When Lightning Strikes: CJEU in AirHelp Germany (C-399/24)

On 16 October, the CJEU issued another flight-related judgment in the case of AirHelp Germany (C-399/24), offering further interpretation of the concept of "extraordinary circumstances" under Regulation 261/2004. The central question was as follows: Does a lightning strike to an aircraft, leading to mandatory safety inspections and a delayed return to service, qualify as an extraordinary circumstance exempting the air carrier from compensation obligations? 

The CJEU ruled that it does. While the notion of "extraordinary circumstances" must be interpreted strictly, since it creates exceptions to the high level of air passenger protection (para 18), meteorological conditions are explicitly recognised as such circumstances (para 21). This includes "the risk of the aircraft being struck by lightning" (para 23). 

The Court emphasised that this risk is not inherent to the normal nature of activities of air carriers, even though planes are designed to withstand such events (para 22). Drawing a parallel with bird strikes, the Court classified both as "collision with a foreign body" (para 24). Moreover, the mandatory safety inspections following a lightning strike are considered distinct from routine malfunctions of aircraft components. These inspections are not "intrinsically linked to the operating system" of the plane (para 26). The lightning strike itself is deemed an event outside the actual control of the air carrier (para 31). As a result, the two cumulative conditions required to classify an event as an "extraordinary circumstance" were found to be satisfied.

The judgment leaves it to national courts to assess whether the air carrier took all reasonable measures to avoid long delay for passengers. This includes evaluating whether the airline acted diligently, without being expected to make "intolerable sacrifices in the light of capacities of its undertaking at the relevant time" (para 37).

Pets as baggage in air travel - CJEU in Iberia (C-218/24)

From an outsider's perspective, the recent judgment may appear controversial. "Pets as baggage" is likely to strike non-lawyers as dehumanising - suggesting that animals are treated as mere objects. However, lawyers may appreciate the legal advantages of such classification. Under international travel rules, such as the Montreal Convention, categorising pets as baggage can trigger compensation mechanisms if they are lost, or damaged, during transit. But does this legal framing actually benefit pet owners? 

In the given case, passengers on a flight from Buenos Aires (a city known for its large dog population) to Barcelona were travelling with a dog. Due to its size, the dog could not be accommodated in the cabin and was instead to be placed in the aircraft hold, inside a special pet carrier. The owner checked in the pet carrier, but tragically, "the dog left the pet carrier, ran around in the vicinity of the aircraft and could not be recovered" (para 16).

The Montreal Convention standardises compensation for lost baggage, unless passengers make a "special declaration of interest in delivery at destination" during check-in, and pay any required surcharge. In this case, the dog's owner did not make such a declaration. The legal issue then became whether the owner could claim compensation for non-material damages, or whether the Montreal Convention's baggage rules limited such claims. Spanish law recognises pets as sentient beings, and thus does not equate their loss with that of material things typically found in baggage (para 19).

The CJEU emphasised that the Montreal Convention is designed to define the limits of air carriers' liability for transporting passengers and their baggage (para 23). Since the Convention does not explicitly define "baggage," the term must be interpreted uniformly and autonomously (para 26). 

While the ordinary meaning of "baggage" refers to objects (para 29), the CJEU noted that for the Montreal Convention to apply to pets, they must be classified either as "passengers" or "baggage". Given this binary, the Court found "baggage" to be the more appropriate legal category (paras 33-34). Importantly, the Convention's liability limits for lost baggage cover both material and non-material damages, meaning the pet's owner could not claim further compensation from the air carrier (para 41).

This ruling ultimately favours air carriers by providing greater legal certainty regarding the types of claims passengers can make for lost items - including pets. It also shields carriers from the complexities of differing national laws on non-material damages. The decision reflects the pragmatic logic of international air travel law.