller...' in contacting consumers and disapplying unfair terms to them, consumers start legal actions, this should not be held against them (para 35). Conclusively, the CJEU then recognises that national law could choose bad faith as a requirement for awarding costs of proceedings (para 38). However, national courts should be ready to recognise such bad faith also when banks, aware of consumers' weaker position, wait with admitting the claim until consumers' take action, just to avoid having to pay the costs of proceedings, instead of informing them of terms' unfairness of their own will (paras 36-37).

What looked at a glance as another judgment focused on a small procedural issue, actually  could have far-reaching consequences for consumer protection. If the reasoning of the CJEU is extrapolated to other situations when sellers have knowledge of unfairness of consumer terms but do not act on it, which would lead to the recognition of sellers acting in bad faith, in various national laws this could have further ramifications for award of damages, burden of proof, etc.

AG Saugmandsgaard Øe in EL and TP v Caixabank (C-385/20): Spanish restrictions on reimbursement of lawyer fees not against effectiveness

For those who have missed updates on impossibly complicated fact-rule patterns in UCTD adjudication, this month has offered a nice pick-me-up in the form of a new AG opinion on procedural rules and principle of effectiveness. Brace, brace for C-385/20: EL and TP v Caixabank!

The dispute in EL and TP v Caixabank concerns not so much unfair terms (the contract between the parties was found in national proceedings to be based on unfair currency terms and hence converted) but the consumer's ability to recover their legal expenses (lawyer fees) after having won an unfair terms case. 

In the case at stake, the claimants had sued Caixabank indicating that the entirety of the dispute was uncertain at start. For such cases, Spanish law has no specific provisions concerning the reimbursable fees; however, courts have concluded by analogy that the disputed amount can be put down to a fictitious lumpsum for the purpose of calculating lawyers fees - which can be, in turn, maximum 1/3rd of the overall value of the dispute. In the dispute underlying this case, the disputed amount had been automatically set at 30000 euros by the court and the reimbursable fees to 10000 euros - less than half of the fee due by the consumers to their lawyers. The entity of the dispute thus set could not later be challenged or altered at the consumer's request.

In essence, the referring court wants to know whether the working of the two rules, which ultimately mean that the consumers must bear a large part of their legal costs on their own despite having won the dispute is against Articles 6 and 7 of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive, requiring the consumer to be put in the same position where they would have been if unfair terms had never become part of the contract. 

The opinion answers two separate questions: whether it is against the effectiveness of Articles 6-7 UCTD that the value of a dispute is set at a certain lumpsum level and cannot be modified by the consumer; whether a rule that caps lawyer fees at a certain proportion of the value of the dispute may again be in breach of the same provisions. The Advocate General considers the arguments proposed by, in particular, the claimants and the European Commission - on one side - and the Polish and Spanish governments on the other side. Saugmandsgaard Øe is not particularly impressed by the Commission's submission that asking consumers to pay out-of-pocket lawyer fees would go against the principle of full compensation established in Gutierrez Naranjo: this principle, according to the AG (para 46) does not regulate the question of legal expenses; in this respect, the AG agrees with the Polish government's submission that some out-of-pocket expenses are allowed as long as they do not make it practically impossible for the consumer to pursue their rights. This may be controversial as such and may not hold well, I think, if the Court decides to answer the questions in a different order. Quite understandably, the AG further brushes off some purely national interpretive issues (see eg para 79) in respect of one of the questions, considering them essentially irrelevant to the purpose of answering the questions posed to the court. 

To both those questions, the AG gives a negative answer in principle: none of these rules are against the Directive insofar as, on the one hand, the lumpsum or otherwise established entity of the dispute ultimately approximates the value of the dispute to the consumer (the wording of the opinion is slightly different, but it seems to me that this is a more logical way of phrasing the condition), while on the other hand any existing cap must allow the consumer to obtain a reimbursement commensurate to the expenses that they had to face. 

In practice, both caveats suggest that the Spanish rules may have to be interpreted in a more consumer-friendly manner than some Spanish courts seem to do - however, the way in which the AG has formulated his opinion may lead some readers to interpret his guidance very differently. Whichever side the Court decided to take on this issue (it seems well possible that they may eg decide to rephrase the questions and answer them at once, looking at the cumulative impact of the rules rather than assessing them separately), it is to be hoped that the outcome will be formulated in slightly clearer terms. 

Default judgments not without ex officio unfairness test - CJEU in Kancelaria Medius (C-495/19)

Last Thursday the CJEU issued another judgment confirming the need for national procedural laws to facilitate effective judicial review of unfair contract terms - Kancelaria Medius (C-495/19). Polish procedural law was closely examined in this judgment, as it mandates national courts to issue default judgments also in cases brought by traders against consumers (in the given case, the claim was for debt collection based on a concluded by the consumer credit agreement). This means that if the defendant-consumer fails to appear at court and defend their rights, after they have been duly notified of the claim, default judgments for traders should be issued based solely on the documents disclosed by traders. The court may not contest the validity of the presented documents of its own motion, unless there are 'reasonable doubts' or a risk of 'circumventing the law', which normally will not occur if the presented information is succinct (para. 16). This would prevent national court to ex officio examine unfairness of contract terms.

The referring court raised this issue following the previous case law of the CJEU in Profi Credit Polska (see our analysis here) and Aqua Med (see our analysis here). The CJEU adheres to its previous judgments in these two cases and again emphasises the need for national procedural rules not to stand in the way of ex officio assessment of unfairness of contract terms in consumer contracts (by 'adopting the measures of inquiry needed to ascertain whether a term in the contract is unfair'), where the court has doubts as to whether the terms are unfair. Only then the Member States may claim that they comply with the obligation of Article 7 UCTD to provide effective consumer protection against unfairness, by ensuring that both the principle of equivalence and of effectiveness are observed (para 32). It falls within the ambit of the dispute, and thus is not prevented by the delimitation by parties of the subject matter of an action and the principle of ne ultra petita, for the national court to require the trader to present the content of the contract, on which the application for the claim is based (in the given case - the credit agreement signed by the consumer, instead of an unsigned pr forma contract) (paras 44-45). 

