Lexitor saga takes (perhaps not so) unexpected twist: CJEU in UniCredit Bank Austria v VKI (C-555/21)

 Dear readers, 

while some of you may think this blogger spends too much time online (true), lately social media have been a great source of information concerning new case-law - take Thursday's CJEU decision in case C-555/21 on non-interest costs in the case of early repayment of mortgage credit as an example. Within an hour of the Court issuing a press release, I could see the judgment *everywhere*. People in my bubble were, in general, not happy (see eg fellow consumer lawyer Catalin Stanescu; however, I should say: people were not happy, except some fellow Italians, see * below). What happened? 

In 2019, the CJEU decided Lexitor, a case in which it was requested to decide whether article 16 in the 2008 Consumer Credit Directive, regulating the unwinding of consumer debt in case of early repayment, required also non-interest costs to be returned pro rata tempore. In that case (see our post here), the CJEU ruled that indeed this would be the case: a different interpretation, in particular, would have made it too tempting for credit providers, who are to a large extent unilaterally able to set up the remuneration structure for consumer credit, to set up a business model largely based on low interest and high fixed costs.

This case sent airwaves throughout Europe, even if more visibly so in some systems: in Italy, for instance, it led to a recent decision by the Constitutional Court that may or may not need to be reconsidered after today. Why?

An important question outstanding after Lexitor was whether the established interpretation should be limited to the Consumer Credit Directive or could also be extended to the 2014 Mortgage Credit Directive - this in particular given that the two directives contain textually similar provisions and hence a consistent cross-directive interpretation may be good for legal certainty. Today's decision seems to suggest that it can be extended, as a matter of national law - but such extension is anyway not required by EU law. In particular, the preliminary reference asked whether the Austrian provisions preventing the recovery of non-interest costs unconnected to the duration of the credit contract was compatible with article 25 of the 2014 Directive. The CJEU concluded that it is. 

In the case of mortgage contract, the referring court [see para 18] had already observed, much of the fees that do not depend on the duration of the credit are actually outside of the credit provider's control: think for instance of notary costs, obtaining an assessment of the value of the house and so on. In such context, the CJEU found, the risk of perverse incentives found in Lexitor does not seem so serious to justify the consequences that a strict interpretation of the right to pro rata restitution would entail [see para 32].  

While somewhat irrationally finding solace in the idea that the standardised information to be provided pursuant to the Mortgage Credit Directive would prevent abuse on the side of credit providers by empowering consumer choices [para 33-34; reader, take it from someone who has recently concluded a mortgage contract - it doesn't], the Court also makes space for appreciation of the circumstances of the case and arguably national variations. This emerges from paras 37-38, according to which it is for national courts, seized with a dispute, to ensure that the Directive's protective aims are not circumvented and that costs that are in fact remuneration for the availability of cash over time are not accounted for under different headers to avoid restitution. This is an interesting and imposing task for national courts (with possible further implications such as: what would be the contractual consequences of a misclassification? would it in any event entail an unfair commercial practice? would the courts have to perform this check ex officio if for any reason they are confronted with the case?).

In Italy, the Judgement has drawn particularly much attention - Lexitor had previously led to a consequential decision of the Italian constitutional court and had drawn quite the criticism in Law & Econ circles (see eg here), which means this weeks decision has been quickly celebrated by parts of Italian academia.  

Consumers' income and mortgage loans: the CJEU in C-778/18

Last week the CJEU delivered its judgment in C-778/18 Association francaise des usagers de banque v Ministre de l'Economie et des Finances, interpreting Directive 2007/64 on Payment Services as repealed by Directive 2015/22366, Directive 2014/17 on Mortgage Credit and Directive 2014/19 on Payment Accounts.

This judgment answers a very interesting question on a practice that may be common in some Member States: is it compliant with EU law to require the transfer of consumers' income to the mortgage provider as a condition for approving their mortgage loan applications? 

The facts

This claim was initiated by a consumer association representing banking clients. It sought annulment of the relevant French law implementing the above directives on grounds of misuse of power. The organization explained that the law disregards the objective of customer mobility pursued by the directives because it authorizes credit institutions to require consumers to deposit their salaries or other income with them and fixes the maximum period of 10 years for which consumers can ripe advantage of such deposited money irrespective of the amount, maturity and duration of the loan they were applying for.

The scope of Art. 12(2)(a) Directive 2014/17/EU

The CJEU was in effect faced with interpretation of the scope of Art. 12(2)(a) Directive 2014/17/EU. This provision provides an exception from the general rule of the Directive in Art. 12 that prohibits tying practices. The exemption in Art. 12(2)(a) provides creditors with an option to request from consumers or their family members to 'open or maintain a payment or a savings account, where the only purpose of such an account is to accumulate capital to repay the credit, to service the credit, to pool resources to obtain the credit, or to provide additional security for the creditor in the event of default'. Given this exemption, the CJEU noted that the obligation to deposit income is in principle consistent with the Directive (para. 54). However, the CJEU goes on to clarify that the exemption must comply with the requirements of proportionality, that is, it should provide account of the characteristics of the loan concerned, its amount, maturity and duration (para 56). Any different interpretation would jeopardize the achievement of the objectives of the Directive to provide a high level of protection for consumers, and to secure consumer mobility between banks, especially in circumstances when consumers wish to conclude a number of loans with different lenders. Tying them to a single bank would stand on the way of having an opportunity to shop around and  make informed decisions for better deals. The CJEU therefore concluded that Art. 12(2)(a) must be interpreted to preclude national legislation that allows lenders to grant loans conditional on the deposit of all borrowers income on the payment account opened with the creditor (para 58).  In regard to the duration of this obligation to have the account opened with the mortgage lender, the CJEU highlighted that the Directive does not provide  any limitations as to the duration of the loan, and in principle therefore, this requirement is not inconsistent with the Directive, as long as the purpose of the deposit/account complies with the requirements set out in Art. 12(2)(a) (para. 61).

The meaning of ‘charges’ or ‘fees’ in Directive 2007/64, Directive 2015/2366 and Directive 2014/92 

The second question raised in this case related to the meaning of 'charges' and 'fees' within Directive 2007/64, Directive 2015/2366 and Directive 2014/92. To promote consumer mobility and account switching, these rules provide consumers with a freedom to terminate framework contracts such as a current account contract without being liable to pay compensation in the form of fees or charges. French law however provides that if borrowers case to satisfy the income deposit requirement, lenders may terminate for remainder of the duration of the mortgage loan any individual advantages that were conferred on consumers, for instance, a better interest rate. The question infront of the CJEU was whether this denial of the benefit can be understood as a fee or charge within the meaning of the above directives. The CJEU ruled that it cannot.

Our evaluation 

This judgment tackles a very interesting legal question. However, in addition to the bank account being extra security for the provided loan, another important aspect of transferring income in the mortgage provider bank is not considered in the judgment. Namely, not only that consumers' incomes provides additional security for banks that loans are going to be or at least they can be repaid, it also provides banks with additional data on customers. This enables banks to pull on a larger amount of data for profiling customers and monitoring their behavior. On the one hand, this may be beneficial for consumers, data could help banks to identify problems in repayment and income stream of the customer and address this with early intervention measures such as payment holidays. On the other hand, this additional information can help banks to provide new products to consumers that are tailored to their behavior and needs, that are arguably more likely to be taken by consumers than any products or services that does not suit them as much. The use of big data in banking is still in its infancy but having a bank account certainly provides extra opportunities for banks to get to know their customer, and represent a potential for extra profit. Perhaps this aspect could have also been taken into account in shaping the concept of fees and charges in the present context.