The CJEU suggests to Polish courts specifically to use the principle of harmonious interpretation in interpreting Polish procedural rules on default judgments, namely to broadly interpret the exceptions of 'reasonable doubts' and 'circumventing the law' to accommodate ex officio assessment of unfairness. As long as such a broad interpretation would not be contra legem, it would allow Polish law to be perceived in conformity with the UCTD (paras 48-49). If that is impossible, Polish procedural rules standing in the way of ex officio unfairness test should be disapplied (para. 51).

Case C‑511/17 Unicredit Bank Hungary: Ex officio unfairness assessment limited to subject matter and to existing legal and factual elements

In  the case C-511/17, the CJEU followed the AG’s opinion closely (about which we wrote here). The case deals with the scope of the obligation to assess the unfairness of contractual terms ex officio, under Directive 93/13/EEC (Unfair Terms Directive).

The CJEU clarified that the Unfair Terms Directive does not oblige national courts to conduct any unfairness assessment beyond the subject matter of the dispute (paragraph 28). In other words, as AG Tanchev also defended, the CJEU highlighted the importance of protecting the ne ultra petita principle. However, the CJEU considered that it is within the subject matter of the dispute that national courts examine ex officio the unfairness of contractual terms in order to guarantee a high consumer protection, particularly to prevent the consumer’s claim from being rejected when it could have been upheld had the consumer invoked the unfair nature of that particular term (paragraph 32).

In addition, the CJEU established that national courts are only obliged to carry out an ex officio assessment of unfairness regarding those contractual terms whose unfairness can be determined by existing elements of law and fact available to the court (Profi Credit Polska case). However, in order to implement the duty of ex officio examination, national courts should not be confined exclusively to the elements of law and fact provided by the parties (paragraph 36). This means that national courts can, of their own motion, take investigative measures in order to complete the case file. However, national courts should only do this if the existing elements of law and fact ‘give rise to serious doubts as to the unfair nature of certain clauses which were not invoked by the consumer but which are related to the subject matter of the dispute’ (paragraph 37).

Finally, the CJEU reiterated that in order to assess the unfairness of a contractual term (on which the claim is based) the national court must take into account all the other terms of the contract (Banif Plus Bank, C‑472/11). This obligation is justified by the fact that the assessment of one or more specific terms must be contextualized, and the ‘cumulative effect of all the terms of that contract’ must be taken into account (paragraph 47). This does not mean, however, that there is an obligation for the national court to ex officio assess the unfairness of all individual clauses in the contract – it is rather a duty to contextualize the assessment of unfairness. The CJEU also calls for a non-formalistic consumer protection, that is, an interpretation of the claim that is based on the comprehension of its content and of the laws it invokes (paragraph 33).

Therefore, the CJEU concluded that Article 6(1) of the Unfair Terms Directive does not require national courts to examine every individual contractual term ex officio. Instead, the Unfair Terms Directive must be interpreted as imposing an obligation to examine only the contractual terms which are connected to the subject matter of the dispute, as long as the national courts have the legal and factual elements required for that assessment (which can be supplemented by measures of inquiry). The CJEU also determined that, while Articles 4(1), 6(1) and 7(1) impose a duty to take all contractual terms into account, there is no duty for the national court to individually assess the unfairness of each term.

In this specific case, the CJEU determined that the terms that the consumer did not challenge but whose unfairness assessment is required of the referring court are not connected to the subject matter of the dispute in the main proceedings. Therefore, the national court does not have a duty to ex officio assess the unfairness of those terms (paragraph 39).

Ex officio unfairness assessment limited to contractual clauses connected to the dispute – Opinion of AG Tanchev in Case C‑511/17 Unicredit Bank Hungary

On the 19^th of December 2019, AG Tanchev delivered an Opinion on Case C-511/17 (found here), which deals with the scope of the obligation to assess the unfairness of contractual terms ex officio, under Directive 93/13/EEC (Unfair Terms Directive). As AG Tanchev starts by noting, this case is related to other cases on the Hungarian framework on consumer credit agreements denominated in a foreign currency (for example, Sziber C‑483/16, OTP Bank and OTP Faktoring C‑51/17 and Dunai C‑118/17).

The ex officio obligation in question is well established in the CJEU’s case law. This obligation is aimed at ensuring an effective protection of the consumer under the Unfair Terms Directive and it intends to restore the balance between the consumer and the professional party (see, for example, OTP Bank and OTP Faktoring C‑51/17 and Pannon GSM C‑243/08). As the AG acknowledges, the interpretative framework of the obligation to assess unfairness of contractual terms ex officio affects the civil procedure principle that the subject matter of an action is delimited by the parties and the court can go no further than that subject matter (ne ultra petita). In fact, the existence of this obligation means that under national procedural law the court must go beyond the object of the dispute as originally defined by the parties (para 44).

The main question raised in this case was, as summarized by the AG, whether a national court is required under Articles 6(1) and 7(1) of Directive 93/13 to examine ex officio the unfairness of all of the terms of the contract even if they are not necessary to decide on the parties’ claims in the dispute. In other words, the question underlying this case is whether that obligation should be unlimited and, if not, what the limits of that obligation are. Must all contractual terms be examined for unfairness based on the courts’ own motion?

To clarify, there are three different dimensions to this issue. First, whether national courts must only assess the unfairness of the terms invoked by the consumer or also the unfairness of other terms that the consumer did not invoke (ex officio). Second, whether the courts must take the whole contract into account when assessing the unfairness of the terms invoked. Third, whether there is an ex officio obligation regarding investigative measures, if the court does not have all the necessary elements to assess the unfairness of a term.

All the parties’ observations – as well as the AG’s – agreed that an unlimited obligation to assess the unfairness of contractual terms ex officio would largely (and unnecessarily) hinder fundamental principles of national procedural law. Illustratively, UniCredit Bank Hungary defended a triple criterion to limit the ex officio obligation: a national court must examine unfair terms ex officio only if i) the court has ‘the necessary legal and factual elements’ for that examination, ii) if the term concerned is relevant to the decision to be given and iii) if the term has a material and logical relationship with the case. In its statement, Hungary followed the same lines of reasoning, arguing that the court must examine ex officio ‘terms whose unfairness can be clearly established, as a matter of fact, on the basis of the available evidence’.

Following the same logic, the AG concludes that Articles 6(1) and 7(1) of the Unfair Terms Directive require national courts to assess ex officio the unfairness of contractual terms which are related to the object of the dispute and have a link with the legal or factual elements in the case file. This opinion suggests, therefore, a double criterion to limit the ex officio obligation to assess unfair terms: a relation between the clause and the object of the dispute and a link with existing legal or factual elements in the case. In other words, the courts’ obligation to assess ex officio the unfairness of contract terms does not extend to all contract terms, but only those with a link to the case in question. Consequently, AG Tanchev’s opinion is that national courts do not have to examine ex officio all the other contractual terms for unfairness, but merely to take all the other terms into account when examining the unfairness of a specific term, according to Article 4(1) of the Unfair Terms Directive.

This interpretation also means that it is not enough that the contractual term is relevant to the object of the dispute, but it is also necessary that the court possesses some legal and factual elements to determine the unfairness of the term. AG Tanchev also states that Articles 6(1) and 7(1) of Directive 93/13 allow national courts to ‘take ex officio investigative measures to complete the case file’ (e.g. asking for clarification or documentary evidence from the parties) in order to obtain the necessary legal and factual elements to carry out an ex officio examination of unfairness (para 55). The AG’s opinion follows the CJEU decision in VB Pénzügyi Lízing (C‑137/08). According to the AG, it appears that if the national courts do not have the necessary legal or factual elements, they are not obliged to assess the unfairness of the term, although they are able (but not obliged) to request those elements from the parties.

While this interpretation seems reasonable and it strikes a balance between fundamental principles of civil procedure law and EU consumer protection, this last argument regarding ex officio investigative measures is slightly more confusing than the previous ones. In fact, as the AG acknowledges, the CJEU has previously highlighted the need for ‘sufficient evidence’ in order to assess the unfairness of the contractual terms (para 62). The AG addresses this aspect by stating that ‘this may be viewed as lending support for the position that the national court has at its disposal sufficient legal and factual elements for the ex officio examination if necessary by being able to take ex officio investigative measures to that effect’. More clarification on this aspect in the final CJEU decision would be desirable.

CJEU judgment in Salvoni: no extra consumer protection in cross-border enforcement

In May we reported on this blog on AG Bobek's Opinion in C-347/18 Salvoni v Fiermonte. The referring Italian court that was requested to issue a Certificate for the cross-border enforcement of an order for payment against a consumer in Germany under the Brussels I Regulation (Recast). The order appeared to be in breach of the Regulation's jurisdiction rules; the consumer was domiciled in Germany, not in Italy. Should the court review and rectify the order, or inform the consumer of the possibility to challenge its enforcement? In this respect, the court referred to the CJEU's case law on Article 47 EUCFR and the Unfair Contract Terms Directive. According to AG Bobek, however, such an "extra layer of protection for consumers" could not be read into the provisions of the Regulation.

The CJEU confirms this in its judgment of 4 September. First, it found that the Certificate-procedure under the Brussels I Regulation can be qualified as judicial in the sense of Article 267 TFEU. Therefore, the preliminary reference was admissible. Secondly, it held that the court that issues the Certificate does not have to (re-)examine (ex officio) the jurisdiction of the court that has given the underlying judgment, even if it involves a consumer. The CJEU made a distinction between jurisdiction (see e.g. Article 17(1) of the Regulation for specific rules on consumer contracts) and recognition and enforcement. In the latter phase, it is the party against whom enforcement is sought who must oppose it. Because jurisdiction is one of the opposition grounds, there is no violation of Article 47 EUCFR. The CJEU's case law on the Unfair Contract Terms Directive does not apply in the context of the Brussels I regulation, which contains rules of a procedural nature. 

As we pointed out earlier, this outcome is understandable in light of the Regulation's framework, which aims to enhance the free movement and rapid enforcement of judgments within the EU, in the light of mutual trust based on legal certainty. From a consumer protection perspective, it possibly leads to a gap in the effective judicial protection of consumers. Not only is a court that has failed to apply mandatory jurisdiction rules (ex officio) in violation of the Regulation not allowed to rectify this; it is not allowed to subsequently inform the consumer of her defence possibilities either.  

Crossing Paths: AG Bobek on jurisdiction in consumer cases under Regulation 1215/2012 and Directive 93/13

Yesterday, Advocate-General Bobek published his Opinion in a case where the Brussels I Regulation (Recast) and the Unfair Contract Terms Directive cross paths (C-347/18 Salvoni v Fiermonte). The case concerns the question what happens if a national court fails to check - ex officio - whether the rules on jurisdiction over consumer contracts have been observed in a cross-border dispute and the court issues an order for payment, even if there are indications that the consumer involved lives abroad? Once the order becomes final, can judicial review still take place in the country of origin before the order is enforced in another Member State?

When the defendant is a consumer, only the courts in the Member State where the consumer is domiciled have jurisdiction under the Brussels I Regulation (Article 18). In the case at hand, the consumer involved - Ms Fiermonte - appeared to live in Hamburg, Germany, which would mean that the Italian court where the order-for-payment procedure was brought did not have jurisdiction. In so far as Ms Fiermonte did not enter an appearance, the court should have declared of its own motion that it had no jurisdiction (Article 28). And if she did appear in court, she should have been informed of her right to contest jurisdiction (Article 26(2) of the Regulation).

Source: e-justice.europa.eu

The court in Milan nevertheless issued an order for payment against Ms Fiermonte, who did not oppose it. The court was subsequently requested to issue a so-called 'Article 53 Certificate'. Under the Regulation such a Certificate is necessary for cross-border enforcement (i.e. in Germany) to demonstrate that the order is enforceable in the country of origin (i.e. in Italy). The court then concluded that it should have verified its jurisdiction.
It found - ex officio - that the order in question was based on a legal relationship between a consumer and a professional. Thus, the order was issued in breach of the jurisdiction rules in the Regulation. The court asked the CJEU whether it should rectify this in the course of the Certificate-procedure. In this respect, it referred to the CJEU's case law on effective consumer protection under the UCTD and pointed out that the automatic issue of the Certificate might deprive Ms Fiermonte of an effective remedy as guaranteed by Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.

Before we discuss AG Bobek's Opinion, let us briefly recall that in the context of the UCTD, the CJEU has repeatedly held - e.g. in Océano, Pénzügyi Lízing, and most recently Aqua Med - that costs or distance may deter consumers from taking legal action or exercising their rights of the defence. This would be the case where proceedings are brought before a court which is very far away from the consumer's place of residence (see Aqua Med, para 54). If this is already the case in domestic disputes, it applies all the more strongly in cross-border disputes. Moreover, the CJEU has held that rules conferring final and binding effect (res judicata force) on a decision must still meet the requirements of equivalence and effectiveness; see e.g. Finanmadrid. For instance, short time-periods to oppose an order for payment or to challenge its enforcement are problematic, also from the perspective of Article 47 Charter; see e.g. Profi Credit Polska.

Against this background, the referring court's question whether it should review the order and/or inform the consumer of the possibility to challenge its enforcement in Germany is not so strange. In addition, it was unclear whether the documents were properly served and thus, whether Ms Fiermonte had had an actual opportunity to oppose the order for payment. In a domestic situation, it would therefore be questionable whether the requirements of effectiveness and Article 47 Charter are complied with. The court responsible for the enforcement may operate as a last resort.

However, AG Bobek makes a strict separation between the CJEU's case law on the UCTD and the system of the Regulation. In his view, judicial review (ex officio) in the course of the Certificate-procedure is neither permitted nor required by EU law. It would run against the logic and spirit of the Regulation, which is aimed at the rapid and efficient enforcement of judgements abroad. The court must issue the Certificate automatically when the formal conditions are satisfied. It cannot re-evaluate the underlying judgment on points of substance and jurisdiction. This would compromise the Regulation's effectiveness.

Whereas AG Bobek's view is understandable in light of the Regulation's framework, his explanation of the distinction between the Regulation and the UCTD seems a bit artificial. On the one hand, he states that the Regulation lays down rules of a procedural nature, which are not as result-oriented and far-reaching as the (substantive) provisions of the UCTD. Yet, the rationale of the CJEU's case law on the UCTD is that consumers must be enabled to exercise their rights and that, because of their weaker (procedural) position in terms of knowledge and financial means, courts fulfil a compensatory role.
On the other hand, Bobek submits that the Regulation recognises that consumers are worthy of specific protection as defendants and that it contains additional procedural guarantees for that reason. Doesn't this mean that courts should play a role in enabling consumers to exercise their rights under the Regulation as well? It might be true that Ms Fiermonte can make an application for refusal of enforcement of the order in Germany on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction or the absence of due service of documents, but this depends on her initiative (Articles 45 and 46 of the Regulation). To what extent will it be taken into account that Ms Fiermonte is a consumer who might not be aware of her rights or not be able to pay lawyer's fees? (Ironically, the case was about unpaid lawyer's fees.) Shouldn't she at least be informed of her defence possibilities?
Bobek observes that it would be strange for the court to issue a Certificate for enforcement of the order while simultaneously pointing out its allegedly erroneous nature. This would be contrary to the principle of legal certainty. It would also undermine the principle of fair trial if the court would take on the role of the defendant's legal counsel.

Still, one cannot help but wonder why "an extra layer of protection for consumers" as proposed by the referring court could not "be ‘read into’ the provisions of Regulation No 1215/2012". That would be a true crossing of paths.

Confusing Grand Chamber judgment on 'accelerated repayment clauses' in mortgage loan contracts (C-70/17 and C-179/17)

Yesterday the Grand Chamber of the EU Court of Justice gave judgment in two Spanish cases on so-called 'accelerated repayment clauses' (vencimiento anticipado): Joined Cases C-70/17 and C-179/17, Abanca v García Salamanca Santos and Bankia v Lau Mendoza. We have discussed Advocate-General Szpunar's extensive Opinion in these cases in an earlier blog post.

Summary of the preliminary references

In short, both cases pertain to the consequences of a finding of unfairness of a clause allowing for the early termination of a mortgage loan contract - also referred to as an 'acceleration clause' or 'early maturity clause'. Spanish procedural law provides that on the basis of such a clause, the bank can call in the entire loan and initiate enforcement proceedings against the debtor. After Aziz, the minimum time period for access to mortgage enforcement proceedings was changed to 3 months instead of 1 month. Early termination is still allowed, if agreed by the parties. Thus, it is not a default provision.

The question the Spanish Supreme Court put before the CJEU in Abanca was whether the national court could consider only the 1-month period as unfair, so the rest of the 'early maturity clause' would remain valid. In that event, the bank could still claim the full amount in the enforcement proceedings, as long as it respected the statutory 3-month period.

In Bankia, a Court in First Instance in Barcelona questioned the case-law of the Supreme Court that allowed continuation of the enforcement proceedings, because this was arguably more favourable to consumers. According to the Barcelona Court, the enforcement proceedings should be terminated after the clause was found to be unfair. The bank could only claim termination of the contract in ordinary court proceedings, which would possibly result in a favourable outcome for consumers.

Thus, the preliminary reference in Bankia challenged the Supreme Court's approach. The Spanish Government even contested the admissibility, on the ground that the Supreme Court had already made a preliminary reference on this issue.

Summary of AG Szpunar's Opinion

AG Szpunar's clear and elaborate analysis of the issue led to his conclusion that it is not possible for the national court to "replace" the 1-month period in the 'early maturity clause' with the statutory 3-month period. Once the clause is found to be unfair, it must be struck out in its entirety. This would mean there is no longer a basis for enforcement of the full amount and therefore, the bank no longer has access to mortgage enforcement proceedings. However, the decision should ultimately be left to the consumer, who can then decide if she wants to avail herself of the protection offered to her.

As we have noted in our blog post, AG Szpunar rightly observed that when the 'early maturity clause' is struck out, this does not extinguish the creditor's rights. The loan agreement is still valid. The creditor can still claim unpaid instalments due and/or seek termination of the agreement in ordinary court proceedings.

The CJEU's judgment: rejection of the Spanish Supreme Court's approach?

Yesterday's preliminary ruling is a Grand Chamber judgment, yet it is much less clear than the AG's Opinion. On the one hand, the CJEU holds that the mere removal of the 1-month period from 'early maturity clauses' is "tantamount to revising the content of those terms by altering their substance", which undermines the dissuasive effect (para 55).

On the other hand, the CJEU expressly leaves the door open for substitution with the statutory 3-month period, if the consumer would otherwise be exposed to unfavourable consequences (para 61). What makes this part of the judgment confusing, is not only that it is doubtful whether the use of an ordinary procedure rather than the special mortgage enforcement procedure does entail "a deterioration of the procedural position of the consumer" (para 62).

[NB: In this respect, it is confusing that the CJEU refers to "the ordinary enforcement procedure", where a declaratory action is meant (cf. para 35).]

Source: bufeterosales.es

Also and more strikingly, the judgment seems to be based on the erroneous presumption that removal of the 'early maturity clause' could potentially mean that the continued existence of the mortgage loan contract is no longer possible (para 60). It seems obvious that the invalidity of the clause at stake does not require the national court to annul the contract in its entirety. Whilst the CJEU reinforces its case law on the modification, revision or replacement of unfair contract terms, in particular Kásler (paras 53-60), it is not relevant for the present cases. The exception of Kásler does not apply here, as - again - AG Szpunar already observed.

The only way forward for the national court is to exclude the application of the terms at stake (cf. para 63). The CJEU's judgment suggests that in that event, the supplementary application of the 3-month period is not possible, and the Spanish Supreme Court's approach must be rejected. We hope this will be clarified in another case on this issue that is still pending: C-486/16.
The 'early maturity clause' must be removed in its entirety, unless the consumer objects. The role of the consumer, who must be consulted in the matter, is indeed an important point. The consumer must be heard in case of non-application of unfair terms, as well as - presumably - in case of substitution of unfair terms, although the CJEU does not say this explicitly. As noted in our previous blog post, the consumer can be informed by the court about the advantages and disadvantages of the mortgage enforcement procedure vs. the ordinary procedure. She can then consent to maintaining the 'early maturity clause', although this seems to be an unlikely scenario.

Ex officio control of unfair terms presupposes an effective remedy: CJEU order in PKO Bank Polski

On 28 November 2018, the EU Court of Justice issued an order in PKO Bank Polski (C-632/17), which concerns the same issue as Profi Credit Polska (C-176/17), a case we have reported on earlier. In short, the question raised by the referring Polish court was whether the order-for-payment procedure at issue is incompatible with Article 7(1) of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive (93/13/EEC), because:

(i) the procedural rules restrict the consumer's right to lodge an objection against such an order for payment in such a way that there is a significant risk that she will not exercise that right, and

(ii) in the absence of the consumer, the court does not have the power to examine (a) the unfairness of the terms of the underlying credit agreement and (b) compliance with the requirements deriving from the Consumer Credit Directive (2008/48/EC).

Thus, there were two problems:

• The court's role is, in principle, limited to a review of formalities; it does not have available to it all the elements of fact and law arising from the credit agreement and thus, is not in the position to examine unfair terms. 
• The legal relationship resulting from the credit agreement is reviewed only if the consumer lodges an objection; the objection must meet various procedural requirements in an extremely short period (two weeks); and the consumer-defendant must pay a court fee that is three times greater than the claimant; see also our blog on Profi Credit Polska. 

In Profi Credit Polska, the CJEU already held that the Member States' obligation "to lay down procedural rules that ensure observance of the rights which individuals [i.e. consumers] derive from Directive 93/13", which "implies a requirement that there be a right to an effective remedy", also enshrined in Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The two above-mentioned problems combined prevented the court from carrying out the required assessment under the EU consumer protection legislation at issue. This is reiterated in PKO Bank Polski. The CJEU concludes that the Polish order-for-payment procedure is precluded by Article 7(1) of Directive 93/13 and Article 10 of Directive 2008/48/EC.

We can tentatively draw two conclusions from the CJEU's decisions:

1. While the CJEU (still) does not make a clear distinction between Article 7(1) of Directive 93/13 (which requires "adequate and effective means" against unfair terms) and Article 47 of the Charter, it appears that the first presupposes the latter. If a case is not brought before the court, it cannot perform unfair terms control (either ex officio or at the consumer's request). In case of an "inversion of the dispute", i.e. it is the defendant – here: the consumer-debtor – who must initiate adversarial proceedings by lodging an objection, the court must determine whether the procedural rules infringe the consumer's right to an effective remedy (or rights of the defence, for that matter) as guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter. If the obstacles are too high, there is a significant risk that consumers will not lodge and objection. 
2. The CJEU seems to suggest that the national court must be able to perform ex officio control, whether the consumer involved invokes the existence of unfair terms or not. This is in line with its earlier case law, see e.g. Banesto and Radlinger. But how does the referring Polish court obtain the necessary information? One possible answer is that the creditor must submit the underlying credit agreement in evidence. This calls into question the entire order-for-payment procedure, which is based on only a banking ledger excerpt. Is such an excerpt sufficient? And what should happen in the absence of the consumer? Should she be required to lodge an objection at all? The CJEU does not answer these questions. 

In its case law on other types of debt collection proceedings, the CJEU did not consider an "inversion of the dispute" to be contrary to EU (consumer) law in itself, as long as there were judicial remedies available to consumer. We have brought this up in previous blog posts.

However, PKO Bank Polski shows why a reliance on the consumer's initiative might be problematic, exactly because of the procedural obstacles discussed in light of Article 47 Charter. Removing those obstacles is a first step. Preventing creditors from circumventing judicial control – by allowing them to resort to extrajudicial enforcement procedures or to withhold information from the court – would be the next.

Conference and call for papers on New Deal for Consumers

On 11-12 April 2019, the conference A New Deal for Civil Justice? The New Deal for Consumers and the Justiciability of EU Consumer Rights will take place in Amsterdam. It is organised by the Centre for the Study of European Contract Law (CSECL) and revolves around the New Deal for Consumers that was proposed by the European Commission on 11 April 2018. The conference focuses on issues of civil justice that the New Deal aims to address – as well as, crucially, the questions it appears to raise. It will bring together researchers interested in (the future of) European private law, civil procedure, consumer law and, possibly, others with an interest in the enforcement of EU law and EU constitutional law.

For more information and the call for papers, click here. 

CSECL particularly welcomes papers that expressly address the interaction and tension between different functions of (consumer law) adjudication and enforcement mechanisms, as well as the converging or diverging (public and private) interests involved at the different relevant levels. Who or what is the New Deal for?

CJEU on equivalence as to consumer associations' intervention in individual proceedings (C-448/17)

One of the latest instalments in unfair terms adjudication was delivered yesterday by the Court of Justice in case C-448/17 (EOS KSI Slovensko), concerning a Slovak consumer who had concluded a consumer credit contract. 

In this case, the most prominent substantive problem with the contract itself was that it did not mention the APR. Only a mathematical formula was provided, with no further information that would allow the consumer to calculate the applicable rate. 

The creditor - a debt recovery company - sought an order for payment, which was granted though a procedure taking place on the basis of documental evidence, without a hearing. Under Slovakian law, this procedure involved not a judge but a civil clerk. Once the order was granted, without any assessment being carried out under unfair terms rules, nor consideration being given to the lack of APR, the consumer had 15 days to file their opposition. This, in turn, required an indication of substantive reasons for opposing enforcement. 

Intervention by an interested consumer association was rejected in follow-up proceedings on the basis of the fact that previous action by the consumer was required before other interested parties could intervene - in other words, the association could intervene in a case that was already pending thanks to the consumer's action, but not initiate a new case. 

A Slovak court took stakes with a number of issues in the scenario above: 

First, it asked whether it was open to Slovak law to restrict the possibility for interventions by consumer associations in the way it did, in particular in light of the fact that for claims regulated entirely by "Slovak" (vis à vis "European") law the criteria for considering a case to be pending are looser than in cases where EU consumer law plays a role. 

The Court of Justice answered this question by, on the one hand, re-affirming that article 7 of the UCTD does not require member states to allow consumer associations to intervene in individual proceedings (para 41 - no problems, thus, on the effectiveness front); on the other hand, the Court recalls, in these cases the member states are anyhow bound by the principles of effectiveness and equivalence. In particular, the latter principle precludes a national legislation which sets different pendency requirements for purely "national" cases and cases connected to EU (consumer) law. Thus, should the national court indeed find the existence of one such difference here, the stricter pendency rule would be incompatible with EU law (para 40). 

Second, the referring court asked the CJEU to test the procedure for granting the order for payment and, subsequently, the enforcement, for compatibility with the Directive. The CJEU recalls its previous case-law to the effect that the absence of unfairness assessment in the order for payment procedure is not per se problematic as long as the consumer is protected by the possibility of (ex officio) unfair terms control at the stage of enforcement.  However, insofar as Slovak law requires the debtor to file a motivated objection within 15 days, there is a concrete risk that no assessment will take place since the requirements make it rather difficult for the consumer to take action (para 53). This situation is not in line with the Directive. 

Third, concerning the specific contract at stake, the court asked whether the provisions in the credit contract could be considered as transparent in spite of the lack of mention of the APR and interest rate. Mentioning of the APR is required on the basis of the 1987 consumer credit directive - but what impact does a violation of that requirement have on  the unfairness assessment? According to the CJEU, the consequence of this omission is that the consumer cannot be considered as liable for having actually accepted the terms of the contract (para 67), with the consequence that, to the ends of unfair terms control, the missing APR can be considered as a decisive factor in assessing whether the interest terms are drafted in plain intelligible language. This finding, of course, will then open the way to a possible finding of unfairness. 

Second-guess or second instance: Opinion of AG Szpunar in five cases on the EU Court of Justice and differences of interpretation between lower, higher and highest national (civil) courts

"La protection du consommateur est ainsi devenue un des chapitres essentiels du droit de l’Union qui, avec une double dimension – tant économique que sociale –, touche à la vie quotidienne des consommateurs de l’Union." 

~ Advocate General Szpunar, Opinion in Cases C-70/17 and C-179/17 (point 53)

Introduction

Consumer protection has become "an essential chapter of EU law", as Advocate General Szpunar rightly observes in one of his Opinions that were published this week. It is a focal point in the interplay between different actors at different levels in EU law. In 3 Opinions, AG Szpunar discusses 5 separate cases that touch on the relation between the national (civil) courts of the EU Member States and the EU Court of Justice in respect of the interpretation and application of national (procedural) law in the light of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive. It appears that the CJEU provides an avenue for lower courts to 'second-guess' the approach of courts that are higher in hierarchy, to the extent that they challenge the instructions of their own appellate court or the case law of the Supreme Court. Through preliminary references, the CJEU may be called upon to settle differences between courts of different instances. This raises questions as to the division of competences between the EU and the Member States, as well as the link between the substantive and procedural protection of EU citizens in their role as consumers. In the absence of harmonised procedural rules, who is the ultimate interpretor of national provisions governing civil proceedings (involving consumers)? Is there any room for a balancing of interests, other than the 'overriding objective' of the protection of consumers against unfair terms? And who decides what's in the consumers' best interest? 

Five cases, three Opinions

The 3 Opinions this blog post is concerned with pertain to the following 5 cases:

• C-70/17 (Abanca v. García Salamanca Santos) and C-179/17 (Bankia v. Lau Mendoza), hereinafter referred to as the Abanca-case; click here
• C-486/16 (Bankia v. Sánchez Martínez); click here
• C-92/16 (Bankia v. Rengifo Jiménez) and C-167/16 (BBVA v. Quintano Ujeta); click here

Especially the Opinion in the Abanca-case is worth reading. AG Szpunar analyzes the background of consumer protection against unfair terms elaborately, and summarises the development of the CJEU's case law in this area. He also tries to distinguish the legal issues from socio-economical considerations, and to clarify the role of national (civil) courts from an EU law perspective. In this blog post, we will focus on two aspects:

1. the power of national courts to substitute a national legislative provision for an unfair term, or rather: the lack of such a power (cf. Joined Cases C-96/16 and C-94/17, discussed here), and
2. the possibility of lower courts to 'circumvent' guidance given by a higher court by making a preliminary reference to the CJEU.

Both aspects illustrate the tension between the requirements flowing from EU (consumer) law and a more traditional view on private law and civil procedure as a matter of national law. On the one hand, AG Szpunar's answers to the questions posed by the referring courts could be seen as a logical continuation of the CJEU's case law. On the other hand, those answers could be seen as limiting the room for discretion of national (civil) courts even further. However, AG Szpunar carefully considers the different interests involved, and explains that while he understands the concerns, his proposed solution is in line with previous judgments.

First, we will examine the type of contractual terms at issue in these cases. It is not so much about the assessment of the (un)fairness of those terms as such, as it is about the consequences of a finding of unfairness. Secondly, we will take a closer look at the procedural implications. At the end of this blog post, we will get back to the position of lower courts vis-à-vis higher courts.

Accelerated repayment and mortgage enforcement: differences of interpretation between Spanish courts

The 5 above-mentioned cases are all requests for preliminary rulings from Spanish civil courts: in the Abanca-case, the Spanish Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo) itself, in the other cases courts in first instance (Juzgados de Primera Instancia). All 5 cases relate to so-called 'early maturity' or acceleration clauses in mortgage loan agreements, i.e. terms containing an advanced expiration date (vencimiento anticipado): when the debtor fails to meet his payment obligations, the creditor can claim repayment of the totality of the loan after the expiration of a stipulated time period and initiate mortgage enforcement proceedings. The CJEU's judgment in Aziz gave rise to a debate in Spain as to, among other things, when the debtor's non-compliance was "sufficiently serious" - in the light of the duration and amount of the loan - to justify the creditor's exercise of the right to invoke accelerated repayment (cf. Banco Primus). Since 2013, Article 693.2 of the Spanish Code of Civil Procedure (Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil; hereinafter LEC) sets the minimum time period that the parties may agree on at 3 months. However, many contracts predating that provision allowed the creditor to invoke the clause after only 1 month. In this respect, it is relevant to know that in Spain, the creditor needs leave from the court to enforce his security rights. Therefore, the question arose how the court should deal with unfair acceleration clauses. Should the mortgage enforcement proceedings - which were based on the clause - be terminated even when the creditor has waited 3 months or longer?

The Tribunal Supremo. (source: informativojuridico.com)

According to the Tribunal Supremo, the answer to this question was negative. As long as the right to invoke accelerated repayment was exercised fairly, the creditor would still have access to mortgage enforcement. The unfair clause would effectively be replaced by Article 693.2 LEC. One of the reasons given by the Tribunal Supremo was that the mortgage enforcement procedure is also more beneficial for consumers. The parties would not have to resort to ordinary proceedings. Thus, consumers would avoid the risk of having to pay high legal costs and default interest.

Some lower courts disagreed with this interpretation, and openly questioned it before the CJEU. They found that an unfair acceleration clause could not be replaced by reference to Article 693.2 LEC. Where the clause was the basis of the mortgage enforcement, the proceedings should be declared inadmissible or suspended; whether the clause had been invoked after 1, 3 or 38 months did not matter. Moreover, the creditor’s chances of success in ordinary proceedings were regarded to be low; this cast doubt on the Tribunal Supremo’s reasoning as to which procedure was actually more beneficial for consumers. Lastly, the referring court in Case C-92/16 wondered whether giving consumer-debtors procedural advantages in one procedure, as opposed to another, was compatible with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights if it was up to the creditor, not the consumer, to choose between procedural mechanisms and thus, to decide whether or not the consumer could enjoy those advantages.

AG Szpunar: no ‘reparatory revision’ of unfair terms

AG Szpunar disagrees with the Tribunal Supremo's interpretation as well, and refers to Banesto and in this regard. The Unfair Contract Terms Directive imposes a result obligation on the Member States and their national courts to ensure that unfair terms are not binding on consumers. As we have seen in e.g. Gutiérrez Naranjo, this obligation is far-reaching. The Directive does not have 'direct horizontal effect', i.e. it cannot be relied on directly by private parties in 'horizontal' disputes. Yet, "not binding" really means "not binding", and the deterrent or dissuasive effect of the Directive requires that an unfair term cannot be revised or replaced by the court (only in exceptional circumstances, see e.g. Kásler). The acceleration clause must be struck out from the loan agreement, regardless of when it has been invoked by the creditor. The loan agreement will continue to exist without the clause. 'Reparatory revision' is not possible; the clause cannot be substituted with Article 693.2 LEC. That provision cannot be qualified as 'supplementary law', although this is ultimately for the national court to decide. 

A reference to the so-called 'blue pencil test' of the German Bundesgerichtshof does not help either, because the acceleration clause cannot be split up: it would lose its meaning if the unfair parts were to be crossed out. Without the stipulation of a specific time-period, the clause would practically be deprived of its purpose. 

Procedural implications

If AG Szpunar's conclusion is followed, creditors would be sanctioned for including unfair acceleration clauses in their standard terms and conditions by denying them access to the mortgage enforcement procedure. Once the acceleration clause is struck out, there is no longer a basis for enforcement of the entire loan. This would allegedly negate the creditor's security rights, which are crucial for the financial market. Another argument used by the Tribunal Supremo was that this would have economic repercussions. It should nevertheless be noted that the existence of an acceleration clause in the mortgage loan agreement is not a necessary precondition for enforcement (cf. Articles 578 and 693.1 LEC). Without the acceleration clause, the creditor would not be able to claim repayment of the entire loan at once, but he could still claim unpaid instalments due.

Advocate General Szpunar.
(source: curia.europa.eu)

This raises the question whether it is justified that, as soon as the creditor relies on an unfair acceleration clause, he should be denied access to mortgage enforcement. AG Szpunar acknowledges that this constitutes a limitation of the creditor's rights, but not an extinction, if only because the loan agreement remains valid for the rest. From the Directive's point of view, the legal issue is whether the acceleration clause is unfair and should therefore be declared null and void, rather than whether the creditor would have provided the loan without the clause. According to AG Szpunar, it is not relevant whether the mortgage enforcement procedure is more beneficial to consumers. Yet, he illustrates with clear examples that is doubtful if this is indeed the case. The decision should ultimately be left to the consumer herself, who can be informed by the court about (procedural) advantages and disadvantages and then decide if she wants to avail herself of the protection offered to her; see e.g. Banif Plus Bank.

In Cases C-92-/16 and C-167/16, AG Szpunar observes that there is not enough information available to conclude that the Spanish mortgage enforcement procedure in general is incompatible with the Charter or the principle of effectiveness. If it is true that this procedure awards certain procedural advantages, it may be contrary to the principle of effectiveness. The specific characteristics of court proceedings, which are governed by national (procedural) law, cannot constitute a factor that is liable to affect the legal protection of consumers under the Directive.

Lower courts as EU-judges

In Case C-486/16, the creditor - Bankia - had initiated mortgage enforcement proceedings on the basis of an acceleration clause. The court found the clause to be unfair, and refused to grant leave for the enforcement. Pursuant to Article 552.3 LEC, the creditor then has recourse to ordinary proceedings. Instead, Bankia waited more than two years to try again, arguing that this time the non-compliance was sufficiently serious. We understand this second attempt was based on Article 693.2 LEC (not 693.1).
The court in first instance held that the decision in the earlier proceedings had the status of (formal) res judicata; it was final in the sense that it could no longer be appealed. This entailed that Bankia should be denied a second opportunity. The Court of Appeal, however, allowed the enforcement. The case was referred to the court in first instance, which subsequently made a preliminary reference to the CJEU. In line with his Opinion in the Abanca-case, AG Szpunar considers the Court of Appeal's approach to be contrary to EU (consumer) law. He points out that EU law gives lower courts the possibility to make a request for a preliminary ruling (Article 267 TFEU); they are EU-judges as well. National legislation or case law cannot stand in the way of this possibility.

From the perspective of (national) civil procedure, it is quite revolutionary for lower courts to go against the instructions of their own appellate court in the same case. These instructions are, in principle, binding upon the parties and the lower court. It may be seen as problematic if lower courts start to second-guess their appellate courts and/or come to view the CJEU as a second instance, insofar as this undermines legal certainty. Of course, this is not to say that lower courts cannot or should not make preliminary references. It is just to show that the objectives of EU law and national law are not always aligned.

Lower courts and the highest (civil) court of a Member State are both entitled to ask questions to the CJEU. That the Tribunal Supremo was first in the Abanca-case, could not stop the Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Barcelona from making a preliminary reference as well. For the Tribunal Supremo this is a sensitive issue, as it appears to be a direct confrontation by the court in Barcelona. In addition, AG Szpunar's Opinion suggests that the Tribunal Supremo has overstepped its power to give guidance to lower courts as to how to apply national (procedural) law in unfair terms cases. The summary of the Opinion in this blog post does not do justice to its thoroughness, which demonstrates that AG Szpunar is aware of the context in which the CJEU must answer the questions put before it.